THE NATURE OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
The eye of God, seeing all things, doth not alter the properties of things, for everything is present to him, though its temporal event is future. ¶ Ryȝt so þan [the] deuyne lokynge byholdynge
alle þinges vndir hym ne troubleþ nat þe qualite of
þinges þat ben certeynely present to hym ward. but as
to þe condicioun of tyme for soþe þei ben future. When God knows that anything is to be, he knows at the same time that it is not under the necessity of being—but this is not conjecture, but certain knowledge founded upon truth. for [5096]
whiche it folwiþ þat þis nis non oppinioun. but raþer a
stedfast knowyng ystrengeþed by soþenes. þat whan
þat god knoweþ any þinge to be he ne vnwoot nat þat
þilke þinge wanteþ necessite to be. þis is to seyn þat [5100]
whan þat god knoweþ any þinge to bitide. he woot wel
þat it ne haþ no necessite to bitide. If you insist that what God foresees shall and must happen; and that which cannot do otherwise than happen, must needs happen, and so bind me to admit a necessity, I must confess that things are under such a restraint; but it is a truth that we scarce can comprehend, unless we be acquainted with the Divine counsels. and yif þou seist
here þat þilke þinge þat god seeþ to bytide it ne may
nat vnbytide. as who seiþ it mot bitide. ¶ and þilke [5104]
þinge þat þat ne may nat vnbytide it mot bitide by
necessite. and þat þou streine me to þis name of necessite.
certys I wol wel confessen and byknowe a þinge of
ful sadde trouþe. but vnneþ shal þere any wyȝt [mowe] [5108]
seen it or comen þer-to. but yif þat he be byholder of þe
deuyne þouȝte. For I will answer you thus. That the thing which is to happen in relation to the Divine knowledge is necessary; but, considered in its own nature, seems free and absolute. ¶ for I wol answere þe þus. þat þilke
þinge þat is future whan it is referred to þe deuyne
knowyng þan is it necessarie. but certys whan it is vndirstonden [5112]
in hys owen kynde men sen it [is] vtterly fre
and absolut from alle necessite. There are two kinds of necessity—one simple; as men must necessarily die—the other is conditional, as if you know a man walks he must necessarily walk—for that which is known cannot be otherwise than what it is apprehended to be. for certys þer ben two
maneres of necessites. þat oon necessite is symple as
þus. þat it byhoueþ by necessite þat alle men be mortal [5116]
or dedely. an oþer necessite is condicionel as þus. yif
þou wost þat a man walkiþ. it byhoueþ by necessite þat
he walke. þilke þinge þan þat any wyȝt haþ yknowe to
be. it ne may ben non oþer weyes þan he knoweþ it to be. [5120]
PRESCIENCE AND NECESSITY.
But this condition does not infer the absolute necessity, for the nature of the thing itself does not here constitute the necessity, but the necessity arises from the conjunction of the condition. ¶ but þis condicioun ne draweþ nat wiþ hir þilke
necessite symple. For certys þis necessite condicionel.
þe propre nature of it ne makeþ it nauȝt. but þe adieccioun
of þe condicioun makiþ it. No necessity compels a man to walk who does so willingly, but it must be necessary that he walk when he does step forward. for no necessite ne constreyneþ [5124]
a man to [gon / þat] gooþ by his propre wille. al be it
so þat whan he gooþ þat it is necessarie þat he gooþ.
So everything that is present to the eye of Providence must assuredly be, although there is nothing in its own nature to constitute that necessity. ¶ Ryȝt on þis same manere þan. yif þat þe purueaunce
of god seeþ any þing present. [* fol. 40.] þan mot þilke *þinge be [5128]
by necessite. al þouȝ þat it ne haue no necessite of hys
owen nature. Since God beholds all future events proceeding from free-will as actually present—these events in relation to Divine sight are necessary—yet in relation to themselves they are absolutely free. but certys þe futures þat bytyden by fredom
of arbitre god seeþ hem alle to-gidre presentȝ. þise
þinges þan [yif] þei ben referred to þe deuyne syȝt. [5132]
þan ben þei maked necessarie to þe condicioun of þe
deuyne knowynge. but certys yif þilke þinges ben considred
by hem self þei ben absolut of necessite. and ne
forleten nat ne cesen nat of þe liberte of hire owen [5136]
nature. All things which God foresees shall surely come to pass; but some of these things proceed from free-will, which although they happen, yet do not thereby change their nature, þan certys wiþ outen doute alle þe þingus
shollen be doon whiche þat god woot by-forn þat þei
ben to comen. but somme of hem comen and bitiden of
[free] arbitre or of fre wille. þat al be it so þat þei bytiden. [5140]
PROVIDENCE AND HUMAN INTENTIONS.
