DEFINITION OF ETERNITY.
PROSA VLTIMA.
[QUONIAM IGITUR UTI PAULO ANTE.]
ÞEr-fore þan Since everything which is known is not, as I have shown, perceived by its own inherent properties, but by the faculties of those comprehending them, let us now examine the disposition of the Divine nature. as I haue shewed a litel her byforne þat [4976]
al þinge þat is ywist nis nat knowen by hys nature
propre. but by þe nature of hem þat comprehenden it.
¶ Lat vs loke now in as moche as it is leueful to vs. as
who seiþ lat vs loken now as we mowen whiche þat þe [4980]
estat is of þe deuyne substaunce so þat we mowen [ek]
knowen what his science is. All rational creatures agree in affirming that God is eternal. þe comune iugement of alle
creatures resonables þan is þis þat god is eterne. lat vs
considere þan what is eternite. For certys þat shal [4984]
shewen vs to-gidre þe deuyne nature and þe deuyne
science And eternity is a full, total, and perfect possession of a life which shall never end. This will appear more clearly from a comparison with temporal things. ¶ Eternite þan is perfit possessioun and al
togidre of lijf interminable and þat sheweþ more clerely
by þe comparisoun or collacioun of temporel þinges. Temporal existence proceeds from the past to the present, and thence to the future. for [4988]
al þing þat lyueþ in tyme it is present and procediþ fro
preteritȝ in to futures. þat is to sein. fro tyme passed
in to tyme comynge. And there is nothing under the law of time, which can at once comprehend the whole space of its existence. ne þer nis no þing establissed in
tyme þat may enbracen to-gidre al þe space of hys lijf. [4992]
THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL.
Having lost yesterday it does not as yet enjoy to-morrow; and as for to-day it consists only in the present transitory moment. for certys ȝit ne haþ it nat taken þe tyme of þe morwe.
and it haþ lost þat of ȝister-day. and certys in þe lijf
of þis day ȝe ne lyuen no more but ryȝt as in þis moeueable
and transitorie moment. Whatever, therefore, is subjected to a temporal condition, as Aristotle thought of the world, may be without beginning and without end; and although its duration may extend to an infinity of time, yet it cannot rightly be called eternal: for it doth not comprehend at once the whole extent of its infinite duration, having no knowledge of things future which are not yet arrived. þan þilke þinge þat suffriþ [4996]
temporel condicioun. a[l]þoughe þat [it] bygan neuer
to be. ne þoughe it neuere cese forto be. as aristotle
demde of þe worlde. and al þouȝ þat þe lif of it be
strecchid wiþ infinite of tyme. [* fol. 39.] ȝit al*gates nis it no [5000]
swiche þing þat men myȝten trowen by ryȝt þat it is
eterne. for al þouȝ þat it comprehende and embrace þe
space of life infinite. ȝit algates ne [em]braceþ it nat þe
space of þe lif alto-gidre. for it ne haþ nat þe futures [5004]
þat ne ben nat ȝit. ne it ne haþ no lenger þe preteritȝ
þat ben ydon or ypassed. For what is eternal must be always present to itself and master of itself, and have always with it the infinite succession of time. but þilke þing þan þat haþ
and comprehendiþ to-gidre alle þe plente of þe lif interminable.
to whom þere ne failiþ nat of þe future. [5008]
and to whom þer nis nat of þe preterit escapid nor
ypassed. þilk[e] same is ywitnessed or yproued by ryȝt
to ben eterne. and it byhoueþ by necessite þat þilke
þinge be alwey present to hym self and compotent. as [5012]
who seiþ alwey present to hym self and so myȝty þat al
by ryȝt at hys plesaunce. and þat he haue al present
þe infinit of þe moeuable tyme. Therefore some philosophers, who had heard that Plato believed that this world had neither beginning nor end, falsely concluded, that the created universe was coeternal with its Creator. wherfore som men
trowen wrongefully þat whan þei heren þat it semid[e] [5016]
to plato þat þis worlde ne had[de] neuer bygynnynge
of tyme. ne þat it neuere shal haue faylynge. þei wenen
in þis manere þat þis worlde ben maked coeterne wiþ
his makere. as who seiþ. þei wenen þat þis worlde and [5020]
god ben maked to-gidre eterne. and it is a wrongful
wenynge. But it is one thing to be conducted through a life of infinite duration, which was Plato’s opinion of the world, and another thing to comprehend at once the whole extent of this duration as present which, it is manifest, can only belong to the Divine mind. for oþer þing is it to ben yladd by lif interminable
as plato graunted[e] to þe worlde. and oþer
þing is it to embracen to-gidre alle þe presence to þe lif [5024]
interminable. þe whiche þing it is clere and manifest
þat it is propre to þe deuine þouȝt. Nor ought it to seem to us that God is prior to and more ancient than his creatures by the space of time, but rather by the simple and undivided properties of his nature. ne it ne sholde nat
semen to vs þat god is elder þan þinges þat ben ymaked
by quantite of tyme. but raþer by þe proprete of hys [5028]
symple nature. The infinite progression of temporal things imitates the ever-present condition of an immovable life: for þis ilke infinit[e] moeuyng of temporel
þinges folwiþ þis presentarie estat of þe lijf inmoeueable.
