FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL.
For as pure knowledge has no element in it of falsehood, so what is comprehended by true knowledge cannot be otherwise than as comprehended. ¶ For ryȝt as science ne may nat be medelyd wiþ falsnesse. [4520]
as who seiþ þat yif I woot a þing. it ne may nat
be fals þat I ne woot it. ¶ Ryȝt so þilk þing þat
is conceyued by science ne may [nat] ben noon
oþer weyes þan [as] it is conceiued. Hence it is that true knowledge cannot err, because everything must precisely be what true knowledge perceives it to be. For þat is þe cause [4524]
whi þat science wantiþ lesynge. as who seiþ. whi þat
witynge ne receyueþ nat lesynge of þat it woot. ¶ For
it byhoueþ by necessite þat euery þinge [be] ryȝt as science
comprehendiþ it to be. What follows, then? How does God foreknow these uncertain contingencies? what shal I þan sein. ¶ In [4528]
whiche manere knoweþ god byforn þe þinges to comen.
¶ yif þei ne be nat certeyne. For if he thinks that a thing will inevitably happen, which possibly may not, he is deceived—but this is sheer blasphemy. ¶ For yif þat he deme
þat þei ben to comen vneschewably. and so may be þat
[* fol. 35 b.] it is possible þat þei ne shullen *nat comen. god is [4532]
desseiued. but nat only to trowen þat god is desseiued.
but for to speke it wiþ mouþe it is a felonous synne.
But if God discerns that just as things are to come they shall come; if he knows that they may or may not come, what sort of prescience is this, which comprehends nothing certain, nothing invariable? ¶ But yif þat god woot þat ryȝt so as þinges ben to
comen. so shulle þei comen. so þat he wit[e] egaly. as [4536]
who seiþ indifferently þat þinges mowen ben don or
ellys nat don. what is þilke prescience þat ne comprehendiþ
no certeyne þinge ne stable. Or how does divine prescience differ from human opinion, if He hath an uncertain judgment of things, whereof the events are uncertain and unfixed? or ellys what difference
is þer bytwixe þe prescience. and þilke iape-worþi [4540]
dyuynynge of Tiresie þe diuinour þat seide. ¶ Al þat
I seie quod he eyþer it shal be. or ellys it ne shal nat
be. Or ellis how moche is worþe þe diuyne prescience
more þan þe oppinioun of mankynde yif so be þat it [4544]
demeþ þe þinges vncerteyne as men don. of þe whiche
domes of men þe bytydynge nis nat certeyne. But if there can be no uncertainty in his knowledge, who is the source of all certainty; the event of all things which he foreknows must be fixed and inevitable. ¶ But
yif so be þat noon vncerteyne þinge may ben in hym
þat is ryȝt certeyne welle of alle þinges. þan is þe [4548]
bytydynge certeyne of þilke þinges whiche he haþ wist
byforn fermely to comen. Whence it follows that men have no freedom in their designs and actions; because the Divine Mind, endowed with an infallible foresight, constrains and binds them to a certain event. For whiche it folweþ þat þe
fredom of þe conseils and of þe werkes of mankynde nis
non syn þat þe þouȝt of god seeþ alle þinges with outen [4552]
errour of falsnesse byndeþ and constreiniþ hem to a
bitidynge by necessite. and yif [this] þing be on-is
grauntid and receyued. þat is to seyn. þat þer nis no
fre wille. þan sheweþ it wel how gret distruccioun and [4556]
how grete damages þer folwen of þinges of mankynde.
FATE UNDER THE CONTROL OF PROVIDENCE.
