Operations 21/23 Oct. 1918.
N. of Tournai.
In the meantime, on the left, Captain Eccles sent forward patrols to ascertain the position. No. 7 Platoon, hearing from their patrol of certain hostile positions, including a machine gun firing from a window in the Convent, advanced at 11.30 a.m., but after proceeding a short distance came under intense machine-gun fire, 2nd-Lieutenant Waln and one man, unhappily, being killed and eight men wounded. The remainder of the platoon were forced to fall back. Riflemen O'Sullivan and R. O. Jones, who were with the platoon as stretcher-bearers, endeavoured to go forward to bring in the wounded. The enemy, however, opened fire on them, and they were compelled to lie down. As they lay watching they observed some of the wounded sitting up applying field dressings. Seeing that the enemy took no notice of this, they proceeded to bandage each other for imaginary wounds. They then rose to their feet and limped towards the wounded, whom they were able materially to assist in tying up their wounds and eventually crawling to the rear. For their gallantry and initiative they were both awarded the Military Medal.
The loss of 2nd-Lieutenant Waln was very great. He had won the Divisional Commander's Card for his gallantry in the Battle of Cambrai, and on this occasion he proved himself no less regardless of danger. He had gained the respect and admiration of all ranks.
Second-Lieutenant Bardgett and the reserve platoon were sent up and formed a post, the remnant of No. 7 Platoon being sent into reserve. No. 6 Platoon, after waiting for some while for their patrol to return, sent out a further party, which was followed by the platoon itself. Crossing the railway, they forced their way into one of a small group of houses, of one of which the door was barricaded, and were almost immediately fired on from the doorway of an adjoining house. The fire was returned, and two of the enemy were seen to fall; but further hostile activity developing, they withdrew to the railway and established a post there. Their original patrol joined them at dusk, having been held up by hostile fire and unable to move. No. 5 Platoon could make no move owing to the open nature of the ground in front of them, each attempt being met with heavy fire.
At midday two platoons of "C" Company were sent up to each of the front line companies, as their advance, short as it was, was leaving their flanks in an exposed position. One half company under 2nd-Lieutenant Simpson took up a position in the right rear of "A" Company; the other half company was located near "B" Company Headquarters as reserve.
At 1.30 p.m. "D" Company was ordered forward from reserve to work down the railway line, which ran through the centre of "B" Company's front, and endeavour to get round the east side of the wood on the south of the railway line. In spite of heavy fire, the company moved up without casualties, cleared the wood, and by 5 p.m. had established posts on the far edge.
About 7 p.m. the advance of both companies was once more attempted. "A" Company, on the right, advanced some 200 yards, which brought it more into line with "B" Company, but could make no farther headway. Captain Eccles then issued orders for the advance to the Tournai—Cambrai road, and No. 8 Platoon managed to get within about 400 yards of the Convent, where they were absolutely stopped. No. 6 Platoon could make no headway at all; and No. 8 Platoon, which was isolated, was consequently withdrawn for a short distance to preserve the general front. Company Headquarters, which had moved forward, and incidentally were all but demolished by a shell of very large dimensions, withdrew to their previous location, and all posts prepared for the night. "D" Company in the meantime, having been passed by "B" Company, were concentrated at Mont Garnis in reserve. Machine guns were posted at important tactical posts for the night.
Throughout the day, in addition to intense machine-gun fire, the enemy had kept up a heavy and more or less continuous bombardment with every class of shell up to 8-inch. The slightest movement produced great hostile activity, and it was simply owing to the small number of men engaged on a comparatively large front that saved us from heavy casualties. Trench-mortar and artillery support was available, and was employed as far as the conditions of moving warfare and lack of observation permitted.