4866 soune—sown
4868 furþe—forth
4870 out—owte
4871 out forþe—owte forth
4872 forme[s]—formes
yhid—I-hidde
INTELLIGENCE A DIVINE ATTRIBUTE.
[QUOD SI IN CORPORIBUS SENCIENDIS.]
*QUESTIO.
But what Although there are in objects certain qualities which strike externally upon the senses, and put their instruments in motion; although the passive impression upon the body precedes the action of the mind, [yif] þat in bodies to ben feelid þat is
to sein in þe takynge of knowelechinge of bodyly
þinges. and al be it so þat þe qualites of bodies þat ben
obiect fro wiþ oute forþe moeuen and entalenten þe instrumentes [4876]
of þe wittes. and although the former rouses the latter to action, yet if in the perception of bodily things, the soul is not by the impression of external things made to know these things, but by its own power judgeth of these bodily impressions, and al be it so þat þe passioun
of þe body þat is to seyn þe witte [or the] suffraunce
[goth to-forn the strengthe of the workynge corage / the
which passioun or suffraunce] clepiþ furþe þe dede of [4880]
þe þouȝt in hym self. and moeueþ and exiteþ in þis
mene while þe formes þat resten wiþ in forþe. and yif
þat in sensible bodies as I haue seid oure corage nis nat
ytauȝt or enprentid by passioun to knowe þise þinges. [4884]
but demiþ and knoweþ of hys owen strengþe þe passioun
or suffraunce subiect to þe body. how much more shall those pure spiritual beings (as God or angels) discern things by an act of their understanding alone, without the aid of impressions from external objects? Moche more þan þoo
þinges þat ben absolut and quit fram alle talentȝ or
affecciouns of bodies. as god or hys aungels ne folwen [4888]
nat in discernynge þinges obiect from wiþ oute forþe.
but þei accomplissen and speden þe dede of hir þouȝt For this reason, then, there are several sorts of knowing distributed among various beings. by þis resoun.
¶ þan þere comen many manere knowynges
to dyuerse and differyng substaunces. For sense (or sensation) destitute of all other knowledge is allotted to those creatures that have no motion, as shell-fish. for þe wit [4892]
of þe body þe whiche witte is naked and despoyled of
alle oþer knowynges. þilke witte comeþ to bestes þat ne
mowen nat moeuen hem self here ne þere. as oystres
and muscles and oþer swiche shelle fysshe of þe see. [4896]
þat cliuen and ben norissed to roches. But imagination is given to such brutes capable of motion, and having in some degree the power of desiring or refusing. but þe ymaginacioun
comeþ to remuable bestes þat semen to han talent
to fleen or to desiren any þinge. Reason, however, is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God. but resoun is al only to
þe lynage of mankynde ryȝt as intelligence is oonly þe [4900]
deuyne nature. Hence His (i. e. God’s) knowledge exceeds all other, comprehending both what belongs to His own nature, and what is comprehended by all inferior creatures. of whiche it folweþ þat þilke knowyng
is more worþe þan [th]is[e] oþer. syn it knoweþ by hys
propre nature nat only hys subiect. as who seiþ it ne
knoweþ nat al oonly þat apperteiniþ proprely to hys [4904]
knowynge. but it knoweþ þe subgitȝ of alle oþer knowynges.
THE POWERS OF SENSE AND IMAGINATION.