as before they happened they had it in their power not to happen. ȝit algates ne lese þei nat hire propre nature ne
beynge. by þe whiche first or þat þei were doon þei
hadden power nat to han bitidd. But it is a thing of no moment then, whether things are necessary in their own nature or not, since by the condition of the Divine knowledge they fell out as if they were necessitated. Boece. what is þis
to seyn þan quod I. þat þinges ne ben nat necessarie by [5144]
hire propre nature. so as þei comen in alle maneres in
þe lykenesse of necessite by þe condicioun of þe deuyne
science. P. The difference is explained in the instances lately given you, of the man walking, &c. Philosophie. þis is þe difference quod she. þat
þo þinges þat I purposed[e] þe a litel here byforn. þat [5148]
is to seyn þe sonne arysynge and þe man walkynge þat
þerwhiles þat þilke þinges ben ydon. þei ne myȝten nat
ben vndon. The event of the former was necessary before it befell, whereas that of the latter was altogether free. naþeles þat oon of hem or it was ydon it
byhoued[e] by necessite þat it was ydon. but nat þat [5152]
oþer. ryȝt so it is here þat þe þinges þat god haþ present.
wiþ outen doute þei shulle ben. but somme of hem descendiþ
of þe nature of þinges as þe sonne arysynge.
and somme descendiþ of þe power of þe doers as þe man [5156]
walkynge. B. Then I did not go from the truth when I said that some things referred to the Divine knowledge are necessary, while considered in themselves they are not under the bond of necessity. ¶ þan seide I. no wronge þat yif þat þise
þinges ben referred to þe deuyne knowynge þan ben þei
necessarie. and yif þei ben considered by hem selfe þan
ben þei absolut from þe bonde of necessite. In the same way everything that is an object of sense is general when considered in relation to reason—but particular when considered by itself. ryȝt so [as] [5160]
alle þinges þat appiereþ or sheweþ to þe wittes yif þou
referre it to resoun it is vniuersel. and yif þou referre
it or look[e] it to it self. þan is it synguler. But you may say—If I am able to change my purpose I can deceive providence by changing that which she hath foreseen I would do. but now
yif þou seist þus þat yif it be in my power to chaunge [5164]
my purpose. þan shal I voide þe purueaunce of god.
whan þat perauenture I shal han chaunged þo þinges
þat he knoweþ byforn. þan shal I answere þe þus
GOD’S KNOWLEDGE FIXED AND UNCHANGED.
P. You may perhaps alter your purpose—but as providence takes note of your intentions, you cannot deceive her; for you cannot escape the divine prescience though you have the power, through a free-will, to vary and diversify your actions. ¶ Certys þou maist wel chaungen þi purpos but for as [5168]
mochel as þe present soþenesse of þe deuyne purueaunce
byholdeþ þat þou mayst chaungen þi purpose. and
wheþir þou wolt chaunge it or no. and whider-ward
þat þou tourne it. þou maist nat eschewen þe deuyne [5172]
prescience ryȝt as þou ne mayst nat fleen þe syȝt of þe
present eye. al þouȝ þat þou tourne þi self by þi fre
wille in to dyuerse accioun. But you may say—Shall the divine knowledge be changed according to the mutability of my disposition, and the apprehensions of the Deity fluctuated with my changing purposes? ¶ But þou mayst seyn
aȝeyne how shal it þan be. shal nat þe dyuyne science [5176]
ben chaunged by my disposicioun whan þat I wol o
þing now and now an oþer. and þilke prescience ne
semeþ it nat to enterchaunge stoundes of knowynges.
as who seiþ. ne shal it nat seme to vs þat þe deuyne [5180]
prescience enterchaungeþ hys dyuers stoundes of knowynge.
so þat it knowe somme tyme o þing and somme tyme
þe contrarie. No, indeed! The view of the Deity foreruns every future event, and brings it back into the presence of his own knowledge, which does not vary, as you imagine, to conform to your caprices, but remaining fixed, at once foresees and comprehends all your changes. ¶ No for soþe. [quod I] for þe deuyne syȝt
renneþ to-forne and seeþ alle futures and clepeþ hem aȝein [5184]
and retourniþ hem to þe presence of hys propre knowynge.
ne he ne entrechaungeþ nat [so] as þou wenest þe
stoundes of forknowyng [as] now þis now þat. but he
ay dwellynge comiþ byforn and enbraceþ at o strook [5188]
alle þi mutaciouns. This faculty of comprehending and seeing all things as present, God does not receive from the issue of futurities, but from the simplicity of his own nature. and þis presence to comprehenden
and to sen alle þinges. god ne haþ nat taken it of þe
bitydynge of þinges forto come. but of hys propre symplicite.
AN ANSWER TO FORMER OBJECTIONS.