SIERRA MADRE PASS.
On the 21st of February, the positive advance of that chief was announced. The camp was immediately broken up, and all our forces rapidly concentrated in the gorge of Angostura. Our troops did not amount to more than four thousand six hundred and ninety efficient men, while we had reason to believe that Santa Anna commanded nearly five times that number and was greatly superior to us in cavalry, a part of which, had been sent by secret paths through the mountains, to the rear of our position, so as to cut off our retreat, in the event of our failure in the battle.
The great object of Taylor in selecting his ground and forming his plan of battle, was to make his small army equal, as near as possible, to that of Santa Anna, by narrowing the front of attack, and thus concentrating his force upon any point through which the Mexicans might seek to break. In other words, it was his design to dam up the strait of Angostura with a living mass, and to leave no portion of the unbroken ground on the narrow table-land undefended by infantry and artillery. The battle ground that had been selected was admirably calculated for this purpose; and his foresight was justified by the result. It was not necessary for Taylor to capture, or annihilate his enemy, for he was victor, if with, but a single regiment, he kept the valley closed against the Mexicans. The centre of the American line was the main road, in which was placed a battery of eight pieces, reduced, during the action to five, supported by bodies of infantry. On the right of the stream, which swept along the edge of the western mountains, was a single regiment and some cavalry, with two guns, which it was supposed, would be sufficient, with the aid of the tangled gulleys to arrest the Mexicans in that quarter. On the left of the stream, where the ravines were fewer, and the plain between them wider, stood two regiments of infantry, suitably furnished with artillery, and extending from the central battery on the road, to the base of the eastern mountains, on whose skirts an adequate force of cavalry and riflemen was posted.
In order to break this array, Santa Anna divided his army into three attacking columns, each of which nearly doubled the whole of Taylor's force. One of these, was opposed to the battery of eight guns in order to force the road, and the other two were designed to outflank our position by penetrating or turning the squadrons stationed at the base of the mountains.
On the afternoon of the 22d of February, the attack began by a skirmishing attempt to pass to the rear of our left wing; but as the Mexicans climbed the mountain, in their endeavor to outflank us in that quarter, they were opposed by our infantry and riflemen, who disputed successfully every inch of ground, until night closed and obliged the Mexicans to retire. General Taylor, fearing an attack from the cavalry upon Saltillo, immediately departed with a suitable escort to provide for its safety, and left General Wool to command during his absence.
After day dawn, on the 23d, Santa Anna again commenced the battle, by an attack upon the left wing, and, for a while, was withstood, until a portion of our forces, after a brave defence, mistaking an order to retire, for an order to retreat, became suddenly panic-struck, and fled from the field. At this moment, Taylor returned from Saltillo, and found the whole left of our position broken, whilst the enemy was pouring his masses of infantry and cavalry along the base of the eastern mountains towards our rear.
Meanwhile the battery in the road had repulsed the Mexican column sent against it, and spared three of its guns for service on the upper plain. The regiment, on the right of the stream, had been brought over to the left bank with its cannons, and was now, in position with two other regiments, facing the mountains, between which and this force, was a gap, through whose opening, the Mexicans steadily advanced under a dreadful fire. Nearly all the artillery had been concentrated at the same place, while, in other parts of the field and nearer to the hacienda of Buena Vista, in the American rear, were bodies of our cavalry, engaged in conflict with the advancing foe.
As Taylor approached this disastrous scene, he met the fugitives, and speedily made his dispositions to stop the carnage. With a regiment from Mississippi, he restrained a charge of Mexican cavalry, and ordered all the artillery, save four guns, to the rear to drive back the exulting Mexicans. This manœuvre was perfectly successful, and, so dreadfully was the enemy cut up by the new attack, that Santa Anna, availed himself of a ruse, by a flag of truce, in order to suspend the action, whilst he withdrew his men.
The transfer of so large a portion of Taylor's most efficient troops to the rear of his original line, had greatly weakened his front, in the best positions, where the inequalities of ground sustained his feeble numbers. Santa Anna was not unmindful of the advantage he had gained by these untoward events, and prepared all his best reserves, which were now brought for the first time into action, for another attack. Taylor had with him three regiments and four pieces of artillery. His front was rather towards the mountain than the open pass, while his back was towards the road along the stream. On his right was the whole Mexican army; on his left, far off in the rear, were the troops that had repulsed and cut up the Mexican column; and the great effort, upon whose success all depended, was to bring these dispersed squadrons again into action, whilst he maintained the position against the assault of the fresh reserves. As Santa Anna advanced with his inspirited columns, he was met by regiments of infantry, which stood firm, until, overwhelmed by numbers and driven into a ravine, they were cruelly slaughtered. After the American infantry had been overcome, the last hope was in the artillery, and, with this, the Mexican advance was effectually stopped and the battle won.