But how shall it be then, if sense and imagination oppose reason, affirming that the general idea of things, which reason thinks it so perfectly sees, is nothing? but how shal it þan be yif þat wit and ymaginacioun
stryuen aȝeins resonynge and sein þat of þilke
vniuersel þinges. þat resoun weneþ to seen þat it nis [4908]
ryȝt nauȝt. For what falls under the cognisance of the senses and imagination cannot be general. for wit and ymaginacioun seyn þat þat. þat
is sensible or ymaginable it ne may nat ben vniuersel.
þan is eiþer þe iugement of resoun [soth]. ne þat
þer nis no þinge sensible. or ellys for þat resoun woot [4912]
wel þat many þinges ben subiect to wit and to ymaginacioun.
þan is þe consepcioun of resoun veyn and fals
whiche þat lookeþ and comprehendiþ. þat þat is
sensible and synguler as uniuersele. But if reason should answer to this—that in her idea of what is general she comprehends whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their knowledge is confined to material figures; and therefore in all real knowledge of things we must give the greatest credit to that faculty which has a more steadfast and perfect judgment of things. and ȝif þat resoun [4916]
wolde answeren aȝein to þise two þat is to sein to wit
and to ymaginacioun. and sein þat soþely she hir self.
þat is to seyn þat resoun lokeþ and comprehendiþ by
resoun of vniuersalite. boþe þat þat is sensible and þat [4920]
þat is ymaginable. and þat þilke two þat is to seyn wit
and ymaginacioun ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhaunsen
hem self to knowynge of vniuersalite for þat
þe knowyng of hem ne may exceden nor sourmounten [4924]
þe bodyly figure ¶ Certys of þe knowyng of þinges
men auȝten raþer ȝeue credence to þe more stedfast and
to þe more perfit iugement. In a controversy of this kind ought not we, who possess faculties of reason, &c., to side with reason and espouse her cause? In þis manere stryuynge
þan we þat han strengþe of resonynge and of ymaginynge [4928]
and of wit þat is to seyn by resoun and by ymaginacioun
and by wit. [and] we sholde raþer preise þe cause
of resoun. as who seiþ þan þe cause of wit or ymaginacioun.
REASON SHOULD SUBMIT TO INTELLIGENCE.
The case is entirely similar when human reason thinks the Divine Intelligence cannot behold future events in any other way than she herself is capable of perceiving them. semblable þinge is it þat þe resoun of mankynde [4932]
ne weneþ nat þat þe deuyne intelligence byholdeþ or
knoweþ þinges to comen. but ryȝt as þe resoun of mankynde
knoweþ hem. For thus you argue:— for þou arguist and seist þus.
What things are not necessitated cannot be foreknown; therefore there is no prescience of these things, for, if there were, everything would be fixed by an absolute necessity. þat yif it ne seme nat to men þat somme þinges han certeyne [4936]
and necessarie bytidynges. þei ne mowen nat ben wist
byforn certeynely to bytiden. þan nis [ther] no prescience
of þilke þinges. and yif we trowen þat prescience
ben in þise þinges. þan is þer no þinge þat it ne [4940]
bitidiþ by necessite. If it were possible to enjoy the intelligence of the Deity, we should then deem it right that sense and imagination should yield to reason, and also judge it proper that human reason should submit to the Divine Intelligence. but certys yif we myȝten han þe
[* fol. 38 b.] iugement of þe deuyne þouȝt as we *ben parsoners of
resoun. ryȝt so as we han demed. it byhoueþ þat ymaginacioun
and wit ben byneþe resoun. ryȝt so wolde [4944]
we demen þat it were ryȝtful þing þat mans resoun
auȝt[e] to summitten it self and to ben byneþe þe deuyne
þouȝt. Let us, therefore, strive to elevate ourselves to the height of the supreme intelligence—there shall reason see what she cannot discover in herself; and that is in what manner the prescience of God sees and defines all things; although they have no certain event; and she will see that this is no mere conjecture, but rather simple, supreme, and unlimited knowledge. for whiche þat yif we mowen. as who seiþ.
þat yif þat we mowen I conseil[e] þat we enhanse vs in [4948]
to þe heyȝt of þilke souereyne intelligence. for þere shal
resoun wel seen þat þat it ne may nat by-holden in it
self. and certys þat is þis in what manere þe prescience
of god seeþ alle þinges certeins and difinissed al þouȝ þei [4952]
ne han no certein issues or by-tydynges. ne þis is non
oppinioun but it is raþer þe simplicite of þe souereyn
science þat nis nat enclosed nor yshet wiþinne no boundes.
4873 [yif]—from C.
4878 [or the]—from C.
suffraunce—MS. suffisaunce, C. suffraunce
4879-80 [goth——suffraunce]—from C.
4883 seid—MS. seide, C. seyd
4887 quit—quite
4888 hys—hise