3162 lyke—liketh
derkenesse—dyrknesses
3164 wrecched[e]—wrecchede
3165 shule—shollen
from—fro
THE GOOD ARE ALWAYS STRONG.
[TUNC EGO PAPE INQUAM. ET CETERA.]
ÞAnne seide I B. Ah! thou promisest me great things indeed!—but without delay, satisfy the expectations you have raised. þus. [owh] I wondre me þat þou by-hetest
me so grete þinges. ne I ne doute nat þat þou
ne mayst wel performe þat þou by-hetest. but I preie þe [3168]
oonly þis. þat þou ne tarie nat to telle me þilke þinges
þat þou hast meoued. P. You must first be convinced that the good are always strong and powerful and the wicked destitute of strength. first quod she þou most nedes
knowen. þat good[e] folk ben al wey strong[e] and
myȝty. and þe shrewes ben feble and desert and naked [3172]
of alle strengþes. These assertions do mutually demonstrate each other. and of þise þinges certys eueryche of
hem is declared and shewed by oþer. For since good and evil are contrary, if good be powerful evil must be impotent. ¶ For so as good
and yuel ben two contraries. yif so be þat goode be
stedfast. þan sheweþ þe fieblesse of yuel al openly. And if the frailty of evil is known, the strength and stability of good must also be known to you. and [3176]
yif þou knowe clerely þe freelnesse of yuel. þe stedfastnesse
of goode is knowen. But to convince you I shall proceed to prove it from both these principles, establishing these truths, by arguments drawn first from one of these topics and then from the other. but for as moche as þe fey of
my sentence shal be þe more ferme and haboundaunt. I
wil goon by þat oon wey and by þat oþer and I wil conferme [3180]
þe þinges þat ben purposed now on þis side and
now on þat syde. Two things are necessary to every action—the Will and the Power; if either be wanting, nothing can be effected. ¶ Two þinges þer ben in whiche þe
effect of alle þe dedes of man kynde standiþ. þat is to
seyn. wil and power. and yif þat oon of þise two fayleþ [3184]
þere nis no þing þat may be don. A man can do nothing without the concurrence of his will, and if power faileth the will is of no effect. for yif þat wil lakkeþ
þere nys no wyȝt þat vndirtakeþ to done þat he wol not
don. and yif power fayleþ þe wille nis but in ydel and
stant for nauȝt. Hence, if you see a person desirous of getting what he cannot procure, you are sure he lacks power to obtain it. and þer of comeþ it þat yif þou se a [3188]
wyȝt þat wolde geten þat he may nat geten. þou mayst
nat douten þat power ne fayleþ hym to hauen þat he
wolde. ¶ þis is open and clere quod I. ne it may nat
ben denyed in no manere. And if you see another do what he had a mind to do, can you doubt that he had the power to do it? and yif þou se a wyȝt quod [3192]
she. þat haþ don þat he wolde don þou nilt nat douten
þat he ne haþ had power to done it. B. No, surely. no quod. I. and in
þat. þat euery wyȝt may. P. A man, then, is esteemed powerful in respect of what he is able to do, and weak in relation to what he is unable to perform. in þat þat men may holden
hym myȝty. as who seiþ in as moche as a man is myȝty [3196]
to done a þing. in so moche men halden hym myȝty.
and in þat þat he ne may. in þat men demen hym to
ben feble. B. That is true. I confesse it wel quod I. P. Do you remember that I proved that the will of man, following different pursuits, seeks happiness only? Remembriþ þe quod
she þat I. haue gadred and shewed by forseide resouns [3200]
þat al þe entencioun of þe wil of mankynde whiche þat
is lad by diuerse studies hastiþ to comen to blisfulnesse.
¶ It remembreþ me wel quod I þat it hath ben shewed.
THE IMPOTENCY OF THE WICKED.
Do you recollect too, that it has been shown that happiness is the supreme good of men—and all desire this good, since all seek happiness? and recordeþ þe nat þan quod she. þat blisfulnesse is [3204]
þilke same goode þat men requeren. so þat whan þat
[* fol. 25 b.] blisfulnesse is requered *of alle. þat goode [also] is
requered and desired of al. It recordeþ me wel quod I.
for haue it gretly alwey ficche[d] in my memorie. All men, then, good and bad, seek to acquire good? alle [3208]
folk þan quod she goode and eke badde enforcen hem
wiþ oute difference of entencioun to comen to goode.
þat is a uerray consequence quod I. And it is certain that when men obtain good they become good? and certeyne is quod
she þat by þe getyng of goode ben men ymaked goode. [3212]
B. It is most certain. þis is certeyne quod. I. P. Do good men, then, get what they desire? ¶ þan geten goode men þat þei
desiren. B. It seems so. so semeþ it quod I. P. If evil men obtain the good, they can be no longer evil? but wicked[e] folk quod
she yif þei geten þe goode þat þei desiren þei [ne]
mowen nat ben wicked. B. It is so. so is it quod .I. P. Since then both parties pursue the good, which only the virtuous obtain, we must believe that good men are powerful, and that the wicked are weak and feeble? ¶ þan so as [3216]
þat oon and þat oþer [quod she] desiren good. and þe
goode folk geten good and nat þe wicked folk ¶ þan
nis it no doute þat þe goode folk ne ben myȝty and þe
wicked folk ben feble. B. None can doubt this, save such as either consider not rightly the nature of things, or are incapable of comprehending the force of any reasoning. ¶ who so þat euer quod I [3220]
douteþ of þis. he ne may nat considre þe nature of
þinges. ne þe consequence of resoun. and ouer þis quod she.
THE WICKED DO NOT SEEK ARIGHT THE SUPREME GOOD.