The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical / Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

by C. A. Row

Eighthly: The moment we view an event otherwise than as a mere phenomenon, and take into consideration the causes producing it, however unusual it may be, it is impossible to affirm that it is contrary to experience. When we take these into consideration the entire character of the event is at once changed, and the probability of the occurrence must be estimated on wholly different grounds. Under such circumstances, an extremely improbable event, which we might otherwise justly reject as contrary to experience, becomes simply one of which we have had no experience. Thus it is contrary to experience that men can live for one hour under water, but when we take into consideration and thoroughly understand the contrivance of the diving-bell, the event becomes one of a different order from that of which we supposed that we had experience. Before this apparatus was invented, the assertion that men could live an hour under water would have been rejected as fabulous. The invention has introduced a fresh condition into the case. The event has now become a portion of our experience; but prior to the discovery of the apparatus it was merely an event lying outside our experience, and not to be rejected as being contrary to it. In a similar way, a miracle, as a mere phenomenon, may be said to be contrary to our experience; but the moment that we take into account its true character, viz. that its very conception implies the presence of a force of some kind with which we were previously unacquainted, then such an event is no longer one which we can pronounce contrary to our experience, but merely one which lies beyond or outside [pg 160] it. In the case of miracles, therefore, the position of Hume is inapplicable.

Ninthly: It is not true that in estimating the truth of testimony, we simply balance probability, against probability, as stated in Hume's argument. The form in which it has been put by him is too abstract to admit of application to individual cases; nor does any man, in estimating the truth of testimony for practical purposes, set down and deliberately balance probabilities against probabilities. The whole process is of a far more instantaneous character, and a number of minute considerations are involved, which do not admit of statement in the form of general propositions. Thus, if an event lying outside my present experience is reported to me by a friend on whose veracity and powers of judgment I have implicit reliance, I accept the truth of his statement, notwithstanding a great degree of abstract improbability; it being assumed that the event was one in which it was impossible that he should be deceived. In estimating this latter point, we never balance the probabilities as to the truth or falsehood of human testimony, but we consider the individual circumstances of the case, whether they are of such a nature that our friend could be deceived about them. If on consideration we are convinced that deception was impossible, we yield assent to his known veracity, although, as far as we know, the event reported by him has never before come within the range of human experience.

Let me remove the question from an abstract into a concrete form. There are numberless events in which it happens that men of unquestionable judgment and veracity are deceived. There are others in which no deception can be possible. An instance of one class is the alleged case of persons living a considerable time [pg 161] without food. Here astuteness may impose on the vigilance of the most wary. Take, on the other hand, the case of a man born blind. One informant, on whose veracity we have the fullest reliance, tells us that he has known the man from his birth; that, up to a certain day, his blindness was established beyond all reasonable doubt to every one who knew him, that on that day, he saw a person touch the eyes of the blind man, who not only instantly received his sight, but could use his eyes as perfectly as those who had enjoyed the use of them from birth. I admit that this case is a supposed one, and does not exactly represent any case recorded in the Gospels. But though an assumed one, it is perfectly valid for the purposes of argument. In it deception would be impossible. If all this was affirmed to have come under the direct knowledge of one, of whose veracity and judgment we were assured, we should accept his statement as true, without balancing the abstract probability of the truth of evidence against the probability of its falsity, although the event narrated lay outside the range of our experience. Our knowledge of the judgment and veracity of the informant is the essential element in judging of the truth of evidence. It is only when our means of forming this judgment are deficient that we attempt to balance abstract probabilities.

Tenthly: The question of the truth of testimony as against past experience and the alleged greater probability that testimony should be false, than that past experience should be unreliable, is greatly modified by the consideration that an overwhelming amount of the sum total of past experience rests for its acceptance on the validity of testimony itself. That portion which is not the result of our own individual experience rests for its truth exclusively on the validity of human testimony, [pg 162] and must be unreliable in proportion as testimony is invalid. It must be observed, however, that I by no means deny that testimony is much more frequently invalid in its narrations of extraordinary events than of ordinary ones.

Eleventhly: While it is freely conceded that the evidence to prove the truth of a very extraordinary occurrence must be far stronger than that which is required to prove an ordinary one, it must never be forgotten that the amount of evidence necessary to prove any particular fact always varies with the amount of the antecedent probability of its occurrence. The very same action may be credible or otherwise, just in proportion as we can discern an adequate purpose for its performance, or infer the presence of a particular motive. If, for example, it were reported that a man of the highest character had been seen during the hours of early morning issuing from one of the lowest haunts of vice in London, those who knew him well would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to establish the truth of the assertion. They would undoubtedly fall back on the question of abstract probability, and argue that it was more likely that it was either a case of mistaken identity (a very common error), or a deliberate falsehood, than that the statement should be true. But, if, on the contrary, it could be shown that he had been sent for to visit a dying person, and had gone at his particular request, the whole of the antecedent improbability would vanish, and the otherwise incredible testimony would become perfectly credible. It follows, therefore, that the credibility of testimony varies with our knowledge of the motive for the performance of the action.

