The enterprise of General Scott was one of extraordinary magnitude and responsibility. With his usual foresight he determined that he would not advance until the expedition was perfectly complete in every essential of certain success. Nothing was permitted to disturb his equanimity or patient resolution in carrying out the scheme as he thought best. He weighed all the dangers and all the difficulties of the adventure, and placed no reliance upon the supposed weakness of the enemy. This was the true, soldier-like view of the splendid project; and if, at the time, men were found inconsiderate enough to blame him for procrastinating dalliance, the glorious result of his enterprise repaid him for all the petty sneers and misconceptions with which his discretion was undervalued by the carpet knights at home. There is but one point upon which we feel justified in disagreeing with his plan of campaign. He should not have weakened the command of General Taylor in the face of Santa Anna's army. It was almost an invitation to that chief for an attack upon the valley of the Rio Grande; and had the Army of Occupation been effectually destroyed at Buena Vista, scarcely an American would have remained, throughout the long line of Taylor's base, to tell the tale of cruelties perpetrated by the flushed and revengeful victors.
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Whilst events were maturing and preparations making in the valley of the Rio Grande and the island of Lobos, we shall direct our attention again for a short time to the central regions of the north of Mexico in the neighborhood of Santa Fé.
A considerable force of Missourians had been organized under the command of Colonel Doniphan, and marched to New Mexico, whence it was designed to despatch him towards Chihuahua. Soon after General Kearney's departure from Santa Fé for California, Colonel Price, who was subsequently raised to the rank of general, reached that post with his western recruits and took command, whilst Doniphan was directed, by orders from Kearney, dated near La Joya, to advance with his regiment against the Navajo Indians, who had threatened with war the New Mexicans, now under our protection. He performed this service successfully; and, on the 22d of November, 1846, made a treaty with the chiefs, binding them to live in amity with the Spaniards and Americans. Reassembling all his troops at Val Verde, he commenced his march to the south, in the middle of December, and, after incredible difficulties and great sufferings from inadequate supplies and equipments he reached Chihuahua, fighting, on the march, two successful actions against the Mexicans at Bracito, and Sacramento. Having completely routed the enemy in the latter contest, Chihuahua fell into his power. Here he tarried, recruiting his toil-worn band, for six weeks, and, as the spring opened, pushed onwards to the south until he reached the headquarters of Taylor, whence he returned with his regiment to the United States. His army marched five thousand miles during the campaign, and its adventures form one of the most romantic episodes in the war with Mexico.
Whilst Doniphan was advancing southward, the command of Price was well nigh destroyed in New Mexico and the wild region intervening between its borders and the frontiers of the United States. A conspiracy had been secretly organized, among the Mexican and half-breed population, to rise against the Americans. On the 19th of January, 1847, massacres occurred, simultaneously, at Taos, Arroyo Hondo, Rio Colorado and Mora. At Taos, Governor Charles Bent, one of the oldest and most experienced residents in that region was cruelly slain, and a great deal of valuable property destroyed by the merciless foe. Price received intelligence of this onslaught on the 20th, and rapidly calling in his outposts, marched with a hastily gathered band of about three hundred and fifty men against the enemy, whom he met, attacked and overawed on the 24th, at Cañada. Reinforced by Captain Burgwin from Alburquerque, he again advanced against the insurgents; and on the 28th, defeated a Mexican force estimated at fifteen hundred, at the pass of El Embudo. Passing, thence, over the Taos mountain, through deep snows, in midwinter, the resolute commander pursued his way unmolested through the deserted settlement which had been recently ravaged by the rebels, nor did he encounter another force until he came upon the enemy at Pueblo, when he stormed the fortified position, and gained the day but with the loss of the gallant Burgwin and other valuable officers. Mora was reduced again to subjection, early in February, by Captain Morin; and, in all these rapid but successful actions, it is estimated that near three hundred Mexicans paid the forfeit of their lives for the cruel conspiracy and its fatal results.
From this moment the tenure of our possessions in New Mexico was no longer considered secure. The troops in that district were not the best disciplined or most docile in the army, and, to the dangers of another sudden outbreak among the treacherous Mexicans, was added the fear of a sudden rising among the Indian tribes who were naturally anxious to find any pretext or chance for ridding the country of a foe whom they feared far more, as a permanent neighbor, than the comparatively feeble half-breeds and Mexicans.
In December of 1846, Lieutenant Richie, who bore despatches to Taylor apprising him of the meditated attack upon Vera Cruz, was seized and slain by the Mexicans whilst on his way to the headquarters, and, thus, Santa Anna became possessed of the plan of the proposed campaign. The Army of Occupation had been sadly impaired by the abstraction of its best material for future action on the southern line under the commander-in-chief. But General Taylor resolved at once to face the danger stoutly, and to manifest no symptom of unsoldierlike querulousness under the injustice he experienced from the government. Nevertheless,—prudent in all things, and foreseeing the danger of his command, of the lower country, and of the morale of the whole army, in the event of his defeat,—he exposed the error of the war department in his despatches to the adjutant general and secretary, so that history, if not arms, might eventually do justice to his discretion and fortitude.
The note of preparation preceded, for some time, the actual advent of Santa Anna from San Luis Potosi, and all was bustle in the American encampments which were spread from Monterey to Agua Nueva beyond Saltillo, in order to give him the best possible reception under the circumstances. Wool was encamped with a force at Agua Nueva, in advance on the road from Saltillo to San Luis, about thirteen miles from the pass of Angostura, where the road lies through a mountain gorge, defended, on one side, by a small table land near the acclivities of the steep sierra and cut with the channels of rough barrancas or ravines worn by the waters as they descend from the summits, and, on the other by an extensive net work of deep and impassable gullies which drained the slopes of the western spurs.
This spot was decided upon, as the battle ground in the event of an attack, and the encampment at Agua Nueva, in front of it was kept up as an extreme outpost, whence the scouts might be sent forth to watch the approach of Santa Anna.