[PURO CLARUM LUMINE.]
HOmer wiþ þe The sweet-tongued Homer sings of the sun’s pure light. Yet the sun’s beams cannot pierce into the inner bowels of the earth, nor into the depths of the sea. hony mouþe. þat is to seyn. homer
wiþ þe swete dites syngeþ þat þe sonne is cleer by
pure lyȝt. naþeles ȝit ne may it nat by þe inferme lyȝt
of hys bemes breken or percen þe inwarde entrailes of [4428]
þe erþe. or ellys of þe see. But God, the world’s maker, beholding from on high, has his vision impeded neither by earth nor cloud. ¶ so ne seeþ nat god makere
of þe grete worlde to hym þat lokeþ alle þinges from on
heye ne wiþstandiþ nat no þinges by heuynesses of erþe.
ne þe nyȝt ne wiþstondeþ nat to hym by þe blake [4432]
cloudes. At a glance he sees all events, present, past, and future. ¶ þilke god seeþ in o strook of þouȝt alle
þinges þat ben or weren or schullen come. God, then, that alone sees all things, may indeed be called the true Sun. ¶ and þilke
god for he lokeþ and seeþ alle þinges al oon. þou maist
seyn þat he is þe verray sonne. [4436]
4425 mouþe—Mowth
4428 percen—MS. perten, C. percen
inwarde—inward
4430 worlde—world
on heye—an hegh
4431 nat—omitted
4434 schullen come—shollen comyn
4435 al oon—alone
[TAMEN EGO EN INQUAM.]
ÞAn seide I B. I am distracted by a more difficult doubt than ever. now am I confounded by a more harde
doute þan I was. what doute is þat quod she.
¶ For certys I coniecte now by whiche þinges þou art
troubled. God’s foreknowledge seems to me inconsistent with man’s free-will. It semeþ quod I to repugnen and to contrarien [4440]
gretly þat god knoweþ byforn alle þinges. and
þat þer is any fredom of liberte. For if God foresees all things, and cannot be deceived, then that which Providence hath foreseen must needs happen. for yif so be þat god
lokeþ alle þinges byforn. ne god ne may nat ben
desseiuid in no manere. þan mot it nedes ben þat alle [4444]
þinges bytyden þe whiche þat þe purueaunce of god haþ
sein byforn to comen. If God from eternity doth foreknow not only the works, but the designs and wills of men, there can be no liberty of will—nor can there be any other action or will than that which a Divine and infallible Providence hath foreseen. ¶ For whiche yif þat god
knoweþ by-forn nat oonly þe werkes of men. but also
hir conseils and hir willes. þan ne shal þer be no [4448]
liberte of arbitre. ne certys þer ne may ben noon oþer
dede ne no wille but þilke whiche þe deuyne purueaunce
þat ne may nat ben desseiued haþ feled byforn For if things fall out contrary to such foreseeing, and are wrested another way, the prescience of God in regard to futurity would not be sure and unerring—it would be nothing but an uncertain opinion of them: but I take it to be impious and unlawful to believe this of God. ¶ For
yif þat þei myȝten wryþen awey in oþer manere þan þei [4452]
ben purueyed. þan ne sholde þer ben no stedfast prescience
of þinge to comen but raþer an vncerteyn
oppinioun. þe whiche þinge to trowen on god I deme it
felonie and vnleueful. Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some. For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be hid from the divine Providence. ¶ Ne I ne proeue nat þilk [4456]
same resoun. as who seiþ I ne allowe nat. or I ne preise
nat þilke same resoun by whiche þat som men wenen
þat þei mowen assoilen and vnknytten þe knot of þis
questioun. ¶ For certys þei seyn þat þing nis nat to [4460]
come for þat þe purueaunce of god haþ seyn it byforne.