This consideration ought to have due weight in considering the evidence of miracles. Viewed as mere [pg 163] phenomena, their abstract improbability is great. When they are viewed as deviations from the ordinary course of nature, their improbability becomes still greater. But those who believe in the existence of a personal God energizing in the universe at every moment, and in every place, postulate the presence of a force fully adequate to work them, for this is involved in the idea of God. But the question arises, Will He? Until a well-attested miracle has actually been performed, the antecedent probability derived from our experience of the order of nature is against the supposition that He will, and throws on the reporter the necessity of giving a stronger proof than we require for an ordinary fact. But in proportion as we can show that it is probable that God will make a revelation, the antecedent improbability of a miracle is diminished; and if it can be shown that it is very probable that He will do so, it wholly disappears.

It will be readily admitted that such an argument can only have weight with a believer in the existence of a God, who is the moral Governor of the Universe. To him, however, it is of the utmost value, for on the supposition in question, the probability of some higher manifestation of the divine character than that displayed in the material universe does not rest on theory, but on the facts of man and his condition. Looking at the past history of the world, it is matter of fact that God has made higher and higher manifestations of himself. So far it is antecedently probable that He will continue to do so. His last manifestation has been in the production of a being possessed of a moral nature, with powers capable of immense elevation. It is also no theory, but a fact, that this moral being now is, and ever has been within the historical periods in a state of great imperfection. It is therefore highly [pg 164] probable that the Creator will adopt means for elevating the moral being whom He has created, and that He will effect this by acting, not on matter, but on mind. Contemplating the actual state of man, the known law of the Creator's previous action, and the moral character of God, the antecedent probability that God will make a further manifestation of himself is established quite independently of the facts or assertions in the Bible.

Twelfthly: Whatever be the supposed antecedent improbability of an occurrence, it is capable of being overcome by an amount of evidence which can leave no reasonable doubt in a mind endowed with common sense. Theoretical objections may be adduced against any evidence which can be brought in proof of particular facts, but the ultimate appeal must be, not to a multitude of abstract theories, but to the common sense of mankind. Of this character is all historical evidence. It rests on the same principles as those which guide us in the affairs of daily life. There is a certain amount of evidence which leaves no doubt on the common sense of mankind, although it may be open to many theoretical objections. Such evidence is capable of proving a fact against a very high degree of antecedent improbability. Mr. Mill may be considered as a witness whose predilections were all in favour of unbelief. Yet his clear logical mind has led him to state the case fairly as far as the à priori probability or improbability of miracles is concerned. His conclusions are adverse to the position assumed by the author of “Supernatural Religion.” I will briefly state the most important of Mr. Mill's positions.

First. He points out that a miracle involves nothing contradictory to any law of causation. He well remarks that to prove such a contradiction, it is not only [pg 165] necessary that the cause should exist without producing the effect, but that no contravening cause should be present. But the very idea of a miracle presupposes an adequate contravening cause, i.e. God. The possibility of a miracle therefore cannot be denied on the ground that it does not presuppose the presence of a force adequate to produce it. Mr. Mill states, “Of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no doubt, and the only antecedent improbability that can be objected to a miracle, is the improbability that any such cause existed,” that is to say, the whole controversy resolves itself into the question between Pantheism and Atheism on the one hand, and Theism on the other.

Secondly. He observes: “All therefore that Hume has made out, and this he must be considered to have made out, is, that (at least in the imperfect state of our knowledge of natural agencies, which leaves it always possible that some of the physical antecedents may have been hidden from us) no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who did not previously believe in the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power, or who believes himself to have full proof that the character of the being whom he recognises is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question. If we do not already believe in supernatural agencies, no miracle can prove to us their existence. The miracle itself, considered as an extraordinary fact, may be satisfactorily certified by our senses, or by testimony; but nothing can ever prove that it is a miracle: there is still another possible hypothesis, that of its being the result of some unknown cause; and this possibility cannot be so completely shut out, as to leave no alternative but that of admitting the existence of a being superior to nature. [pg 166] Those, however, who already believe in such a being have two hypotheses to choose from, a supernatural and an unknown natural agency; and they have to judge which of the two is the most probable in this particular case.”