The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical / Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

by C. A. Row

It is impossible to deny that this is a correct statement of the question. Hume's position is a generalized statement, that no evidence can establish the reality of a miracle, on the ground that our experience of the uniformity of nature's laws is so firm and unalterable, that no amount of testimony can establish a fact in opposition to it; or as he elsewhere puts it, “unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.” He affirms this to be equally true on the principles of Atheism, Pantheism, or Theism, for the only thing that he takes into account is the inadequacy of the testimony, and not the inadequacy of the cause. Mr. Mill therefore says correctly that all that this argument avails to prove is, that it is impossible to prove a miracle, except to persons who are already convinced that a being or beings exist who are possessed of supernatural powers, and that it is in conformity with their character to work one. If this is the only intelligible meaning of Hume's position (and it is evident that it is), it reduces his argument against miracles to a very harmless one. The conception of a miracle as distinct from an unusual phenomenon implies purpose. Purpose is only conceivable of a being possessed of personality and will. To those therefore who either deny the existence of any such being higher than man, or who affirm that we have no evidence of his existence, it is impossible to prove a miracle as a miracle. The utmost that could be done would be to prove that an event had taken place in nature which [pg 167] in the present state of our knowledge could be assigned to no known cause. In such a case the Pantheist and the Atheist have always the alternative of believing that the event in question must be due to the operation of some unknown force in nature, but which in the gradual development of knowledge we may hereafter be able to detect. This is a position that no defender of revelation worthy of the name can be anxious to dispute. Let it further be observed that Mr. Mill does not deny, but affirms, that the occurrence of an extraordinary event analogous to a miracle viewed simply as a phenomenon, may be satisfactorily certified by our senses or by testimony. To affirm the contrary would be simply absurd, as involving the stereotyping of human thought, and making the wisdom of our ancestors the only standard of truth. There was a time when the earth was believed to be an extended plain. If at that time any one had asserted that by continually sailing westward he had at last arrived at the place from which he started, or, in other words, had circumnavigated the globe, this affirmation ought to have been rejected, not only as founded on testimony contrary to all previous experience, but as intrinsically impossible. Yet if Hume's dictum has any value as an argument against the possibility of a miracle, it must affirm the impossibility of establishing such an occurrence by any amount of evidence whatever. Mr. Mill's mind was far too logical not to perceive that such a position is altogether untenable.

Mr. Mill, however, affirms that there is one ground on which the argument might be tenable against a theist, not because the evidence is insufficient to prove the occurrence of an extraordinary fact, as a mere phenomenon, but because it could not prove it to be a miracle. It is not only necessary, says he, in order to [pg 168] render this proof valid, that one should believe in the existence of a supernatural being who is able to bring about the occurrence, but also that “the character of this Being is not inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question.” Thus a man may be a believer in the existence of God, and yet be persuaded that it was not consistent with his character to interfere with the course of natural phenomena at all, or in such a manner as the conception of a miracle pre-supposes. To such a theist the utmost that evidence could prove would be, that the extraordinary event had been brought about by the action of an unknown force. Again, the same principle acts, and acts reasonably, on the minds of multitudes of intelligent Christians, who summarily reject a certain class of reported miracles without inquiring into their evidence, on the ground that the working of such miracles is inconsistent with their conceptions of the divine character; that is to say, they think it more probable that the stories should be untrue, than that God should work in the way in question. But to give this argument any validity against the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, it must be proved that it is inconsistent with the divine character to make a revelation, or to introduce a deviation from what is to us the ordinary mode of His working; or that the miracles recorded in the Gospels are repugnant to the character of God.

Mr. Mill's general position is therefore incontrovertible, that those who believe in the existence of God “have two hypotheses to choose from, viz. a supernatural, or an unknown natural agency;” and that they must judge which of these two is the more probable; and that, in forming their judgment, a most important consideration must be the character of God, [pg 169] and the conformity of the supposed event to that character. This position every intelligent Christian will readily accept.

Mr. Mill adds: “But with the knowledge which we now possess of the general uniformity of the course of nature, religion, following in the wake of science, has been compelled to acknowledge the government of the universe, as being on the whole carried on by general laws, and not by special interpositions. To whosoever holds this belief, there is a general presumption against any supposition of divine agency, not operating through general laws; or, in other words, there is an antecedent improbability in every miracle, which in order to outweigh it, requires an extraordinary strength of antecedent probability derived from the special circumstances of the case.” These observations require consideration.

