CANAL DE L'ÉSCAUT NEAR CAMBRAI
THE CAMBRAI—BAPAUME ROAD, NEAR FONTAINE NOTRE DÂME.
For the next day (October 21st) we received orders that we were to pass through the 8th K.L.R. at 8.30 a.m., seize the bridgeheads, and, passing the Scheldt, capture the high ground on the other side. To assist us in this somewhat ambitious scheme, we received one battery R.F.A., two sections M.G.C., one mobile medium trench mortar battery, and two bridging sections, R.E.
The action which followed will be described in some detail, as it proved a very interesting operation, and the only one of its kind in which the battalion took part. It was real open warfare, as distinct from the miscellaneous fighting which followed a "set piece" attack during the recent battles.
The country between us and the River Scheldt was flat in the main, dotted with houses and small woods, and rising slightly towards Froyennes, whence it fell away to an open stretch of grassland up to the near bank of the river. It was an excellent position for a rearguard to hold; and in addition, on the Tournai—Courtrai road, about one mile north of Froyennes, the enemy enjoyed magnificent observation from the Convent, and also for his guns from Mont St. Aubers, a conspicuous eminence on the far side of the river. He had a considerable number of guns, and evidently an ample supply of ammunition.
We, on the other hand, suffered the usual disadvantages of an attacking force in open warfare. We had no knowledge of the strength or location of the enemy, while our own movements could not be concealed. Moreover, the hasty advance and the interruption of communications due to the complete demolition of all bridges, the damage to roads by mines, and the absolute destruction of all railways—every single metal on the lines having had a piece blown out—had effectually prevented the advance of any heavy artillery, and the 18-pounders which we had were but scantily provided with ammunition.
We moved off at 8 a.m. to take over from the Irish—"A" Company on the right, "B" on the left, "C" in support, and "D" in reserve. The front line, which was some 2,000 yards in extent, ran north and south about 1,500 yards east of the hamlet of Honnevain. This was taken over by 10 a.m., the 8th K.L.R. being collected into groups near that place, with "C" Company and Battalion Headquarters just in front. The two front line companies now endeavoured to advance.
In this and subsequent similar attempts we were heavily handicapped by being the only battalion of the Division in the line. On our left was the 59th Division, and on our right the 74th Division, which belonged to another Corps. The isolated attempts that resulted from this position of affairs enabled the enemy to concentrate his attention on our unfortunate companies, there being no time for our request for flanking support to reach all the authorities concerned.
"A" Company, moving forward on a four platoon frontage, came at once under intense machine-gun and trench-mortar fire from woods and houses opposite their front, and sustained various casualties. The Lewis gun team of No. 2 Platoon spotted one of the enemy machine-gun posts, and dealt with it successfully. The advance was thereby able to proceed a little farther, but at no point was the amount of ground gained very considerable—about 500 yards in all. About 1 p.m. the advance was compelled to cease, owing to the determined and accurate fire of the enemy and the heavy shelling which had also commenced. The situation was further complicated by the death of the Company Commander, Captain Carr, who was shot through the head while moving forward to make a personal reconnaissance. The death of this able and gallant young officer was felt as a great loss, and the delay in getting hold of Lieutenant Blake, the next senior officer, who, owing to the grave shortage of officers, was with a platoon, for some time made it hard for this company to operate collectively.