The next subject which caused much anxiety to Ballin was the question as to what Roumania would do, a country to whose attitude, considering her importance to Germany as a food-producing area, he attached even more value than to that of Italy. In his notes dating from that time he said:
“ ... June 21st, 1915. The news which I received from X. regarding the political situation in Roumania and Bulgaria was so serious that I felt bound to send copies of these letters to the Chief of the General Staff, General v. Falkenhayn, and to inform him that, in my opinion, our Foreign Office had now done all it could possibly do, and that nothing but some forcible military pressure such as he and Baron Conrad could exercise on Count Tisza would induce this obstinate gentleman to settle his differences with the Balkan States....”
“ ... On this occasion X. expressed a great deal of contempt at the suggestion that we should draw upon the members of the old diplomacy for additional help. On the whole, he seemed to be very proud of the achievements of the Foreign Office, whereas I am of opinion that this body has entirely failed, and is of no practical use any longer. Things must be in a pretty bad state if Herr Erzberger, of all people, is looked upon as the last hope of the country. I suggested to the gentlemen that it would do some good if the Chancellor were to request the more virulent of the Pan-Germans to see him, and to ask Hindenburg to explain to them the military situation without any camouflage. This suggestion was favourably received, and it is to be passed on to the Chancellor....
“ ... The Chancellor informed me that he was considering whether, if Roumania remained neutral, and if the operations against the Dardanelles terminated successfully for us, he ought to submit any official proposals for peace to our enemies. I expressed my admiration of the plan, but told the Chancellor of my objections to its practical execution. The Entente, I feared, would refuse to entertain the proposals, and the German people would regard it as a sign of weakness. The Chancellor asked me to refrain from pronouncing a definite opinion for the present, but to think it over until our next meeting.”
In a letter of July 31st, 1915, Ballin wrote as follows:
“I should like to express my heartfelt gratitude to you for sending on to me the report which contains some of the finest observations that have come to my knowledge since the outbreak of the war.
“ ... The writer lays great stress on the belief prevalent in enemy and neutral countries alike that Germany is making a bid for universal supremacy and for supremacy on the high seas—a belief which has spurred on the resistance of the enemy to the utmost, and has caused a good deal of bad feeling amongst the neutrals. I repeatedly brought this fact to the knowledge of the Chancellor and I urgently suggested to him that in some way—e.g., by an Imperial proclamation on the anniversary of the outbreak of war, or by some other suitable means—we should announce to all and sundry that such hare-brained schemes are not entertained by any responsible person or body of persons in Germany. I sincerely trust that some such steps will be taken at an early opportunity, because otherwise I do not see when the war will be over. Though not a pessimist I do not believe in taking too rosy a view of things. I envy the British because they have the courage openly to discuss in their press and parliament the reverses as well as the successes they have had.
“ ... You see I am not taking too cheerful a view of matters. I have nothing but the most enthusiastic admiration for the achievements of the German people, both at the front and at home. Although not gifted politically this people could do wonders if led by great statesmen and by great politicians.”
“ ... August 10th, 1915. This morning I spent an hour with the Chancellor, who had requested me to call on him.... We had a long discussion as to the advisability of publishing a statement to the effect that Germany would be ready at any moment to discuss an honourable peace. She had achieved great successes in the field, she was in possession of important mortgages, her armies were occupying large tracts of the enemy’s country, and she was not carrying on a war of aggression but one of defence: therefore such a step could not be regarded as a sign of weakness. The Chancellor, nevertheless, was afraid that such a step might after all be interpreted in that sense. I suggested to him that it might be of some use if the Pope could be induced to address a peace message to the rulers of the various countries.