Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican, Vol. 2 of 2 / A Historical, Geographical, Political, Statistical and Social Account of that Country from the Period of the Invasion by the Spaniards to the Present Time.

by Brantz Mayer

It must not be supposed, however, that in speaking of the Mexican army we design to compare it, either in detail or as an organized body, with the troops of this country or of Europe. Neither in the mass of its materiel, nor in its officers, does it vie with the trained and disciplined forces of other civilized countries. Soldiers in Mexico are rather actors in a political drama,—dressed and decorated for imposing display,—than efficient warriors whose instruction and power make them irresistible in the field. In all the engagements, or attempts to engage, which occurred in Mexico since the termination of the war of independence, there has been a laudable desire, at least among the troops, to avoid the shedding of blood. Cities have been besieged and bombarded; magnificent arrays of forces have been made on adjacent fields; large camps have been formed and held in readiness; cannons, loaded with cannister and grape, have been discharged along the crowded highways of towns; marksmen have been placed in towers, steeples, and azoteas, to pick off unwary passengers; divisions have been reviewed and manœuvred in sight of each other, but, in all these revolts or pronunciamientos, no pitched battles were fought which actually terminated the contest by the gun and sword. The aspirant chief, or the hero he designed to displace, managed to secure the majority of the neighboring military forces, and as soon as the fact was unequivocally ascertained, the one who was in the minority fled from the scene without provoking a trial by battle. In 1840, 1841, and 1844, during the administrations of Bustamante and Santa Anna, there were various exhibitions of these sham contests; but, in all of them, we have reason to believe that the innocent non-combatant people were the greatest sufferers, and that the army escaped comparatively unscathed.

These observations are not designed to impugn the military nerve or spirit of the Mexicans, for the war with the United States and the war of their revolution, demonstrated that they unite both in quite an eminent degree. Our officers believe that the Mexican possesses the elements of a good soldier, but that he is neither trained, disciplined, nor led, so as to make him a dangerous foe. This is demonstrated by the result of the recent war and of every action fought during it. A brave show and a bold assault were not stubbornly followed up with pertinacious resolution, in spite of all resistance. The Mexicans were fighting on their own soil, for their own country, against a hated foe, yet they failed in every conflict, and with every conceivable disparity of numbers.

The great body of the army is of course composed either of Indians or mixed breeds, and the idea of nationality in its high love of a loveable country, does not in all probability, animate or inspire these classes in the hour of danger. They did not fight with a common or an understood purpose. They were rather forced mercenaries than patriots. It was not a war of enthusiasm. Every effort was made by grandiloquent proclamations and false allegations to rally and nerve them; but whenever they crossed arms with our forces, if they failed in the onset, like lions foiled in their spring, they retreated to their lair. Nevertheless, throughout the contest, there were repeated instances of courage, constancy, endurance, and persistence which satisfied our officers that under a different system of education and command, the Mexicans would make excellent soldiers. Their horsemen, probably the best riders on the continent, paid more attention to the management of their animals than to the use of their horse's force in the charge; while their infantry and artillery avoided those close quarters which make the bayonet so powerful a weapon when directed by intrepid, unquailing arms in the presence and under the lead of unflinching company officers. Their lancers did more damage to dismounted victims than to erect and fighting foes.

With the majority of the rank and file, the army is, in all likelihood, not a profession of choice. Enlistment is now scarcely ever voluntary. When men are required for a new regiment or to fill companies thinned by death or desertion, a sergeant is despatched with his guard to recruit among the Indians and peons of the neighborhood. The subaltern probably finds these individuals laboring in the fields, and without even the formality of a request, selects the best men from the group and orders them into the ranks. If they resist or attempt to escape, they are immediately lazo'd, and, at nightfall the gang is marched, bound in pairs, to the nearest barrack, where the wretched victims of military oppression are pursued by a mournful procession of wives and children who henceforth follow their husbands or parents during the whole period of service. From the hands of the recruiting sergeant the conscript passes into those of the drill sergeant. The chief duty of this personage is to teach him to march, countermarch, and to handle an unserviceable weapon. From the drill sergeant he succeeds to the company officer, and here, perhaps, he encounters the worst foe of his ultimate efficiency.

