P. If two beings have the same end in view—and one of them accomplishes his purpose by the use of natural means, while the other not using legitimate means does not attain his end—which of these two is the most powerful? ¶ yif þat þer ben two þinges þat han o same
purpos by kynde. and þat one of hem pursueþ and performeþ [3224]
þilke same þinge by naturel office. and þat oþer
ne may nat done þilk naturel office. but folweþ by
oþer manere þan is couenable to nature ¶ Hym þat
acomplisiþ hys purpos kyndely. and ȝit he ne acomplisiþ [3228]
nat hys owen purpos. wheþer of þise two demest
þou for more myȝty. B. Illustrate your meaning more clearly. ¶ yif þat I coniecte quod .I. þat
þou wilt seye algates. ȝit I desire to herkene it more
pleynely of þe. P. The motion of walking is natural to man? And this motion is the natural office of the feet? Do you grant this? þou nilt nat þan denye quod she þat þe [3232]
moeuementȝ of goynge nis in men by kynde. no for soþe
quod I. ne þou ne doutest nat quod she þat þilke naturel
office of goynge ne be þe office of feet. B. I do. I ne doute
it nat quod .I. P. If, then, he who is able to use his feet walks, whilst another lacking this power creeps on his hands—surely he that is able to move naturally upon his feet is more powerful than he who cannot. þan quod she yif þat a wyȝt be myȝty to [3236]
moeue and goþ vpon hys feet. and anoþer to whom
þilke naturel office of feet lakkeþ. enforceþ hym to gone
crepynge vpon hys handes. ¶ whiche of þise two auȝte
to ben holden more myȝty by ryȝt. knyt furþe þe remenaunt [3240]
quod I. ¶ For no wyȝt ne douteþ þat he þat
may gone by naturel office of feet. ne be more myȝty
þan he þat ne may nat P. The good and bad seek the supreme good: the good by the natural means of virtue—the wicked by gratifying divers desires of earthly things (which is not the natural way of obtaining it). ¶ but þe souereyne good quod
she þat is euenlyche purposed to þe good folk and to [3244]
badde. þe good folke seken it by naturel office of
uertues. and þe shrewes enforcen hem to geten it by
dyuerse couetise of erþely þinges. whiche þat nis no
naturel office to geten þilke same souereyne goode. [3248]
Do you think otherwise? trowest þou þat it be any oþer wyse. B. The consequence is plain, and that follows from what has been granted—that the good are powerful, while the wicked are feeble. nay quod .I. for þe
consequence is open and shewynge of þinges þat I haue
graunted. ¶ þat nedes goode folk moten ben myȝty.
and shrewes feble and vnmyȝty. P. You rightly anticipate me; for it is a good sign, as physicians well know, when Nature exerts herself and resists the malady. ¶ þou rennest aryȝt [3252]
byfore me quod she. and þis is þe iugement þat is to
seyn. ¶ I iuge of þe ryȝt as þise leches ben wont forto
hopen of seke folk whan þei aperceyuen þat nature is
redressed and wiþstondeþ to þe maladie. But, as you are so quick of apprehension, I shall continue this mode of reasoning. ¶ But for I [3256]
see þe now al redy to þe vndirstandynge I shal shewe
þe more þilke and continuel resouns. The weakness of the wicked is conspicuous—they cannot attain the end to which their natural disposition prompts and almost compels them; what would become of them without this natural prompting, so powerful and irresistible? ¶ For loke now
how gretly shewiþ þe feblesse and infirmite of wicked
folke. þat ne mowen nat come to þat hire naturel [3260]
entencioun ledeþ hem. and ȝitte almost þilk naturel
entencioun constreineþ hem. ¶ and what were to deme
þan of shrewes. yif þilke naturel helpe hadde for-leten
hem. ¶ þe whiche naturel helpe of entencioun goþ alwey [3264]
byforne hem. and is so grete þat vnneþ it may be
ouercomen. Consider how great is the impotence of the wicked. (The greater the things desired, but unaccomplished, the less is the power of him that desires, and is unable to attain his end.) ¶ Considre þan how gret defaute of power
and how gret feblesse þere is in grete felonous folk as
who seiþ þe gretter þinges þat ben coueited and þe desire [3268]
nat accomplissed of þe lasse myȝt is he þat coueiteþ it
and may nat acomplisse. ¶ And forþi philosophie seiþ
þus by souereyne good. The wicked seek after no trivial things—which they fail to obtain; but they aspire in vain to the sovereign good, which they endeavour day and night to obtain. ¶ Sherewes ne requere nat
lyȝt[e] medes ne veyne gaines whiche þei ne may nat [3272]
folwen ne holden. but þei faylen of þilke some of þe
heyȝte of þinges þat is to seyne souereyne good. ne þise
wrecches ne comen nat to þe effect of souereyne good.
