XXIX. I well know, that in the opinion of many people, this political money is current in our times, and that it is frequently said, the words and promises of those who have the supreme management of affairs, should not remain in force for any longer time than they are found not to clash with the interests of the state. I have read of an Italian prince, who, when he was negotiating a peace with a powerful monarch, requested among other conditions, the restitution of a large part of his territories, which had been taken from him during the war, to which request, the ambassador of the monarch answered, what reliance can the king my master place on the fidelity of your highness, in case he gives you all you ask? to which the prince replied:—Assure him, that I will pledge my word to him to fulfil my engagements, not in quality of a sovereign, for in that capacity, whenever favourable opportunities offer, it behoves me to sacrifice every thing to my grandeur, and the interests of my state; but as a gentleman, and a man of honour.
XXX. But after all, this assurance contains in it a large portion of hyperbole; for I firmly believe, the majority of the princes of this day, are scrupulous about breaking the treaties they have entered into; although it be true, that at every turn, you will hear them reciprocally accusing each other of being the infringers of them; but it seldom happens, that either of the parties can so clearly make out the justice of his cause, as not to leave room for a difference of opinion on the subject. Thus they both go upon probabilities, and also upon the strength of probabilities, accuse each other. If either of them happens to be a person of so enlarged a conscience, as knowingly, and without scruple, to trample on all the obligations of equity, justice, and public faith, he endeavours notwithstanding to save appearances, and to seek some specious pretence for his behaviour. This shews, that he is ashamed of what he does, and would gladly hide the odium of his actions for fear of being pointed at, which would not happen, if breaking their words was so common among princes, and so little scrupled by them, as some would persuade us.
XXXI. I know very well, that an anonymous French author, asserted a few years ago, that Don Ferdinand the Catholic, being told that Louis the twelfth of France complained he had twice deceived him, replied, By the Lord! the French man lies, for it was not twice, but ten times that I deceived him. If such a thing ever happened, we may suppose, that our Don Ferdinand prided himself in perfidy. But these are mere gossips tales, and such as prudent people pay no regard to. I suppose, that before this joke or tale, could arrive at the ears of the French man who wrote it, from the mouth of Don Ferdinand, it must necessarily pass through the mouths of a hundred different people; and we may conclude, that out of that hundred, at least ninety of them were more capable of framing it, than Don Ferdinand was of uttering it.
XXXII. But admitting this was true, all that can be inferred from it is, that among a great number of princes of our times, here and there one of them, has without shame or blushing, practised lying and deceit in the affairs of state; whereas among the antients, this was very frequent and common; for all, or nearly all of them, seem to have stamped on their hearts, that sentence of Chorebus: Dolus, an virtus, qius in hoste requirat? or some other like it.
SECT. IX.
XXXIII. But our surprize will cease at their acting in this manner, when we reflect, that that great philosopher and oracle of antiquity, the divine Plato, by his doctrine, taught, that it was lawful for those who had the management of public affairs, to lye, whenever it could be of use to the interests of the state. Igitur rempublicam administrantibus præcipue, si quibus aliis, mentiri licet, vel hostium, vel civium, causa ad communem civitatis utilitatem. Reliquis autem à mendacio abstinendum est. (lib. III. de Repub.) If the princes of antiquity had so able a master, and one of so great authority, what loss could they be at for want of a Machiavel?
XXXIV. It is true, that Plato only allowed lying to be lawful, in cases where it might be conducive to advance the public good; Machiavel advises it, whenever it can be useful to serve the particular interests of a tyrant. Thus Plato was a bad moralist, and Machiavel a bad man. But this difference in the character of the matters, does not prevent tyrants from making the same use of the doctrine of Plato, for the purpose of serving their particular conveniencies, that disinterested princes may do for the good of the public, because a tyrant, always endeavours to make the people believe, that every thing he does to advance his own grandeur, is transacted with a view of promoting their interest; and if at any time he is detected in a lye, he will pretend that he lyed for the public good, and quote the doctrine of Plato to justify his conduct; but in case this doctrine of Plato’s should appear too limited or confined for tyrants, as in truth it is, they may be supplied with a much more copious and enlarged system, in the writings of Plato’s disciple Aristotle.
XXXV. I do not mean to say, that Aristotle was an abettor of perverse policy, or that he wrote with a design of instructing tyrants in the methods by which they might make themselves absolute, and support themselves by tyrannic rule, but only mean to declare, that in the fifth book of his Politics, cap. 11. he did it without intending it, or without being aware that he was doing it. In this chapter, which is a pretty long one, not only those two famous maxims, Oderint dum metuant, Divide ut imperes, are exactly pointed out and applied; but all, or very near all the others, which are published by the Florentine author, in his book intitled Il Principe, are to be found in this chapter of Aristotle’s. I have never seen Machiavel’s book, but only the capital maxims of it, as they are cited by other authors; but hear Hermanus Conringius, who has read both that and Aristotle. He says, Nicholas Machiavel, that trumpeter of political arts, cannot, nor does not, teach his prince any arcana or secrets, for promoting or maintaining tyrannic dominion, which many hundred years before, had not been taught by Aristotle in his fifth book of Politics; and it is not improbable, but that cunning teacher and promoter of wickedness, transcribed from Aristotle, although he concealed the plagiary, all that he published in his own book; but there is a remarkable difference in the application the two masters make of their doctrine, which is, that Machiavel advises all princes without distinction, to pursue and practise what he teaches; whereas Aristotle declared more justly and frankly, his to be fit and necessary for tyrants only. (Conring. Introduct. ad Politic. Aristotelis, cap. III.)
XXXVI. But let the truth prevail. I say the same of both Aristotle and Machiavel, which is, that neither of them were the inventors of systems of perverse policy; for that they copied them, from the actions of the kings of Persia and Egypt; from the Archelaus’s and Philips of Macedon; from the Phalaris’s, the Agathocles’s, the Hierones, and Dionysius’s of Sicily; from the Perianders, from the Pisistratus’s, and other political pests of Greece.