Officers in Mexico have no thorough military and scientific education. There is a military school at Chapultepec, near the capital, but it has never been carefully and completely organized, nor has it furnished many men who have distinguished themselves in the field. The politicians, relying on the dramatic power of the army, made that army the means of reward and influence in civil life, by selecting its officers of all grades from every employment or occupation. Merchants, tradespeople, professional men, children of wealthy or ambitious families, all attained rank in the army by this unwise means, and the consequence has been that the majority of company, and perhaps even of field officers, was rather fitted to display the magnificent uniforms to which their grades entitle them than to discipline the rank and file when organized in battalions, regiments and divisions.

The picturesque and scenic efficiency of such an army will be easily admitted, and the causes of its failure in the late war will be quite as easily understood. What can be more deplorable in battle, even for the victors, than to behold an undisciplined man badly led or driven into conflict? What can be more disastrous for an officer than to stand in the midst of blood and carnage, without knowing what to do in the moment of trial when knowledge and presence of mind are imperatively needed? Can it be surprising, therefore, to observe that the columns of Mexican gazettes and pages of Mexican pamphlets published during the war, are filled with the basest crimination and recrimination or the lamest attempts at exculpation from disgraceful defeat?

A writer in the Monitor Republicano, speaking of the Mexican army, says, you have nothing to do but to read the writings of its generals from the commencement of the campaign, through the different actions and skirmishes in chronological order, and it will be seen that they have mutually called one another traitors, cowards, and imbeciles. He gives the following list of recriminations:—"Arista accused Torrejon, Ampudia and others; Torrejon Ampudia, while Uraga charged Arista; Jarregui accused Carrasco and various chiefs; Carrasco accused Jarregui and other generals; Mejia brought charges against Ampudia; Ampudia against him and several leaders, as Carrasco, Enciso and others, principal officers of the army. Urrea and others charged Parrodi with cowardice and treason; Parrodi accused Urrea and Romero, and Romero accused the famous Miramon of Mazatlan, the speculator in the goods taken by the troops of Urrea from those of Gen. Taylor.

Requena accused Santa Anna; Santa Anna in his turn, Requena; Torrejon and Juvera recriminate Requena; Requena, in his turn, Torrejon, Juvera and Portilla. Santa Anna accused Miñon; Miñon accused Santa Anna and his confederates. Santa Anna brought charges against Valencia, in Ciudad Victoria; Valencia in his turn, accused Santa Anna. Viscayno accused Heredia and Garcia Conde; these in turn, Viscayno. Santa Anna recriminates against Canalizo, Uraga and others at Cerro Gordo; Canalizo, Uraga, Gaona and others against Santa Anna. Santa Anna again accuses Valencia in Padierna; Valencia accuses Santa Anna, Salas and others, and Salas accuses Valencia, Torrejon and others. Santa Anna, in the first actions in the valley, accuses everybody; he accuses Rincon, Anaya, and the National Guard at Churubusco; in the other actions of September, Terrés, Bravo and others. Bravo, Terrés and others in turn, recriminate Santa Anna, Perdigon and Simeon Ramirez. Perdigon accuses Simeon Ramirez and Terrés himself. Alvarez accuses Don Manuel Andrade, and Andrade in turn accuses him. Alcorta accuses the Andrade of the hussars, while he accuses Alcorta;—and in fine, we have before us the letters and despatches of the whole of them—we have before us their actions and skirmishes, from the battle of San Jacinto up to the ignominious capture of Gaona and Torrejon by the Poblano robber, Dominguez."

We have quoted these passages, to prove, by Mexican authority, that our remarks upon the army are not made in a captious spirit or with a desire to undervalue its officers ungenerously.

Bad as had been the organization and conduct of the army, they were not, of course, improved by the results of the war. The morale and the materiel were both destroyed, so that when our troops withdrew during the summer of 1848, little more than a skeleton of the regiments remained to preserve order. This was, indeed, one of the greatest sources of dread to orderly Mexicans, for they feared that when all foreign restraint was suddenly removed, the country would be given up to anarchy. Without men and without means, the government justly apprehended the uprising of the mob, nor were there demagogues wanting to excite the evil passions of the masses by an outcry against the treaty. At the head of this disgraceful movement was General Paredes, who had returned from exile, but had not been trusted by the government during the conflict. The payment of the first instalment of the sum agreed upon in the treaty, however, enabled the authorities to maintain tranquillity, and as soon as comparative order was enforced by a new administration, the army was reorganized under a law passed on the 4th of November, 1848. By this act, the military establishment was greatly reduced, even on paper, and, in 1849, not more than five thousand two hundred, rank and file, were in actual service.