If there were, in reality, no need of an army in Mexico to oppose a foreign enemy, or, to preserve domestic peace, one would still be required to secure the Northern Frontier against the incursions of Indians. From the earliest periods, the Spaniards were vexed by their savage assaults, and, since the establishment of independence, the Mexicans have every year seen their people and property carried off by the robber tribes, whilst their villages, ranchos and haciendas were totally destroyed or partially ravaged.
Mexican engineers have calculated that the new boundary line, following the course of the Rio Grande and the Gila and including a mathematical line of seventy leagues between these streams, is six hundred and forty-six leagues or about nineteen hundred miles in length. Three-fourths of this line pass through an uninhabited region, and, consequently, the savages have free access across it to the few and small settlements on the border. Such an extent of frontier, though considerably reduced from the former line anterior to the treaty, became at once an object of concern to the government, especially as the people of the United States immediately opened communications through the Indian country with the Pacific, and would probably soon control the important passes through the whole region north of the boundary. Accordingly on the 20th of July, 1848, it was decreed that eighteen Military Colonies should be created, and placed within easy communication, so as to protect the southern settlers in some degree, or to encounter and punish the savages in their forays. The greater portions of the most warlike tribes were transferred by the treaty to the United States, and, by one of its articles, we bound ourselves to aid, at least, in saving the Mexicans from their plunder if we could not totally destroy their inimical power. In the neighborhood of the boundary, from near the mouth of the Gila to the commencement of the mathematical line, before alluded to, we find the tribes known as Coyotes, Mimbreños and Gileños, the former of whom wage war against Sonora, whilst the latter attack Chihuahua. The Apaches and Cumanches spread their numerous hordes from the vicinity of Chihuahua to the sources of the Nueces, twenty-five leagues beyond the Rio Grande. Besides these, there are, throughout this district many savage bands, supporting themselves entirely by the chase, and it is probable, according to the opinion of soldiers and captives, who have been among the tribes, that all these clans can unite thirty thousand warriors, whilst they still leave a sufficient number to protect their wigwams and villages.
Fortunately for the white races, these barbarians are not able to maintain peace among themselves. The Apaches and Cumanches are in continual strife, and never return from the "war path" without serious losses. It is not to be feared, therefore, that they will voluntarily join in a general rising against our pioneers; yet a common danger, or a common attack, might soon cement their hatred against the supposed usurper, and, directed by a man of capacity, produce even a more disastrous war than that with the Seminoles of Florida.
The Cumanches are numerous and active. They are divided into Caihuas, Yamparicas, and Llaneros. The Apaches are braver than the Cumanches, and are known as Meselaros and Lipanes. These barbarians arm themselves with guns, rifles, lances, bows and arrows. They manage their weapons admirably, are agile horsemen, and shoot with unerring aim. Tall and majestic in figure; muscular and capable of enduring fatigue; accustomed to live on the simplest food of the forest and to win it when necessary by the arrow alone; uniting the sagacity of men with the instinct of animals, these knights of the southern wilderness realize perfectly our ideas of the daring aborigines who peopled this continent before it was subdued by the white man. Their hatred of the Mexicans and the savage fury with which they pursue their male captives of adult age, appear to denote even a stronger, if not a worthier motive than robbery in their attacks. At least six hundred women and children are borne off by them every year from the settlements to their mountain fastnesses, and they openly confess that they are not unwilling to improve their race by mingling it with the white.
In order to maintain the southern frontier intact from these savages, Mexico designs the establishment of these military colonies, and will, in all probability, support them by a second or rear line of troops from the regular army as well as by forts and strongholds erected in positions affording easy access from the wilderness to inhabited regions. A frontier so open, and thronged with such barbarous hordes, could not be protected by military colonies alone.
The principal Fortresses and strongholds of Mexico have hitherto been those of Perote, Acapulco, Ulua, and the citadels at Mexico and Monterey. The present government has ordered the citadel of Mexico, situated a short distance out of the town to be abandoned, as it only formed a nucleus for the assemblage of the military factionists who have constantly disturbed the peace of the republic. The citadel of Monterey is to be maintained and suitably supported.
The castle at Acapulco, an extremely important point on the southern or Pacific coast, is greatly impaired, and will require at least a hundred thousand dollars to adapt it for defence. The fortress of Perote was designed originally by the Spanish government as a depot for the treasure intended for shipment from Vera Cruz, in which the gold and silver would be safer than at an exposed sea port during that dangerous period of Castilian history, when all the nations of Europe were anxious to plunder her colonies. Situated far in the interior of the country and in the midst of a wide plain, it does not absolutely command any of the approaches either from the coast to the inner states, or to the coast from the capital. It is, however, well placed as a military arsenal, and demands an expenditure of about thirty thousand dollars to render it useful to the nation.
The Castle of San Juan de Ulua, built on a reef opposite the town of Vera Cruz, is in so ruinous a state that scarcely a million and a half of dollars will suffice to restore it to its ancient splendor and power. The one hundred and twenty-four guns now within its walls are all more or less injured or dismounted. "To garrison this Castle properly," said General Arista in his report as Minister of War in 1849, "two thousand men will be required at a yearly cost of four hundred thousand dollars. If this immense treasure is squandered on the Castle, it will surely be wasted alone to preserve a vain luxury; for, as Mexico has no hope of becoming a maritime power, San Juan de Ulua must always fall into the possession of such a naval nation whenever it makes war upon us. Experienced Spanish officers have recommended the dismantling of San Juan, and they now urge it more strongly than ever, as there is far greater reason to believe that it neither defends the nation nor even the city of Vera Cruz. The French, and recently the Americans, have convinced us of this fact; the first possessed themselves early of the Castle, and the latter took the town without hindrance from the Castle." Such is the opinion of one of the most experienced Mexican generals in regard to a fortress which has hitherto been deemed impregnable, and, although we do not agree with him in regard to its entire worthlessness in the hands of abler engineers, we doubt whether its use is not greater in checking the city of Vera Cruz itself, than in commanding the approaches to it from the sea. It must be remembered that the lee of this very Castle is the only comparatively safe harbor on the gulf at present, and that until a mole or breakwater shall be erected elsewhere, it is only in certain seasons and under favorable circumstances that large bodies of troops may be prudently disembarked on the adjacent shores. The landing of General Scott, in 1847, was singularly fortunate in time and circumstances, for, soon after, a furious norther arose and prevented all communication between the land and the squadron. These violent gales are sudden and terrific in their rise and action at Vera Cruz, and the dreadful havoc they made among the American shipping on the coast during the war, attests the value of a military defence whose protective duties are seconded by the very spirit of the storm. The introduction of steam power into the national marine must of course greatly modify the character of coast defences; but we would deem it not only unwise but imbecile to abandon altogether a work which at least makes, if it does not perfectly protect, an important harbor. The city of Vera Cruz, itself, is a regular fortification, and with some important improvements and repairs, may not ultimately require San Juan de Ulua to defend it from assault. These two strongholds, combined, under the command of skilful generals and garrisoned with efficient soldiers, would offer a churlish welcome to any modern power either maritime or military. Their seizure, during the winter months of tempest, would be almost impossible, and their occupation, during the summer would be as fatal, as was unfortunately proved by our troops in the June, July, and August, after the brilliant siege and inglorious surrender.
The following tabular sketch prepared from Ministerial reports, exhibits the condition of the Mexican forces at this epoch.
| Tabular View of the Re-organization of the Mexican Army in 1849. | |
| STAFF OF THE ARMY. | |
| 12 Generals of divisions. 34 Brigadier generals. 4 Colonels. 5 Lieutenant Colonels. 1 Commandant of battalion. | 13 Captains. 8 Lieutenants and 2d adjudants. 3 Ensigns. — 80 Total. |
| ENGINEER CORPS. 1 Brigadier general. 2 Colonels. 4 Lieutenant colonels. 8 Captains. — 15 Total. | MEDICAL STAFF, ACCORDING TO LAW. 1 Inspector. 1 Director of hospital. 8 Hospital professors. 40 Surgeons. 40 1st assistant surgeons. 40 2d "" 30 Apprentices. 18 Surgeons for military colonies. 2 Ambulance companies. |