The Revolutionary Movement of 1848-9 in Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany / With Some Examination of the Previous Thirty-three Years

by C. Edmund Maurice

Nor were their early efforts unworthy of the nation whom they represented; for it seemed likely that the wisest men would be able to get their due influence in the Assembly. And this was the more remarkable, because the ease with which they had accomplished the first steps of their work seems to have led many of the Assembly to fear that there was some deeper plot in the background; and both in the city and among the members of the Assembly a rumour spread that troops were on the march to put down their meeting. A panic seized the Deputies, and bitter reproaches were interchanged. Violence seemed likely to follow, when Robert Blum came forward to reconcile the opposing factions. "Gentlemen," said he, "from whence shall we get freedom, if we do not maintain it in our dealings with each other, in our most intimate circle?" He went on then to point out, that the immediate causes of quarrel were mere matters of form and not of principle; and that it was the duty of the Assembly to maintain the reputation of the German people for calm decision. For any tumults that were made in that Parliament would be settled out of doors not by shouts, but by fists, and perhaps by other weapons. "We will first," he continued, "reverence the law which we ourselves have made, to which we voluntarily submit. If we do that, gentlemen, then not only will the hearts of our people beat in response to us, but other nations too will stretch out their arms in brotherly love to the hitherto scorned and despised Germans, and will greet in the first representative body, which has come here, the full-grown true men, who are as capable of obtaining freedom as they have shown themselves worthy of it." The influence of his clear voice, powerful figure, and determined manner added to the natural effect of his eloquence in bringing the Assembly to a wiser state of mind.[12] Another sign of the power which these men showed, of responding to appeals which were addressed to their higher instincts, was given in answer to one of the Baden representatives, who called on them to accept as their fundamental maxim that "Where the Lord does not build with us, there we build in vain." At these words all the Assembly rose to their feet.

The same triumph of gentle and moderating influences was shown in their reception of a programme presented to them by Struve on behalf of the Committee of Seven. This programme contained fifteen propositions, in which the desire for liberty and national life which animated all sections of the Assembly was combined with Republican aspirations, so strong among the Baden leaders, and with those Socialistic proposals which were as yet entirely in the background of German politics. Thus, for instance, the list begins with a proposal for the amalgamation of the army with the Civic Guard, in order to give a really national character to the army; while another clause proposes equality of faiths, freedom of association, and the right of communities to choose their own clergy and their own burgomasters. On the other hand, the 12th clause aims at the settlement of the misunderstandings between labour and capital by a special Ministry of Labour, which should check usury, protect workmen, and secure them a share in the profits of their work; while the 15th clause proposes the abolition of hereditary monarchies, and the introduction into Germany of a Federal Republic on the model of the United States of America. This medley of various ideas which Hecker and Struve desired to force upon the Assembly was finally referred to a Committee, which in the end would sift out what was practicable and embody it in a law. Even in the burning question of the relations between the Frankfort Parliament and their antiquated rival the Bundestag, Blum's influence was used in moderating the violence of the disputes between those who wished to drive the older institution to extremities and those who wished to make for it a golden bridge by which it could pass naturally into greater harmony with modern ideas.

So far, then, the German national movement had, on the whole, been guided wisely and moderately; but when the discussions began about the basis of the election of the future Assembly there quickly appeared that German national arrogance which was destined to inflame to so intolerable an extent the antagonism of feeling between the rival races in Bohemia. It was, indeed, unavoidable that the German movement in Austria should be met by some expression of friendliness and some attempt at common action on the part of the Frankfort Parliament; but the desire to welcome all Germans into the bosom of the newly-united Germany became at once complicated with the question of the best way of dealing with those districts where Slavs and Germans were so closely mixed together. This question, indeed, would in all probability have been summarily answered by the German Parliament in favour of absolute German supremacy and of the absorption of Bohemia in Germany; but the Slavonic question in the South could not be considered apart from that other phase of it, which was concerned with the mutual relation between Poles and Germans in the Polish districts of the Kingdom of Prussia. Even the most extreme champions of German supremacy were influenced in their decision of this North Slavonic question by their desire to restore an independent Poland as a bulwark against Russian oppression; and they could not deny that the claims of the Poles to the possession of Posen, at any rate, were as justifiable morally and historically as their claims to that part of their country which had been absorbed by Russia. They were desirous, therefore, of making concessions to Slavonic feeling in Posen; and this desire was increased by the connection which Mieroslawsky had established between the struggle for Polish freedom in Posen and that for German freedom in other parts of Prussia. Under these circumstances they could not wholly disregard in Bohemia the feeling which they humoured in Posen; and thus it came to pass that the Preparatory Parliament, unwilling either to abandon German supremacy or to violate directly the principle of unity and autonomy of race, came to the conclusion so common to men under similar difficulties, to throw the burden of the decision on others. They therefore passed a vague resolution which might be differently interpreted by different readers, while they left the practical decision of the question to the Committee of Fifty which was to govern Germany from the dissolution of the Preparatory Parliament on April 4 till the meeting of the Constituent Assembly on May 8.

It was this Committee, therefore, which undertook the decision of the relations to be established between Bohemia and the new free Germany. The new body proved bolder than the Preparatory Parliament; for it took a step which, though it may have been intended in a conciliatory spirit, yet involved the distinct assertion of the claim to treat Bohemia as part of Germany. They invited the Bohemian historian Palacky to join with them in their deliberations, and thus to sanction the proposal that Bohemia should send representatives to the German Parliament. Palacky answered by a courteous but firm refusal of the proposal, based partly on the grounds of previous history, partly on the needs of Bohemia, and partly on the necessity of an independent Austrian Empire to the safety and freedom of Europe. He pointed out that the supposed union between Bohemia and Germany had been merely an alliance of princes, never of peoples, and that even the Bohemian Estates had never recognized it. He urged that Bohemia had the same right to independence which was claimed by Germany; but that both would suffer if extraneous elements were introduced into Germany. He urged that an independent Austria was necessary as a barrier against Russia, but that Germany could be united only by a Republican Government; and, therefore, Austria, which must necessarily remain an Empire, could not consent to a close union with Germany without breaking to pieces.

In spite, however, of this rebuff, the German leaders at Frankfort were so eager to secure their purpose in this matter that they sent down messengers to Prague to confer with the Bohemian National Committee. A long discussion ensued, turning partly on the independence of the Austrian State, partly on the nationality of Bohemia. The Bohemians urged that the Germans were endeavouring to force upon them traditions which they had rejected for themselves; that the Frankfort Parliament had repudiated the old Bund on account of its unrepresentative character; and yet they demanded that Bohemia should recognise a union which rested on the arrangements which had been destroyed, a union about which the Bohemians had never been consulted as a nation. The Germans, on their side, attempted to advance certain arguments of expediency in favour of a closer union between Bohemia and Germany. But a certain Dr. Schilling, who does not seem to have been one of the original messengers from Frankfort, declared, with brutal frankness, the real grounds of the German proposal. If Austria did not become German, he said, the Germans of Austria would not remain Austrian. The five million Germans in Austria would not stay to be oppressed by the twelve million Slavs. The freedom and culture of Bohemia was, he declared, entirely German. The idea of freedom could not be found among the Slavs; and it was therefore necessary, in the general interests of freedom, that Bohemia should be absorbed in Germany.

Palacky bitterly thanked Schilling for the frankness of his speech; and expressed his regret at hearing that the Germans would not stay where they could not rule, and where they were obliged to be on an equality with others; while another of the Bohemians exclaimed that the Bohemians had shown their love of liberty by their resistance to the attempts to Germanize them. But Schilling seemed entirely unable to appreciate the feelings of his opponents; and, with a naïve contempt for logic, he declared that, because Nationality was just now the leading idea of the Peoples, therefore all the Slavs who belonged to the German Bund must be absorbed in Germany! Kuranda, the former champion of Viennese liberty, tried to soften the effect of Schilling's insults. He abandoned any claim based on the old German Bund, and declared that the Assembly at Frankfort was not so much a German Parliament as a Congress of Peoples, a beginning of the union of humanity. But this ingenious change of front could not destroy the effect of Schilling's words; and perhaps the Bohemians could not understand why a Congress of the Peoples should find its centre at Frankfort any more than at Prague.

But though the Bohemians had failed to convince the German Committee that Bohemia had as much right as Germany to a separate existence, they still hoped that the Austrian Government would protect them from an attack which seemed directed both against their national rights and against the integrity of the Austrian Empire. So they despatched to the Minister of the Interior a protest against the proposal to hold elections for the Frankfort Parliament in Bohemia. Such elections, they declared, would lead to a breach of the peace of the country, to Communistic and Republican agitations, and to attempts to break up the Austrian Empire. The Bohemian Assembly, they urged, would disavow the legal right of such representatives when they were elected; and thus any really satisfactory alliance between Austria and Germany would be hindered by this attempt. The Ministers in Vienna were, no doubt, troubled in their mind about this question of the relations between Germans and Bohemians. On the one hand, they desired to conciliate a people whose national interests led them to seek protection in a union with the rest of the Austrian Empire. But, on the other hand, they felt it difficult to disregard the intense German feeling which was growing in Vienna, and which was shared by important towns in Bohemia. Therefore, after, no doubt, considerable deliberation, the Ministry resolved to announce to the Bohemians that they might either vote for the representatives in the Frankfort Parliament or abstain from voting, as seemed best to them. This seems, of all conclusions, the most unreasonable which could have been arrived at. The union with Germany might or might not be defensible; but it was obviously a step which must be taken by the whole nation or by none. Of all possible political arrangements, none could be more intolerable than the permission to certain citizens of a country to retain their civil rights and residence in that country, and at the same time to be free to claim, according to their own fancy, the special protection secured by citizenship in another State.

The National Committee of Prague, finding that the Government at Vienna were unable or unwilling to protect them, resolved on stronger measures of self protection; and on May 1 they issued an appeal to all the Slavs of Austria to meet on the 31st of the same month in Prague, to protest against the desire of the Frankfort Parliament to absorb Austria in Germany. This appeal was signed by Count Joseph Matthias Thun, whose relative, Count Leo Thun, had taken an active part in forming the National Committee; by Count Deym, who had headed the first deputation to Vienna; by Palacky and his son-in-law Dr. Rieger; by the philologer Szaffarik, and by less well known men. But at the same time the Bohemian leaders were most anxious to try to maintain the connection with Austria and to observe a strictly deferential attitude towards the Emperor. They therefore appealed again to the Emperor and his Ministers to withdraw the indirect sanction which they had given to the proposed Bohemian elections to the Frankfort Parliament. They pointed out that Austria had never belonged, in regard to most of her provinces, to the German Bund; and that the question of whether or no Bohemia should join herself to Germany was clearly one of those internal questions with reference to which she had been promised the right of decision. They further urged that the Emperor had acted on a different line with regard to the union between Moravia and Bohemia; and although the claim for this latter union rested on old treaties and laws, he had decided that it should only be restored by a vote of the respective provincial Assemblies, and the Bohemians had been perfectly willing to accept a compromise on the subject. How much more reasonable then was it that the Bohemians should claim the right of deciding on the question of an entirely new relation between their country and Germany? Again they warned him of the violence which might be the consequence of such elections; and they entreated him to consider also that any attempt on the part of the Frankfort Parliament to make a Constitution for all the lands of the Bund, would be a violation of the independence of the Emperor of Austria and of all his subjects. This last argument might, at an earlier stage, have produced an effect on some at least of the Ministers to whom it was addressed; for they had already announced that Austria could not be bound by the decisions of the Frankfort Parliament. But affairs in Vienna were at this time hastening towards a change, which was materially to affect the relations of that city with the other parts of the Empire.

The Ministry, which had been formed after the fall of Metternich, was little likely to satisfy the hopes of the reformers. Kolowrat and Kübeck, who had been supposed to be rather less illiberal than Metternich, but who had worked with him in most of his schemes, were prominent in this Ministry; and another member of it was that Ficquelmont who had hoped to pacify Milan by help of dancers and actresses. Only one member of the Ministry, the Freiherr von Pillersdorf, had any real reputation for Liberalism; and even he had been a colleague of Metternich, and had done little in that position to counteract Metternich's policy. Finding it impossible, therefore, to put any confidence in the official rulers of their country, the Viennese naturally turned their attention to the formation of some Government in which they could trust. On March 20 a special legion had been formed composed of the students of the University; and a Committee was soon after chosen from those professors and students who had played a leading part in the Revolution. This Committee, which was at once the outcome and the guide of the Students' Legion, became the centre of popular confidence and admiration. Thus then there arose, in the very first days of the Revolution, a marked division of interest and feeling between the real and nominal rulers of Vienna. Some such antagonism is perhaps the scarcely avoidable result of a revolution achieved by violence, especially when the change of persons and forms produced by that revolution is so incomplete as it was in Vienna. Those who, by mere official position, are allowed to retain the leadership of followers with whom they have no sympathy, are constantly expecting that reforms which were begun in violence must be necessarily continued by the same method; while the actual revolutionary leaders can hardly believe in their own success, and are constantly suspecting that those who have apparently accepted the new state of things, are really plotting a reaction.

In Vienna these mutual suspicions had probably stronger justification than they have in most cases of this kind. The courtiers, who had plotted against Metternich, had as little desire for free government as the Jacobins who overthrew Robespierre; and Windischgrätz was gradually gathering round him a secret council, who were eventually to establish a system as despotic as that of Metternich. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the gallant lads who had marched in procession to the Landhaus on March 13, and who had defied the guns of Archduke Albert, were unwisely disposed to prefer violent methods of enforcing their opinions. Thus, when, on March 31, a law regulating the freedom of the Press was issued, as distasteful to the Viennese as Szemere's had been to the Hungarians, the Viennese students at once proposed to follow the example of the students of Pesth, and burn the law publicly. Hye persuaded them to abandon this attempt; and he, with Fischhof, Kuranda, Schuselka and other trusted leaders, went on a deputation to Pillersdorf, to entreat him to withdraw the law. Pillersdorf assured them that this law was only a provisional one, and that amendments would soon be introduced into it; but, a few days later, Count Taaffe, another member of the Ministry, publicly contradicted Pillersdorf's statement, and spoke of the Press law as being a permanent one, though he promised that it should be mildly administered. Perhaps the students may be excused if they felt no great respect for such a Ministry. Nor were their feelings conciliated by what they considered a growing tendency on the part of the Ministry to make concessions of local liberties to the provinces.