GOD IS ETERNAL.
and since it cannot copy nor equal it from an immovable and simply present state, it passes into motion and into an infinite measure of past and future time. and so as it ne may nat contrefeten it ne feynen
it ne ben euene lyke to it. for þe inmoeueablete. þat is [5032]
to seyn þat is in þe eternite of god. ¶ it faileþ and
falleþ in to moeuynge fro þe simplicite of [the] presence
of god. and disencresiþ to þe infinite quantite of
future and of preterit. But since it cannot possess at once the whole extent of its duration, yet, as it never ceases wholly to be, it faintly emulates that whose perfection it can neither attain nor express, by attaching itself to the present fleeting moment, which, because it resembles the durable present time, imparts to those things that partake of it an appearance of existence. and so as it ne may nat han togidre [5036]
al þe plente of þe lif. algates ȝitte for as moche as
it ne cesiþ neuere forto ben in som manere it semeþ
somde[l] to vs þat it folwiþ and resembliþ þilke þing
þat it ne may nat attayne to. ne fulfille. and byndeþ it [5040]
self to som manere presence of þis litel and swifte
moment. þe whiche presence of þis lytele and swifte
moment. for þat it bereþ a manere ymage or lykenesse
of þe ay dwellynge presence of god. it graunteþ to [5044]
swiche manere þinges as it bitidiþ to þat it semeþ hem
þat þise þinges han ben and ben But as it cannot stop or abide it pursues its course through infinite time, and by gliding along it continues its duration, the plenitude of which it could not comprehend, by abiding in a permanent state. and for [þat] þe presence
of swiche litel moment ne may nat dwelle þer-for
[it] rauyssid[e] and took þe infinit[e] wey of tyme. þat [5048]
is to seyn by successioun. and by þis manere it is ydon.
for þat it sholde continue þe lif in goynge of þe whiche
lif it ne myȝt[e] nat embrace þe plente in dwellynge.
If we would follow Plato in giving things their right names, let us say that God is eternal and the world perpetual. and for þi yif we willen putte worþi name to þinges [5052]
and folwen plato. lat vs seyn þan soþely þat god is
eterne. and þat þe worlde is perpetuel. His knowledge, surpassing the progression of time, is ever present, containing the infinite space of past and future times, and embraces in his clear insight all things, as if they were now transacting. þan syn þat
euery iugement knoweþ and comprehendiþ by hys owen
nature þinges þat ben subiect vnto hym. þere is soþely [5056]
al-wey to god an eterne and presentarie estat. and þe
science of hym þat ouer-passeþ alle temporel moe[ue]ment
dwelliþ in þe symplicite of hys presence and embraceþ
and considereþ alle þe infinit spaces of tymes [5060]
preteritȝ and futures and lokeþ in þis symple knowynge
alle þinges of preterit ryȝt as þei weren ydoon presently
ryȝt now Prescience is, then, a foreknowledge, not of what is to come, but of the present and never-failing now (in which God sees all things as if immovably present). ¶ yif þou wolt þan þenke and avisen þe
[* fol. 39 b.] prescience by whiche it knoweþ al[le] þinges *þou ne [5064]
shalt nat demen it as prescience of þinges to comen.
DEFINITION OF PRESCIENCE.
but þou shalt demen [it] more ryȝtfully þat it is science
of presence or of instaunce þat neuer ne fayleþ. Therefore foreknowledge is not so applicable a term as providence—for God looks down upon all things from the summit of the universe. for
whiche it nis nat ycleped prouidence but it sholde raþer [5068]
be cleped purueaunce þat is establissed ful fer fro ryȝt
lowe þinges. and byholdeþ from a-fer alle þinges ryȝt as
it were fro þe heye heyȝte of þinges. Do you think that God imposes a necessity on things by beholding them? It is not so in human affairs. whi axest þou þan
or why disputest þou þan þat þilke þinges ben don by [5072]
necessite whiche þat ben yseyen and yknowen by þe
deuyne syȝt. syn þat for soþe men ne maken nat þilke
þinges necessarie. whiche þat þe seen be ydoon in
hire syȝt. Does your view of an action lay any necessity upon it? for addiþ þi byholdynge any necessite to þilke [5076]
þinges þat þou byholdest present. B. No. ¶ Nay quod I. P. By parity of reason it is clear that whilst you see only some things in a limited instant, God sees all things in his ever-present time. p.
Certys þan yif men myȝte maken any digne comparisoun
or collacioun of þe presence diuine. and of þe presence
of mankynde. ryȝt so as ȝe seen somme þinges in þis [5080]
temporel presente. ryȝt so seeþ god alle þinges by hys
eterne present. His Divine prescience therefore does not change the nature of things—but only beholds those things as present to him which shall in time be produced. ¶ wherfore þis dyuyne prescience ne
chaungeþ nat þe nature ne þe proprete of þinges but
byholdeþ swyche þinges present to hym ward. as þei [5084]
shollen bytiden to ȝow ward in tyme to come. Nor does he judge confusedly of them, but knows at one view what will necessarily and what will not necessarily happen. ne it ne
confoundeþ nat þe Iugementȝ of þinges but by of syȝt
of hys þouȝt he knoweþ þe þinges to comen as wel
necessarie as nat necessarie. ryȝt so as whan ȝe seen togidre [5088]
a man walke on þe erþe and þe sonne arysen in
[the] heuene. al be it so þat ȝe seen and byholden þat
oon and þat oþer to-gidre. ȝit naþeles ȝe demen and
discerne þat þat oon is uoluntarie and þat oþer is necessarie. [5092]