Madison's resolutions elicited very warm, and at times, violent debates. The subject was of a purely commercial nature; but the questions it involved were so interwoven with political considerations, that the debates inevitably assumed a political and partisan aspect. The federalists plainly saw that the recommendations in Jefferson's report, and in the resolutions of Madison, hostility to England and undue favor toward France, neither position being warranted by a wise policy, nor consistent with neutrality. The republicans, on the other hand, regarded the scheme as equitable in itself, and as absolutely necessary for the assertion of the rights of neutral nations, and the protection of American commerce from insult, aggression, and plunder. These debates, which commenced on the thirteenth of January, continued until the third of February, with few intermissions; and the house was so nearly equally divided in sentiment, that the first resolution, authorizing commercial restrictions, was passed by a majority of only five. This was subsequently rejected in the senate by the casting vote of the vice-president, and the further consideration of the whole subject was postponed until March. When it was resumed, the progress of events had given such new complexion to the whole matter, that it was indefinitely postponed.
A new and important subject for legislation was brought up at this time. Very soon after the close of the Revolution, the piratical practices of corsairs belonging to the Barbary powers on the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea, and particularly of Algiers, had suggested the importance of a naval establishment for the protection of the infant commerce of the new-born nation. Many American merchant-ships, trading in the Mediterranean sea, were captured by these corsairs, their cargoes appropriated by the pirates, and their crews sold into slavery. Toward the close of 1790, President Washington called the attention of Congress to the subject, and at the same time Mr. Jefferson, the secretary of state, who had made himself thoroughly acquainted with the facts when in France, gave many interesting details in an official report on the subject.
Colonel David Humphreys was appointed a commissioner to treat with the dey or governor of Algiers concerning his corsairs; but that semi-barbarian—proud, haughty, and avaricious—was not disposed to relinquish his share of the profitable sea-robberies carried on under his sanction. “If I were to make peace with everybody,” he said, “what should I do with my corsairs? What should I do with my soldiers? They would take off my head for the want of other prizes, not being able to live on their miserable allowance!”
This was certainly good logic for the perplexed dey, but it did not convince Humphreys of the justice of piratical practices; and, at the close of 1793, he wrote to the government of the United States, “If we mean to have a commerce, we must have a navy to defend it. Besides, the very semblance of this would tend more toward enabling us to maintain our neutrality, in the actual critical state of affairs in Europe, than all the declarations, reasonings, concessions, and sacrifices, that can possibly be made.”
Washington had communicated to the house on the twenty-third day of December, in a confidential message, the state of affairs with Algiers; and its consideration with closed doors brought about a debate as to whether the public should at any time, or under any circumstances, be excluded from the galleries of the halls of Congress. This, however, interrupted the business only for a short time.
On the second of January, a committee was appointed to report the amount of force necessary to protect American commerce against the Algerine corsairs, and the ways and means for its support. This was the first committee of ways and means ever appointed by Congress, questions of that sort having been hitherto referred to the secretary of the treasury. It indicated an opposition majority in the house, but, as we have seen in the case of Madison's resolutions, it was very small.
Finally, in the spring of 1794, Congress passed an act to provide for a naval armament, because, as the preamble recited, “the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on the commerce of the United States, render it necessary that a naval force should be provided for its protection.” The bill met with strenuous opposition: first, because the time required to form a navy would be too long, the pressing exigency of the case requiring immediate action; and, secondly, because it would be cheaper to purchase the friendship of Algiers by paying a money-tribute, as had been done for some time by European nations, or to purchase the protection of those nations. It appears strange that suggestions so degrading to the character of a free and independent nation should not have been met with indignant rebuke.
The bill was passed by a small majority. The president was authorized to provide four frigates, to carry forty-four guns each, and two to carry thirty-six guns each, and to equip, man, and employ them. The act also gave him some discretion about the size and metal of the vessels. Washington, impressed with the stern necessity that called for this armament, immediately ordered the six vessels to be built, one each at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Portsmouth in Virginia, and Portsmouth in New Hampshire. He also, with the advice and consent of the senate, proceeded to appoint six naval commanders and other officers; and thus was commenced the navy of the United States.[64]
American Naval Commanders