þat is to comen but raþer þe contrarie. ¶ And þat
is þis þat for þat þe þing is to comen þat þerfore
ne may it nat ben hyd fro þe purueaunce of god. [4464]
[* fol. 35.] Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides. For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall should be foreseen. *and in þis manere þis necessite slydiþ aȝein in to þe
contrarie partie. ne it ne byhoueþ [nat] nedes þat þinges
bytiden þat ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes /
þat thinges þat ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it [4468]
were ytrauailed. As if the question was, which was the cause of the other—prescience the cause of the necessity of future events, or the necessity the cause of the prescience of future events? as who seiþ. þat þilke answere procediþ
ryȝt as þouȝ men trauailden or weren bysy to
enqueren þe whiche þing is cause of whiche þinges. as
wheþer þe prescience is cause of þe necessite of þinges to [4472]
comen. or ellys þat þe necessite of þinges to comen is
cause of þe purueaunce. But I will prove that, however the order of causes may stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things to fall out. ¶ But I ne enforce me nat now
to shewen it þat þe bytidyng of þinges y-wist byforn is
necessarie. how so or in what manere þat þe ordre of [4476]
causes haþ it self. al þouȝ þat it ne seme nat þat þe
prescience brynge in necessite of bytydynge of þinges
to comen. For if a man sit—the belief in the sitting is true; and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he must needs sit. ¶ For certys yif þat any wyȝt sitteþ it byhoueþ
by necessite þat þe oppinioun be soþe of hym [4480]
þat coniectiþ þat he sitteþ. and aȝeinward. al so is it of
þe contrarie. yif þe oppinioun be soþe of any wyȝt for
þat he sitteþ it byhoueþ by necessite þat he sitte In both cases there is a necessity—in the latter that the person sits—in the former, that the opinion concerning the other is true. ¶ þan
is here necessite in þat oon and in þat oþer. for in þat [4484]
oon is necessite of sittynge. But the man does not sit because the opinion of his sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his being seated was antecedent in time. and certys in þat oþer is
necessite of soþe but þerfore ne sitteþ nat a wyȝt for þat
þe oppinioun of sittyng is soþe. but þe oppinioun is
raþer soþe for þat a wyȝt sitteþ by-forn. So that although the cause of truth arises from the sitting, there is a common necessity in both. and þus al [4488]
þouȝ þat þe cause of soþe comeþ of [þe] syttyng. and
nat of þe trewe oppinioun. Algates ȝitte is þer comune
necessite in þat oon and in þat oþer. Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future events. ¶ þus sheweþ it
þat I may make semblable skils of þe purueaunce of god [4492]
and of þinges to come. For allowing things are foreseen because they are to happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to destroy all idea of free-will. ¶ For al þouȝ for þat þat þinges
ben to comen. þer-fore ben þei purueid. nat certys for
þei ben purueid. þer-fore ne bytide þei nat. ȝit naþeles
byhoueþ it by necessite þat eiþer þe þinges to comen [4496]
ben ypurueied of god. or ellys þat þe þinges þat ben
purueied of god bitiden [.s.] by necessite. ¶ And þis
þing oonly suffiseþ I-nouȝ to distroien þe fredome of
oure arbitre. þat is to seyn of oure fre wille But it is preposterous to make the happening of temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in imagining that God foresees future events because they are to happen. ¶ But now [4500]
[certes] sheweþ it wel how fer fro þe soþe and how vp
so doun is þis þing þat we seyn þat þe bytidinge of
temporel þinges is þe cause of þe eterne prescience.
¶ But forto wenen þat god purueiþ [the] þinges to comen. [4504]
for þei ben to comen. what oþer þing is it but forto
wene þat þilke þinges þat bitiden som tyme ben causes
of þilke souereyne purueaunce þat is in god. And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is necessary for my belief that it should be. ¶ And
her-to I adde ȝitte þis þing þat ryȝt as whan þat I woot [4508]
þat o þing is it byhoueþ by necessite þat þilke self þing
be. So also when I know that an event shall come to pass, it must needs happen. and eke þat whan I haue knowe þat any þinge shal
bitiden so byhoueþ it by necessite þat þilk[e] same
þing bytide. The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. so folweþ it þan þat þe bytydynge of þe [4512]
þinge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed. Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to what it is—this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and far from the true knowledge. ¶ And
at þe last[e] yif þat any wyȝt wene a þing to ben oþer
weyes þan it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable
oppinioun ful diuerse and fer fro þe soþe of [4516]
science. If, therefore, a thing be so to happen that the event of it is neither necessary nor certain, how can any one foresee what is to happen? ¶ wher-fore yif any þing be so to comen so þat
þe bytydynge of it ne be nat certeyne ne necessarie.
¶ who may weten [byforn] þat þilke þing is to come.