XXIX
The Attitude of Certain Northern States
(Concluded)
THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS
Beginning in 1837, Massachusetts adopted the first of the so-called Personal Liberty Laws, which were followed by others of like import enacted by Vermont, New York and Connecticut. The ostensible object of these statutes was to protect free negroes, but as no such laws were necessary until the rise of the Abolitionists and the operations of the Underground Railroad, they were generally accepted as efforts on the part of these states to assist these agencies and defeat the clause of the constitution of the United States which provided for the return of fugitive slaves.
In 1842, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that so much of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 as authorized or required state officials to assist in executing the law was unconstitutional, and that upon Federal authorities must rest the whole burden.[[294]] This decision was followed by a new series of statutes in Massachusetts, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.[[295]]
On the 18th of September, 1850, Congress passed another Fugitive Slave Law amending the act of 1793 so as to charge Federal officials with the whole duty of carrying into effect the clause in the constitution providing for the return of fugitive slaves, and to remedy the difficulties resulting from the action of the Abolitionists and the acts passed by certain states as above referred to. This aroused fresh antagonism to the constitution and the efforts of the Federal Government to carry the same into effect. The constitutionality of the new law was denied and though affirmed by the Supreme Court, its execution in the foregoing states was much embarrassed by a new series of state statutes. Laws of like import, with like results, were also enacted by Wisconsin, Michigan, Connecticut and Maine.
In some instances, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States affirming the constitutionality of the statute was challenged by the legislative department of state governments, and the right of the former tribunal to fix the obligations of states and citizens with respect to the law strenuously denied.
Thus, in Wisconsin one Sherman M. Booth had been indicted in the Federal Court for a violation of the Fugitive Slave Law enacted by Congress, and, after trial and conviction, was sentenced for the offense. An application for a writ of habeas corpus was presented by Booth to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and his release prayed for on the ground that the Federal statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took cognizance of the case and discharged the prisoner from the custody of the Federal authorities.[[296]]
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States where the constitutionality of the Federal statute was affirmed, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and Booth remanded to custody.[[297]] Thereupon, the General Assembly of Wisconsin on the 16th of March, 1859, adopted a series of resolutions in which, after denying the right of the United States Supreme Court to take cognizance of the above mentioned case, they declared: