For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself, but only points out what the individual is. ¶ For euery sygne sheweþ and signifieþ oonly what þe
þing is ¶ but it ne makiþ nat þe þing þat it signifieþ.
Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a sign of that necessity. ¶ For whiche it byhoueþ firste to shewen þat no þing
ne bitidiþ [þat it ne bytydith] by necessite. so þat it [4704]
may apere þat þe prescience is signe of þis necessite
For if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the sign of that which has no existence. ¶ or ellys yif þere nere no necessite. certys þilke prescience
ne myȝt[e] nat ben signe of þinge þat nis nat.
NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY.
The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity, must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign causes. ¶ But certys it is nowe certeyne þat þe preue of þis [4708]
susteniþ by stedfast resoun ne shal nat ben ladd ne
proued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wiþ oute.
but by causes couenable and necessarie ¶ But þou
mayst sein how may it be þat þe þinges ne bitiden nat [4712]
þat ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ryȝt as we
trowen þat þo þinges whiche þat þe purueaunce woot byforn
to comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [þat] ne sholde
we nat demen. but raþer al þouȝ [þat] þei schal bitiden. [4716]
ȝit ne haue þei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.
and þis maist þou lyȝtly aperceyuen by þis þat I shal
seyn. We see many things when they are done before our eyes; such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like nature. but we seen many þinges whan þei ben don byforn
oure eyen ryȝt as men seen þe karter worken in þe [4720]
tournynge and in attempryng or in adressyng of hys
kartes or chariottes. ¶ and by þis manere as who seiþ
mayst þou vnderstonde of alle manere oþir werkemen.
Now, is there any necessity which compels these things to be done? ¶ Is þere þanne any necessite as who seiþ in oure lokynge [4724]
[þat] constreineþ or compelliþ any of þilke þinges
to ben don so. B. No. For if all things were moved by compulsion—the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless. b. nay quod I ¶ For in ydel and in
veyne were alle þe effect of crafte yif þat alle þinges
weren moeued by constreynynge. þat is to seyn by constreynynge [4728]
of oure eyen or of oure syȝt. P. The things, then, which are done are under no necessity that they should be done; then first before they were done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by necessity. P. þise þingus
þan quod she þat whan men don hem ne han non
necessite þat men don hem. eke þo same þinges first or
þei be don. þei ben to comen wiþ out necessite. for whi [4732]
þer ben somme þinges to bytide of whiche þe endys
[* fol. 37.] and þe bitidynges of hem ben absolut *and quit of alle
necessite. These things therefore, although foreknown, have free events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to come. for certys I ne trowe nat þat any man wolde seyn
þis. þat þo þinges þat men don now þat þei ne weren [4736]
to bitiden. first or þei were ydon ¶ and þilk same
þinges al þouȝ þat men hadden ywyst hem by-forn.
ȝitte þei han fre bitidynges. for ryȝt as science of
þinges present ne bryngeþ in no necessite to þinges [4740]
[þat men doon // Ryht so the prescience of thinges to
comen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytiden
But you may doubt whether there can be any certain prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for here there seems to be an evident contradiction. but þou mayst seyn þat of þilke same it is ydouted. as
wheþer þat of þilke þinges þat ne han non endes and [4744]
bytidynges necessaryes yif þer-of may ben any prescience
THE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE.
If things are foreknown, you may contend they must necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing but what is absolutely certain. ¶ For certys þei seme to discorde. for þou
wenest þat yif þat þinges ben yseyn byforn þat necessite
folweþ hem. and yif (et putas) necessite faileþ hem þei ne [4748]
myȝten nat ben wist byforn. and þat no þinge ne may
ben comprehendid by science but certeyne. And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion. and yif þo
þinges þat ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueied
as certeyn. For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of things otherwise than they really are. it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppinioun nat [4752]
soþefastnesse of science [and þou weenyst þat it be diuerse
fro the hoolnesse of science / þat any man sholde deme
a thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self]. The cause of this error is that men imagine that their knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known, whereas it is quite the reverse. and þe
cause of þis errour is. þat of alle þe þinges þat euery [4756]
wyȝt haþ yknowe. þei wenen þat þo þinges ben y-knowe
al oonly by þe strengþe and by þe nature of þe þinges
þat ben ywyst or yknowe. and it is al þe contrarie. for
alle þat euere is yknowe. Things are not known from their inherent properties, but by the faculties of the observer. it is raþer comprehendid and [4760]
yknowen nat after his strengeþ and hys nature. but after
þe faculte þat is to seyn þe power and [the] nature of
hem þat knowen. The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way, and the touch in another. and for þat þis shal mowe shewen by
a short ensample þe same roundenes of a body .O. oþer [4764]
weyes þe syȝt of þe eye knoweþ it. and oþer weyes þe
touching. The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and by beholding it comprehends its form. þe lokynge by castynge of his bemes waiteþ
and seeþ fro afer alle þe body to-gider wiþ oute mouynge
of it self. But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round. but þe touchinge cliuiþ and conioigneþ to þe [4768]
rounde body (orbi) and moueþ abouten þe environynge.
and comprehendiþ by parties þe roundenesse.
SENSE, REASON, AND INTELLIGENCE.
Man himself is surveyed in divers ways—by the senses, by the imagination, by reason, and by the intelligence (of the Deity). ¶ and þe man hym self oþer weies wyt byholdiþ hym. and
oþerweyes ymaginacioun and oþer weyes resoun. and [4772]
oþer weyes intelligence. The senses take note of his material figure—the imagination considers the form alone, exclusive of the matter. ¶ For þe wit comprehendiþ
fro wiþ outen furþe þe figure of þe body of þe man. þat
is establissed in þe matere subiect. But þe ymaginacioun
[comprehendith only the figure with owte the matere / [4776]
Reason transcends the imaginations, and examining existences in general discovers the particular species, but the eye of Intelligence soars still higher; for, going beyond the bounds of what is general, it surveys the simple forms themselves, by its own pure and subtle thought: Resoun surmounteth ymaginacioun] and comprehendeþ
by an vniuersel lokynge þe commune spece (speciem)
þat is in þe singuler peces. ¶ But þe eye of intelligence
is heyȝer for it sourmounteþ þe envirounynge of þe [4780]
vniuersite and lookeþ ouer þat by pure subtilite of þouȝt.
in which this is chiefly to be considered, that the higher power of perception embraces the lower; but the inferior cannot attain to the energy of the superior: þilk same symple forme of man þat is perdurably in þe
deuyne þouȝt. in whiche þis auȝt[e] gretely to ben considered
þat þe heyest strengþe to comprehenden þinges [4784]
enbraceþ and conteyneþ þe lower[e] strengþe [but the
lowere strengthe ne arysith nat in no manere to heyere
strengthe]. for the senses cannot go beyond the perception of matter; the imagination cannot comprehend existences in general, nor can the reason conceive the simple form. for wit ne may no þinge comprehende oute of
matere. ne þe ymagynacioun ne lokeþ nat þe vniuerseles [4788]
speces. ne resoun ne takeþ nat þe symple forme. so as
intelligence takeþ it. But the Intelligence looking down (as from above) and having conceived the form, discerns all things that are below it, and comprehends what does not fall within the reach of the other faculties of the mind. but þe intelligence þat lokeþ al
abouen whan it haþ comprehendid þe forme it knoweþ
and demeþ alle þe þinges þat ben vndir þat forme. but [4792]
she knoweþ hem vndir þilke manere in þe whiche it
comprehendiþ þilke same symple forme þat ne may
neuer be knowen to non of þat oþer. þat is to seyn to
non of þo þre forseide strengþes of þe soule. Without the aid of those faculties Intelligence comprehends things formally (i. e. by beholding their simple forms) by one effort of mind. for it [4796]
knoweþ þe vniuersite of resoun and þe figure of þe ymaginacioun.
and þe sensible material conseiued. and þou
wenest þat it be diuerse fro þe hoolnesse of science. þat
any man sholde deme a þing to ben oþerweyes þan it is [4800]
it self and þe cause of þis errour etc’. vt supra. by wit.
Reason, without the aid of Imagination and Sense, in considering things in general, comprehends all imaginable and sensible things. ne it ne vseþ nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne
of wit wiþ oute forþe but it byholdeþ alle þinges so as I
shal seye. by a strok of þouȝt formely wiþ oute discours [4804]
or collacioun ¶ Certys resoun whan it lokeþ any þing
vniuersel it ne vseþ nat of ymaginacioun nor of wit and
algates ȝit [it] comprendiþ þe þinges ymaginable and
sensible. For instance, reason defines her general conceptions thus:— [* fol. 37 b.] for resoun is she þat *diffinisseþ þe vniuersel [4808]
of hir conseite ryȝt þus. Man is a rational two-footed animal, which, though it be a general idea, yet every one knows that man thus defined is perceived both by the imagination and the senses, notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use of imagination or the senses, but of her own rational conception. ¶ Man is a resonable t[w]o-footid
beest. and how so þat þis knowynge [is] vniuersel.
ȝit nys þer no wyȝt þat ne woot wel. þat a man is ymaginable and sensible ¶ and þis same considereþ wel [4812]
resoun. but þat nis nat by ymaginacioun. nor by witte.
but it lokiþ it by [a] resonable concepcioun.
The imagination also, although it derives its power of seeing and forming figures from the senses, yet in the absence and without the use of the senses it considers and comprehends all sensible things by its own imaginative power. ¶ Also ymaginacioun
al be it so. þat it takeþ of wit þe bygynyngus
to seen and to formen þe figures. algates al þouȝ þat wit [4816]
ne ware not present. ȝit it envirouniþ and comprehendiþ
alle þinges sensible. nat by resoun sensible of demynge.
but by resoun ymaginatif. Do not you see that men attain to the knowledge of things more by their own faculties, than by the inherent property of things? ¶ sest þou nat þan þat alle
þe þinges in knowynge vsen more of hir faculte or of hir [4820]
power. þan þei don of [the] faculte or of power of þinges
þat ben yknowen. Nor is it unreasonable that it should be so—for since every judgment is the act of the person judging; every one must needs do his own work by the help of his own faculties, and not by the aid of foreign power. ne þat nis no wronge. for so as euery
iugement is þe dede or þe doynge of hym þat demeþ. It
byhoueþ þat euery wyȝt performe þe werke and hys entencioun [4824]
nat of forein power; but of hys propre power.