Invention: The Master-key to Progress

by Bradley A. Fiske

[CHAPTER XII]
INVENTION OF THE MODERN MILITARY MACHINE, TELEPHONE, PHONOGRAPH, AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

In 1866, one of the most important inventions of history was put to test, in a war between Austria and Prussia. The invention was the Prussian Military Machine, of which the inventor was von Moltke, the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army. Moltke was not the original inventor of the Military Machine, any more than Watt was the original inventor of the steam engine; but he was the inventor of the modern Military Machine, just as Watt was the inventor of the modern reciprocating steam-engine.

Moltke had been made Chief of Staff in 1858, and had proceeded at once to embody an idea that his mind had conceived some years before. This idea was to utilize all the new inventions of every kind that had been made, especially in weapons, transportation and communication; and to continue to utilize all new inventions as each reached the useful stage, in such a way that the Prussian Army would be an actual weapon, which could be handled with all the quickness and precision that the products of modern civilization could impart to it. Philip of Macedon, Julius Cæsar, and Frederick William of Prussia evidently had had similar ideas; but no one after them, save Moltke, seems to have realized fully that armies and navies must utilize all the new methods and appliances that can be made to assist their operations, if those armies and navies are to attain their maximum effectiveness. It is true that no very great changes in arms or in methods of transportation and communication had recently taken place, at the time when Napoleon went to war; but this only emphasizes the new conditions with which Moltke was confronted, and the courage and resourcefulness with which he met them.

Moltke's Machine was, of course, much more comprehensive and detailed than the paragraph above would indicate; but almost every machine, after it has been perfected, is comprehensive and detailed, even if the original idea was simple. It is true also that the direct means which Moltke employed to perfect his Machine was to train officers to solve independently certain problems in strategy and tactics, just as children at school were taught to solve problems in arithmetic. It is true also that more attention has usually been fixed on Moltke's system of training than on his utilization of inventions, and it may be true that Moltke himself fixed more attention on it. But the idea of training officers as he did, seems also to have been original with Moltke; and it is certain that Moltke was the first to develop such a system, and therefore, that he was the inventor of that system.

We see, therefore, that Moltke made two separate inventions, and combined both in his machine. Both inventions were condemned and ridiculed, but both succeeded. The result was that, when war was declared in 1866 between Prussia and Austria, a reputedly greater nation, the Prussian machine started smoothly but quickly when the button was pressed, advanced into Austria without the slightest delay or jar, collided at once with the Austrian machine, and smashed it in one encounter. This encounter was near Sadowa and Königgrätz, and took place only seventeen days after war began. The most important single invention that Moltke had utilized was the breech-loading "needle gun," a weapon far better than the Austrians had, not only in speed of loading, but in accuracy. The two armies were not very different in point of numbers: so that, even if von Moltke's other measures had not been taken, the superiority of the Prussian musket over the Austrian must of itself have caused the winning of the war, though not so quickly as actually was the case.

But in the war with France, Moltke's machine demonstrated its effectiveness even more completely, because its task was harder. For France was esteemed the greatest military nation in the world; it was the France of Napoleon the Great, then ruled by his nephew Napoleon III. In the usual sense of the word, the French were a more "military" people than the Prussians. The Empire of Napoleon III was much more splendid than the poor little Kingdom of Prussia, the army was more in evidence, there were more military pageants, the people were more ardent. But the military leaders of the French included no such inventor as von Moltke, there was no one who conceived any such ideas as were pictured in Moltke's imaginative brain; and consequently it never occurred to anyone to utilize strenuously all the new inventions, or to train officers like school boys, in the practical problems of war. The result was that Moltke's machine got into France before the French machine had been even put together. The pieces of the French machine had not been got together even when the war ended. When war was declared by France, her military machine was in three parts. Two of them got together fairly quickly, so that the French machine was soon divided into only two parts; one under Marshal Bazaine, and the other under Marshal McMahon. But Moltke's machine was together at the start, and it stayed together throughout the war. This does not mean that all its parts stood in the same spot; but it does mean that the parts were always in supporting distance of each other. The two parts of the French machine were not in supporting distance of each other, and the German machine prevented them from uniting. When McMahon and Bazaine tried to unite, McMahon was defeated at Wörth, and Bazaine at Gravelotte. McMahon was forced to surrender his entire force, including the emperor at Sedan; and Bazaine was shut up in Metz. Paris was then besieged. Bazaine was soon forced to surrender and Paris to capitulate.

The main immediate result was the establishment of the German Empire. A later result was the establishment of what is sometimes called militarism. Of the two, the latter was probably the more important in future consequences; for the influence of Moltke's conception of military preparedness has been to make all civilized nations keep up enormous and highly organized military and naval establishments, under pain of being caught unprepared for war and beaten to subjection.

The German Empire has vanished, but militarism has not vanished. There seem to be no signs that it will soon vanish, for it is simply part of a general preparedness movement that embraces many fields of life, that is necessitated by the existence of this cumbrous Machine of Civilization, and that is advanced by the realization that everyone must cultivate foresight. The physicians tell us, the financiers tell us, the lawyers tell us, the clergymen tell us, even the business men of every day and the housewives tell us that we must continually look ahead and continually prepare to meet what may be coming. Now this is what Militarism urges as applied to the coming of war. Militarism is the doctrine of preparedness for war; it holds the same relation to national health that preventive medicine does to individual health. It would make us do many unpleasant things, and refrain from doing many pleasant things. But to do many unpleasant things and to refrain from doing many pleasant things is necessary, in order to lead even a moderately virtuous and prudent life. Militarism may be pushed to an undue extreme; but so may any course of conduct.

It may be interesting to note that Moltke was not an "opportunistic inventor," like most men of action typified by Napoleon, but that Bismarck was. Moltke made inventions of a permanent nature, but Bismarck did not. Yet Moltke was a soldier and Bismarck was a statesman. Bismarck's German Empire has already passed away, but Moltke's method of preparedness is with us still, and is gathering more and more prestige as the years go by. Judged by the standard of permanent achievement, Moltke was a greater man than Bismarck; though a belief to the contrary was held during their lifetimes, and is generally held by most men now.