[341] Trans. R.S.V., p. 115.
[342] In order to appreciate my argument, the reader is requested to peruse the passages referred to from the works of Howitt, and from Spencer and Gillen, and judge from their full text whether I am not right. The full quotations of these passages would have encumbered the present work. As polemics are always rather barren, I preferred to abstain from them.
[343] This is an instance of the general truth that descriptive ethnography is highly dependent on the theories known and accepted by the investigator, and that information may be useful or useless according to whether the theoretical principles are correct or not. It is impossible for an observer to go below the surface if he does not discuss the phenomena and theorize on them. On the other hand such speculations, if carried on by the untrained faculties and unaided efforts of the writers, or under the influence of a theoretical prepossession, may be entirely misleading.
[344] Unless we give to the word marriage a new meaning, which would be hardly useful.
[345] Nat. Tr., pp. 99, 100.
[346] This expression is perhaps inexact. But this is not the place for psychological and biological analyses. The reader may be referred to Dr. Westermarck's conclusion that there is a strong instinct of sexual jealousy among primitive races of men, both in males (H.H.M., pp. 117-132) and in females (ibid., pp. 495-500). This instinct is inherited from our animal ancestors (compare Darwin, Descent of Man, ii. p. 395). Important for us are the examples of female jealousy, quoted by Westermarck from the Australian material; Narrinyeri, Taplin, p. 11; Palmer, p. 282; Lumholtz, p. 213; Waitz Gerland, pp. 758, 781.
[348] Custom referring to a certain point—here e. g. to the question whether it is honourable or ignominious to waive one's marital rights—stands in the relation of correspondence to the collective ideas and collective feelings on this point. The expression of Spencer and Gillen that the feeling of jealousy is "subservient to that of the influence of tribal custom" is therefore incorrect (Nat. Tr., p. 99). It would be obviously quite erroneous to assert that there is any collective feeling which would not be subservient to the tribal custom. It is consequently meaningless to affirm that the given feeling here is subservient. We may, therefore, discard also the logical conclusion at which Messrs. Spencer and Gillen arrive from these premisses: viz. that jealousy is a matter of no importance when dealing with the Central Australians (ibid., p. 100). A certain tribal or national custom expresses or formulates public feelings, and, on the other hand, if there is a certain type of collective feelings or ideas, they must have their legal or customary forms wherein to express themselves. We should say: the Australian customs show that there is no such collective feeling as jealousy in our sense, which would obviously object to such customs as theirs. The collective feelings in Australia which correspond to our jealousy do not imply, therefore, the idea of absolute exclusiveness; the idea of inviolable personal access of a man to a woman does not exist there; that is proved by the custom in question. But outside the limits prescribed by tribal custom there is little adultery; jealousy seems to be exceedingly strong, and the same tribal law, which in some cases compels the man to give up his marital rights, in other cases justifies him in the utmost brutalities, and allows him even to inflict death with impunity upon his wife. Owing to the scantiness of our information we can hardly say whether sexual jealousy is stronger or weaker in Australian than in other societies; we can safely affirm that it is different.
[349] See below, [pp. 209] sqq. and 226.
[350] Spencer and Gillen, Nor. Tr., pp. 146 sqq.