There is no doubt that the polytheistic religions postulated the existence of a vast number of superhuman beings by whose agency and caprice many natural occurrences were brought about. Such a belief indicates a very imperfect conception of “order” in nature. But these supposed interferences with it would by no means realize the notion of what we now designate a miracle, the very idea of which implies an order in nature to which the miracle forms an exception. If there is no order in nature, there can be no miracle.

The Hebrew monotheism involved conceptions directly opposite to this. It viewed the action of God as the foundation of all the forces in nature. Whilst above and outside nature, He was everywhere present in nature. Its forces were the expressions of the energy of His will. Its order (for the Hebrew recognised a high order in nature) was the result of His good [pg 170] pleasure, and due to His constant working. In the Old Testament the commonest events in nature are no less ascribed to God than those which we designate miraculous. A Hebrew never conceived of a miracle as a deviation from the divine order, but as a consistent carrying out of a divine purpose in the government of the world. A modern conception of theism differs from this in supposing that there are certain forces in material nature which, when once called into action, go on energizing without any direct intervention of God. But when this conception comes to be minutely analysed, if we believe in a God, it is impossible to conceive of force, at least in its ultimate form, except as a direct expression of the divine energy.

Science has so far modified religious thought on this subject, that while it still continues to hold that the various forces in nature are modes of the divine acting, it nevertheless believes that God does not deviate from his predetermined course for the purpose of meeting what we are pleased to call special contingencies. The divine action is, in fact, not altered to meet man's convenience, and His government is carried on as far as it lies within our cognisance by the general forces of nature. God acts in nature in conformity with a definite law, and from that He will not deviate, whatever consequences man's ignorance or disregard of his mode of action may bring upon him. Mr. Mill observes that to any person holding this belief, there is a general presumption against any supposition of divine agency, not operating through general laws. That is to say, we have had a constant experience of his acting through general laws; and no experience of his acting otherwise. But the idea of a revelation introduces a factor into the case, entirely different from anything of which we have had previous experience. [pg 171] It forms part of a great purpose existing in the divine mind, and is in its nature analogous to the first introduction of life, or the first creation of a free moral agent. Respecting the laws by which God regulates his creative acts, we are ignorant. Yet the theist firmly believes in creative acts of some kind, and that they are regulated by law. In this ignorance of God's law of creation, it is impossible to affirm that it is antecedently improbable that in making a fresh manifestation of himself, he will operate only through those general laws, which are the ordinary manifestations of his will.

There is some want of clearness in Mr. Mill's expression, that in order to outweigh the antecedent improbability of miracles, arising from those modes of the divine action which fall within the limits of our experience, an extraordinary strength of antecedent probability, derived from the special circumstances of the case, is required. If by this antecedent probability he means something such as has been above referred to, there can be no objection to his statement. He ought to have observed, however, that the antecedent improbability which may be supposed to belong to miracles, only attaches to them while contemplated as phenomena, and that such an improbability readily yields to positive evidence. This is virtually admitted in a subsequent sentence. “According as this circumstance, viz. the unknown cause, not having previously manifested itself in action, or the falsity of the testimony, appears more improbable; that is, conflicts with an approximate generalization of a higher order, we believe the testimony or disbelieve it with a stronger or weaker degree of conviction, according to the preponderance, at least until we have sifted the matter further.” “This,” says the author of “Supernatural Religion,” [pg 172] “is precisely Hume's argument, weakened by the introduction of reservations which have no cogency.” We say, this is precisely what Hume's argument is not, for, if it be valid, the whole question of miracles may be summarily dismissed without any inquiry into the evidence on which they rest.

Still, however, as the author affirms and endeavours to prove that Mr. Mill's position leave Hume's argument untouched, a few further observations will be necessary. Hume's statement is, “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience which can possibly be imagined.”

I reply, that the conception of a miracle does not involve any necessary violation of the laws of nature. All that it implies is the presence of another force different from those which have come under our cognisance: and this may act so as to produce the miracle without violating one of nature's laws. But, it is added, “uniform and unalterable experience has established these laws.” What has this experience really established? It is this, and this only, Given the presence of certain forces, and no others, certain results invariably follow. But experience cannot tell us anything, as to what would be the law of nature, if some other force were in action; nor is it able to say one word as to the non-existence of any force which has not come under its observation. Abstractedly, it is true that the argument against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can be imagined, because experience really supplies us with no basis for argumentation in the case. Prior to the invention of railways and the discovery of the uses to which steam [pg 173] can be applied, the argument from experience was equally valid against the possibility of travelling in a carriage not propelled by animal force. In each case a new force enters into the conditions, of which experience is unable to take cognisance.