[* fol. 26.] *þe whiche þei enforcen hem oonly to geten by nyȝtes [3276]
and by dayes. The good attain the end of their desires, and therein their power is manifested. ¶ In þe getyn[g] of whiche goode þe
strengþe of good folk. is ful wel ysen. For as you deem him a good walker that goes to the end of his journey, so you must esteem him powerful that attains his desires, beyond which there is nothing to desire. For ryȝt so as
þou myȝtest demen hym myȝty of goynge þat goþ on
hys feet til he myȝt[e] come to þilke place fro þe whiche [3280]
place þere ne lay no wey forþer to be gon. Ryȝt so
most þou nedes demen hym for ryȝt myȝty þat getiþ
and atteiniþ to þe ende of alle þinges þat ben to desire.
by-ȝonde þe whiche ende þat þer nis no þing to desire. [3284]
THE WICKED HAVE NO REAL EXISTENCE.
Wicked men, then, are destitute of those powers which the good so amply possess. ¶ Of whiche power of good folk men may conclude þat
wicked men semen to ben bareyne and naked of alle
strengþe. Wherefore do they leave virtue, and follow vice? Is it because they are ignorant of good? For whi forleten þei vertues and folwen
vices. nis it nat for þat þei ne knowen nat þe goodes. [3288]
What is more weak and base than the blindness of ignorance? Or do they know the way they ought to follow, but are led astray by lust and covetousness? ¶ But what þing is more feble and more caitif þan is þe
blyndenesse of ignoraunce. or ellys þei knowen ful wel
whiche þinges þat þei auȝten to folwen ¶ but lecherye
and couetise ouerþroweþ hem mysturned. And so, indeed, weak-minded men are overpowered by intemperance, for they cannot resist vicious temptations. ¶ and certis [3292]
so doþ distemperaunce to feble men. þat ne mowen nat
wrastle aȝeins þe vices Do they willingly desert Good and turn to Evil? If they do so, they not only cease to be powerful, but even cease to exist. ¶ Ne knowen þei nat þan wel
þat þei foreleten þe good wilfully. and turnen hem vilfully
to vices. ¶ And in þis wise þei ne forleten nat [3296]
oonly to ben myȝty. but þei forleten al outerly in any
wise forto ben For those who neglect the common end of all beings, cease to exist. ¶ For þei þat forleten þe comune fyn of
alle þinges þat ben. þei for-leten also þerwiþ al forto
ben. You may marvel that I assert that the wicked, the majority of the human race, have no existence—but it is, however, most true. and perauenture it sholde semen to som folk þat [3300]
þis were a merueile to seyne þat shrewes whiche þat
contienen þe more partie of men ne ben nat. ne han no
beynge. ¶ but naþeles it is so. and þus stant þis þing
That the wicked are bad I do not deny— for þei þat ben shrewes I denye nat þat þei ben shrewes. [3304]
but I do not admit that they have any real existence. but I denye and sey[e] symplely and pleynly þat þei
[ne] ben nat. ne han no beynge. You may call a corpse a dead man, but you cannot with propriety call it a man. for ryȝt as þou myȝtest
seyn of þe careyne of a man þat it were a ded man.
¶ but þou ne myȝtest nat symplely callen it a man. [3308]
So the vicious are profligate men, but I cannot confess they absolutely exist. ¶ So graunt[e] I wel for soþe þat vicious folk ben
wicked. but I ne may nat graunten absolutely and
symplely þat þei ben. That thing exists that preserves its rank, nature, and constitution, but when it loses these essentials it ceases to be. ¶ For þilk þing þat wiþ
holdeþ ordre and kepiþ nature. þilk þing is and haþ [3312]
beynge. but þat þing þat faileþ of þat. þat is to seyne
he þat forletiþ naturel ordre he for-letiþ þilk beyng
þat is set in hys nature. But, you may say that the wicked have a power to act, nor do I deny it; but their power is an effect of weakness. but þou wolt sein þat shrewes
mowen. ¶ Certys þat ne denye I nat. ¶ but certys [3316]
hir power ne descendeþ nat of strengþe but of feblesse.
