4644 nouþir habit—nother habite
4645 alle (both)—al
haþ—MS. haþe
4648 [Glosa]—from C.
4649 [textus]—from C.
4650 haþ (both)—MS. haþe
ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS AGAINST PROVIDENCE.
[TAMEN ILLA UETUS INQUIT HEC EST.]
Þanne seide P. This is the old objection against Providence, so ably handled by Cicero in his Book of Divination; and you yourself have anxiously discussed it. she. þis is quod she þe olde questioun of
þe purueaunce of god. and marcus tulius whan he [4652]
deuided[e] þe deuinaciouns. þat is to sein in hys booke
þat he wroot of deuinaciouns. he moeued[e] gretly þis
questioun. and þou þi self hast souȝt it mochel and
outerly and long[e]. But neither of you have offered a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. but ȝit ne haþ it nat ben determined [4656]
ne yspedd fermely and diligently of any of yow.
The cause of this mystery is that the human understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the divine prescience, for if it were possible to comprehend this, every difficulty would at once disappear. ¶ And þe cause of þis derkenesse and [of this] difficulte
is for þat þe moeuynge of þe resoun of mankynde ne
may nat moeuen to. þat is to sein applien or ioygnen to [4660]
þe simplicite of þe deuyne prescience. ¶ þe whiche
symplicite of þe deuyne prescience ȝif þat men [myhten
thinken it in any manere / þat is to seyn / þat yif men] myȝte
þinken and comprehenden þe þinges as god seeþ hem. [4664]
þan ne sholde þer dwellen outerly no doute. I shall, therefore, try to explain and solve this difficult question. þe whiche
resoun and cause of difficulte I shal assaie at þe laste
to shewen and to speden. [* fol. 36 b.] ¶ whan I haue *firste
[yspendyd / and] ansewered to þo resouns by whiche þou [4668]
art ymoeued. I ask, then, why you do not approve the reasoning of such as think—that Prescience does not obstruct the liberty of the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future events? ¶ For I axe whi þou wenest þat þilk[e]
resouns of hem þat assoilen þis questioun ne ben nat
spedeful ynouȝ ne sufficient þe whiche solucioun or þe
whiche resoun for þat it demiþ þat þe prescience nis nat [4672]
cause of necessite to þinges to comen. þan ne weneþ it
nat þat fredom of wille be distourbed or ylett by prescience.
NECESSITY AND PRESCIENCE.
Do you draw an argument of the necessity of future events, from any other topic than this,—that those things which are foreknown must of necessity happen? for ne drawest þou nat argumentes from ellys
where of þe necessite of þinges to comen. As who seiþ [4676]
any oþer wey þan þus. but þat þilke þinge þat þe prescience
woot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. þat is to
seyn þat þei moten bitide. If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man’s will free and unconstrained? ¶ But þan yif þat prescience
ne putteþ no necessite to þinges to comen. as þou þi self [4680]
hast confessed it and byknowen a litel herbyforne. ¶ what
cause [or what] is it. as who seiþ þere may no cause be.
by whiche þat þe endes (exitus) uoluntarie of þinges
myȝten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng. For argument sake let us suppose there is no prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will alone be under the power of necessity? ¶ For [4684]
by grace of possessioun. so þat þou mowe þe better vndirstonde
þis þat folweþ. ¶ I pose (inpossibile) þat
þer ne be no prescience. þan axe I quod she in as
moche as apperteniþ to þat. sholde þan þinges þat [4688]
comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden by
necessite. B. No. Boicius. nay quod I. P. Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will would still remain entire and absolute. þan aȝeinward quod
she. I suppose þat þere be prescience but þat ne putteþ
no necessite to þinges. þan trowe I þat þilk self fredom [4692]
of wille shal dwellen al hool and absolut and vnbounden.
But although Prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable necessity. but þou wolt sein þat al be it so þat prescience
nis nat cause of þe necessite of bitidynge to þinges to
comen. ¶ Algates ȝitte it is a signe þat þe þinges ben [4696]
to bytiden by necessite. by þis manere þan al þouȝ þe
prescience ne hadde neuer yben. ȝit algate or at þe
lest[e] wey. it is certeyne þing þat þe endys and þe
bitydynges of þinges to comen sholde ben necessarie. [4700]