Washington and the American Republic, Vol. 3.

by Benson John Lossing

During the progress of the debates on Madison's resolutions, Washington communicated to Congress evidences of efforts on the part of Genet to excite the people of portions of the Union against the Spanish authorities on its southwestern border, and to organize military expeditions against Louisiana and the Floridas. It was now determined to bear with the insolence and mischievous meddling of the French minister no longer; and, at a cabinet council, it was agreed that his diplomatic functions should be suspended, the privileges resting thereon to be denied him, and his person arrested. This was the only course for the government to pursue for the preservation of its dignity, and perhaps the safety of the republic. This resolution was about to be put into execution, when a despatch was received from Gouverneur Morris announcing Genet's recall. The French minister of foreign affairs had, as soon as he heard of Genet's misconduct, reprobated it as unauthorized by his government, and appointed M. Fauchet secretary of the executive council to succeed him. At the same time the French government asked the recall of Gouverneur Morris, whose views of democracy, as he saw it daily in Paris, did not coincide with the doctrines of the Jacobins. Morris was recalled, and Washington, with a liberal spirit, nominated James Monroe, a political opponent, as his successor. He knew that Monroe would be acceptable to the French Convention, and likely, therefore, to be useful to his government.

Fauchet was a keen diplomatist, and came as the representative of an administration more radical in its democracy than the one that appointed Genet. The Girondists had fallen, and the government of France had passed into the hands of Danton and Robespierre, the leaders of the Jacobins. The Reign of Terror was now in full force. The republican constitution had been suspended, and the Convention had assumed despotic powers with bloody proclivities. Even the warmest sympathizers with the French Revolution, in America, stood appalled at the aspect of affairs there; and many began to doubt, after all, whether English liberty was not preferable to French liberty.[65]

Fauchet arrived at Philadelphia in February, and Genet had liberty to return to France. But he did not choose to trust his person to the caprices of his countrymen in that time of anarchy and blood, and he remained in America. He married Cornelia Tappen, daughter of Governor Clinton, of New York, and became a resident of that state. He at once disappeared from the firmament of politics, but was an excellent citizen of his adopted country, and took great interest in agriculture. His course as minister has been ably defended; but the verdict of impartial history condemns it as unwise and unwarrantable, to say the least. He died at his residence in Greenbush, opposite Albany, in July, 1834.

Another subject now violently agitated the American people. The news of the British orders in council concerning the French colonial trade had produced great excitement in commercial circles at Philadelphia and New York. It was considered a flagrant act of injustice toward neutrals, and both parties vehemently condemned the British government. In Congress a resolution was offered for the raising of fifteen thousand men to serve two years, and for other preparations for war; and it was at this juncture that Madison's commercial resolutions, as we have observed, were called up, debated, and indefinitely postponed. While the debates on these resolutions were pending, the feeling against Great Britain was further stimulated by the publication, in New York, of a reputed speech of Lord Dorchester (Carleton), governor of Canada, to a deputation of Indians of Lower Canada, who had attended a great council of savage tribes, in the Ohio country, in 1793. In this speech, Dorchester, it was alleged, openly avowed his opinion that war between the United States and Great Britain would be commenced that year, and that “a new line between the two nations must be drawn by the sword.” This document was pronounced a forgery. But it had its intended effect in increasing the hatred of Great Britain in the hearts of a very large portion of the American people. Congress, under the excitement of the moment, passed a joint resolution, laying an embargo for thirty days, and afterward for thirty days longer, for the purpose of preventing British supply-ships carrying provisions to their fleet in the West Indies. It was also proposed to enroll an army of eighty thousand minute-men, to man forts and be ready for action; also an additional standing army of twenty thousand men.

War with Great Britain now seemed inevitable. To avert it, was Washington's most anxious solicitude; and, firm in his purpose of preserving for his country neutrality and peace, he resolved to make an experiment for the maintenance of both, by sending an envoy extraordinary to England to open negotiations anew. It required great heroism to attempt such a course; for the popular excitement was intense, and the idea of holding any further intercourse with England was scouted as pusillanimous. The tri-colored cockade was seen upon every side, and the partisans of the French regicides appeared again to rule the popular will for the hour.

While the public mind was thus agitated, the president received despatches from Mr. Pinckney, the resident American minister in London, advising him that the offensive orders in council of the previous November, concerning neutral ships, had been revoked, and that Lord Grenville, in conversation, had assured Mr. Pinckney that that measure had not been intended for the special vexation of American commerce, but to distress France. This intelligence subdued the belligerent tone of the opposition for a moment; yet they showed no reluctance to an open rupture with Great Britain, affecting to regard Grenville's words as insincere. Their vehement opposition to the appointment of a special envoy was speedily renewed, and unscrupulous partisans kept up the war-cry. The opposition press and the democratic societies used every means to inflame the populace and increase the exasperation of their feelings toward Great Britain; and they declared that the crisis had arrived when decision and energy, not moderation toward that government, was demanded.

But these manifestations had no sensible effect upon Washington. His purpose had been adopted after mature reflection. His sagacious mind perceived clearly the probability of success, and his moral heroism, as on all other occasions, was proof against animadversions. He hesitated only when the question, Who shall be appointed? was presented.

Washington's first preference for the mission was Hamilton; but the earliest intimation of this preference that reached the public ear raised a storm of opposition. The proposed mission itself was condemned as a cowardly advance to the British government; and a member of the house of representatives addressed an earnest letter to the president, opposing the mission in general terms, and in an especial manner deprecating the appointment of Hamilton as the envoy to be employed. Senator James Monroe also took upon himself the task of remonstrating with Washington, in writing, against the nomination of Hamilton, assuring him that it would be injurious to the public interest and to the interest of the president himself; and proposed to explain his reasons at a private interview. Washington declined the interview, but requested Mr. Monroe to submit to him, in writing, any facts he might possess which would disqualify the secretary of the treasury for the mission; and added: “Colonel Hamilton and others have been mentioned, but no one is yet absolutely decided upon in my mind. But, as much will depend, among other things, upon the abilities of the person sent, and his knowledge of the affairs of this country, and as I am alone responsible for a proper nomination, it certainly behooves me to name such a one as, in my judgment, combines the requisites for a mission so peculiarly interesting to the peace and happiness of this country.” Nothing more was heard from Mr. Monroe on the subject.

Hamilton, with his usual disinterestedness, relieved the president by advising him to choose, for the proposed envoy, Chief-Justice Jay. In a long letter to the president, written on the fifteenth of April, in which he took a general and comprehensive view of national affairs and the relative position of the country to England, he recommended him to nominate, as special minister to England, a person who should “have the confidence of those who think peace still within our reach, and who may be thought qualified for the mission,” with an observation to Congress that it was done “with an intention to make a solemn appeal to the justice and good sense of the British government;” at the same time, to make an “earnest recommendation that vigorous and effectual measures may be adopted to be prepared for war.”

Hamilton then alluded to the fact that Washington had contemplated nominating him for the mission; and after saying that he was well aware of the obstacles that existed, and that he would be “completely and entirely satisfied with the election of another,” he nominated Mr. Jay, as “the only man in whose qualifications for success there would be thorough confidence.... I think,” he continued, “the business would have the best chance possible in his hands, and I flatter myself that his mission would issue in a manner that would produce the most important good to the nation.”