¶ For in ydel ben þer þan purposed and byhyȝt medes
of goode folk. and peynes to badde folk. syn þat no
moeuynge of free corage uoluntarie ne haþ nat deserued [4560]
hem. þat is to seyn neiþer mede nor peyne. Rewards and punishments now deemed just and equitable, will be considered most unjust, when, it is allowed, that mankind are not prompted by any will of their own, to either virtue or vice, but in all their actions are impelled by a fatal necessity. ¶ And it
sholde seme þan þat þilke þinge is alþer worste whiche
þat is nowe demed. for alþer moste iuste and moste
ryȝtful. þat is to seyn þat shrewes ben punyssed. or [4564]
ellys þat good[e] folk ben ygerdoned. þe whiche folk
syn þat þe propre wille [ne] sent hem nat to þat oon ne
to þat oþer. þat is to seyn. neþer to good[e] ne to
harme. but constreineþ hem certeyne necessite of þinges [4568]
to comen. Nor would there be such things as virtue or vice, but such a medley of the one and the other as would be productive of the greatest confusion. ¶ þanne ne shollen þer neuer ben ne neuer
weren vice ne vertue. but it sholde raþer ben confusioun
of alle desertes medlid wiþoute discresioun. ¶ And
ȝitte þer folweþ an oþer inconuenient of þe whiche þer [4572]
ne may ben þouȝt ne more felonous ne more wikke. And from this it will follow—that since all order comes of Divine Providence, and that there is no freedom of the human will, that also our vices must be referred to the author of all good—which is a most impious opinion. and
þat is þis þat so as þe ordre of þinges is yledd and
comeþ of þe purueaunce of god. ne þat no þing nis
leueful to þe conseils of mankynde. as who seiþ þat [4576]
men han no power to done no þing. ne wilne no þing.
þan folweþ it þat oure vices ben refferred to þe mak[er]e
of alle good. as who seiþ þan folweþ it. þat god auȝt[e]
han þe blame of oure vices. syn he constreiniþ by [4580]
necessite to don vices. Then is it useless to hope for anything from God, or to pray to him. þan nis þer no resoun to han
hopen in god. ne forto preien to god. For why should men do either, when all they can desire is irreversibly predestined? ¶ For what
sholde any wyȝt hopen to god. or whi sholde he preien
to god. syn þat þe ordenaunce of destine whiche þat ne [4584]
may nat ben enclined. knytteþ and streiniþ alle þinges
þat men may desiren. Hope and prayer being thus ineffectual, all intercourse is cut off between God and man. ¶ þan sholde þere be don awey
þilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen god and men. þat is to
seien to hopen and to preien. By reverent and humble supplication we earn divine grace, a most inestimable favour, and are able to associate with the Deity, and to unite ourselves to the inaccessible light. but by þe preis of ryȝtfulnesse [4588]
and of veray mekenesse we deserue þe gerdoun
of þe deuyne grace whiche þat is inestimable. þat is to
sein þat it is so grete þat it ne may nat ben ful ypreised.
and þis is oonly þe manere. þat is to seyen hope and [4592]
prayeres. for whiche it semeþ þat [men] mowen speken
wiþ god. and by resoun of supplicacioun ben conioigned
to þilk clernesse þat nis nat approched no raþer or
þat men byseken it and emprenten it. If men believe that hope and prayer have no power because of the necessity of future events, by what other way can we be united, and hold fast to the sovereign Lord of all things? And yif men [4596]
ne wene [nat] þat [hope] ne preiers ne han no strengþes.
by þe necessite of þinges to comen y-resceiued. what
þing is þer þan by whiche we mowen be conioygned
and clyuen to þilke souereyne prince of þinges. Wherefore mankind must be dissevered and disunited from the source of its existence, and shrink from its beginning. ¶ For [4600]
whiche it byhoueþ by necessite þat þe lynage of mankynde
[* fol. 36.] as *þou songe a litel here byforne ben departed
and vnioyned from hys welle and faylen of hys bygynnynge.
þat is to seien god. [4604]
4437 harde—hard
4445 haþ—MS. haþe
4446 whiche—which
4450 wille—wil
whiche—which þat
4451 haþ—MS. haþe
4453 stedfast—stydefast