They can do evil, but this they could not do, if they retained the power of doing good. for þei mowen don wickednesses. þe whiche þei ne
myȝten nat don yif þei myȝten dwelle in þe forme and
in þe doynge of goode folke. This power, then, clearly shows their impotence. ¶ And þilke power [3320]
sheweþ ful euydently þat þei ne mowen ryȝt nauȝt.
POWER, AN ATTRIBUTE OF THE CHIEF GOOD.
For as evil is nothing, it is clear that while the wicked can only do evil they can do nothing. ¶ For so as I haue gadered and proued a lytel her byforn
þat yuel is nauȝt. and so as shrewes mowen oonly
but shrewednesse. þis conclusioun is al clere. þat [3324]
shrewes ne mowen ryȝt nat to han power. That you may understand the force of this power, I have proved that nothing is more powerful than the sovereign good. and for as
moche as þou vndirstonde whiche is þe strengþe þat is
power of shrewes. I haue diffinised a lytel here byforn
þat no þing nis so myȝty as souereyne good B. That is true. ¶ þat is [3328]
soþe quod .I. P. And that supreme good can do no evil? [and thilke same souereyn good may don
non yuel // B. Certainly not. Certes no quod I] P. Is there any one who thinks that man can do all things? ¶ Is þer any wyȝt þan
quod she þat weniþ þat men mowen don alle þinges.
B. No sane man can think so. No man quod .I. but yif he be out of hys witte. P. But men may do evil. ¶ but [3332]
certys sherewes mowen doñ yuel quod she. B. I would to God they could not. ¶ ȝe wolde
god quod I þat þei ne myȝten don none. P. Since he that can do good, can do all things, and he that has power to do evil cannot do all things, therefore the evil-doers are less powerful. þat quod she
so as he þat is myȝty to done oonly but good[e] þinges
may don alle þinges. and þei þat ben myȝty to done [3336]
yuel[e] þinges ne mowen nat alle þinges. þan is þis open
þing and manifest þat þei þat mowen don yuel ben of
lasse power. Let me add too that power is one of the things to be desired, and that all such things are to be referred to the chief good (the perfection of their nature). and ȝitte to proue þis conclusioun þere
helpeþ me þis þat I haue shewed here byforne. þat al [3340]
power is to be noumbred amonge þinges þat men auȝten
requere. and haue shewed þat alle þinges þat auȝten ben
desired ben referred to good ryȝt as to a manere heyȝte
of hyr nature. But the power of doing evil has no relation to that Good, therefore it is not desirable; ¶ But for to mowen don yuel and [3344]
felonye ne may nat ben referred to good. þan nis nat
yuel of þe noumbre of þinges þat auȝten. [* fol. 26 b.] *be desired.
but as all power is desirable, it is clear that the ability to do evil is not power. but al power auȝt[e] ben desired and requered. ¶ þan is
it open and cler þat þe power ne þe moeuyng of shrewes [3348]
nis no powere. It clearly follows from this reasoning, that the good only are powerful while the vicious are feeble. and of alle þise þinges it sheweþ wel þat
þe goode folk ben certeynly myȝty. and þe shrewes ben
douteles vnmyȝty And Plato’s opinion is hereby verified that the wise only have the power to do what they desire; the wicked may follow the dictates of their lusts, but their great aim and desire, i. e. HAPPINESS, they can never attain. ¶ And it is clere and open þat þilke
sentence of plato is uerray and soþe. þat seyþ þat oonly [3352]
wisemen may [doon] þat þei desiren. and shrewes
mowen haunten þat hem lykeþ. but þat þei desiren þat
is to seyne to comen to souereyne good þei ne han no
power to acomplissen þat. The wicked may gratify their desires, thinking to attain the chief good (for which they wish), but they can never possess it, for impiety and vice can never be crowned with happiness. ¶ For shrewes don þat hem [3356]
list whan by þo þinges in whiche þei deliten þei wenen
to atteyne to þilke good þat þei desiren. but þei ne geten
ne atteynen nat þer to. ¶ for vices ne comen nat to
blisfulnesse. [3360]
3166 [owh]—from C.
3171 good[e]—goode
strong[e]—stronge