In Paris the first elections of the Commune were held on March 26. On April 3 an armed sally of the Communards towards Versailles was repulsed with the loss of some of their chief leaders, including Flourens. Meanwhile, the Army of Versailles had been organized and put under the command of Mac-Mahon. Discipline was restored and the advance on Paris began.
As time passed in the besieged city the saner men were swept into the background and reckless counsels prevailed. Some of the military leaders were competent men, such as Cluseret, who had been a general in the American army during the Civil War, or Rossel, a trained officer of engineers. But many were foreign adventurers and soldiers of fortune: Dombrowski, Wrobleski, La Cecilia. The civil administration grew into a reproduction of the worst phases of the Reign of Terror. Frenzied women egged on destruction and slaughter, and when at last the national troops fought their way into the conquered city, it was amid the flaming ruins of many of its proudest buildings and monuments.
The siege lasted two months. On May 21, the Army of Versailles crossed the fortifications and there followed the "Seven Days' Battle," a street-by-street advance marked by desperate resistance by the Communards and bloodthirsty reprisals by the Versaillais. Civil war is often the most cruel and the Versailles troops, made up in large part of men recently defeated by the Germans, were glad to conquer somebody. Over seventeen thousand were shot down by the victors in this last week. The French to-day are horrified and ashamed at the cruel massacres of both sides and try to forget the Commune. Suffice it here to say that the last serious resistance was made in the cemetery of Père-Lachaise, where those fédérés taken arms in hand were lined up against a wall and shot. Countless others, men, women, and children, herded together in bands, were tried summarily and either executed, imprisoned, or deported thousands of miles away to New Caledonia, until, years after, in 1879 and 1880, the pacification of resentments brought amnesty to the survivors.[4]
Fortunately, M. Thiers had more inspiring tasks to deal with than the repression of the Commune. One was the liberation of French soil from German occupation, another the reorganization of the army. With wonderful speed and energy the enormous indemnity was raised and progressively paid, the Germans simultaneously evacuating sections of French territory. By March, 1873, France was in a position to agree to pay the last portion of the war tribute the following September (after the fall of Thiers, as it proved), thus ridding its soil of the last German many months earlier than had been provided for by the Treaty of Frankfort. The recovery of France aroused the admiration of the civilized world, and the anger of Bismarck, sorry not to have bled the country more. He viewed also with suspicion the organization of the army and the law of July, 1872, establishing practically universal military service. He affected to see in it France's desire for early revenge for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.
M. Thiers, the great leader, did not find his rule uncontested. Brought into power as the indispensable man to guide the nation out of war, his conceit was somewhat tickled and he wanted to remain necessary. Though over seventy he had shown the energy and endurance of a man in his prime joined to the wisdom and experience of a life spent in public service and the study of history. Elected by an anti-Republican Assembly and himself originally a Royalist, the formulator also of the Bordeaux Compact, he began to feel, nevertheless, in all sincerity that a conservative republic would be the best government, and his vanity made him think himself its best leader. This conviction was intensified for a while by his successful tactics in threatening to resign, when thwarted, and thus bringing the Assembly to terms. But he tried the scheme once too often.
The majority in the Assembly was not, in fact, anxious to give free rein to Thiers, and it had wanted to avoid committing itself definitely to a republic. It wanted also to insure its own continuation as long as possible, contrary to the wishes of advanced Republicans like Gambetta, who declared that the National Assembly no longer stood for the expression of the popular will and should give way to a real constituent assembly to organize a permanent republic.
The first endeavor of the Royalists was to bring about a restoration of the monarchy. The princes of the Orléanist branch were readmitted to France and restored to their privileges. A fusion between the two branches of the house of Bourbon was absolutely necessary to accomplish anything. The members of the younger or constitutionalist Orléans line, and notably its leader, the comte de Paris, were disposed to yield to the representative of the legitimist branch, the comte de Chambord. He was an honorable and upright man, yet one who in statesmanship and religion was unable to understand anything since the Revolution. He had not been in France for over forty years, he was permeated with a religious mystical belief not only in the divinity of royalty, but in his own position as God-given (Dieudonné was one of his names) and the only saviour of France. Moreover, he could not forgive his cousins the fact that their great-grandfather had voted for the execution of Louis XVI. So he treated their advances haughtily, declined to receive the comte de Paris, and issued a manifesto to the country proclaiming his unwillingness to give up the white flag for the tricolor. Henry V could not let anybody tear from his hand the white standard of Henry IV, of Francis I, and of Jeanne d'Arc.
Such mediævalism dealt the monarchical cause a crushing blow. The Royalists had already begun to look askance at M. Thiers and hinted that his readiness to go on with the Republic was a tacit violation of the Bordeaux Compact. Under the circumstances, however, his sincerity need not be doubted in believing a republic the only outcome, and his ambition or vanity may be excused for wishing to continue its leader. By the Rivet-Vitet measure of August 31, 1871, M. Thiers, hitherto "chief of executive power," was called "President of the French Republic." He was to exercise his functions so long as the Assembly had not completed its work and was to be responsible to the Assembly. Thus the legislative body elected for an emergency was taking upon itself constituent authority and was tending to perpetuate the Republic which the majority disliked.
From this time the tension grew greater between Thiers and the Assembly, which begrudged him the credit for the negotiations still proceeding, and already mentioned above, for the evacuation of France by the Germans. It thwarted the wish of the Republicans to transfer the seat of the executive and legislature to Paris. Thiers was, indeed, working away from the Bordeaux Compact and was advocating a republic, though a conservative one. This "treachery" the monarchists could not forgive, though bye-elections were constantly increasing the Republican membership. Thiers did not, on the other hand, welcome the advanced republicanism of Gambetta declaring war on clericalism, and proclaiming the advent of a new "social stratum" (une couche sociale nouvelle) for the government of the nation.
By the middle of 1872, Thiers was the open advocate of "la République conservatrice," and this gradual transformation of a transitional republic into a permanent one was what the monarchists could not accept. So they declared open war on M. Thiers. On November 29, 1872, a committee of thirty was appointed at Thiers's instigation to regulate the functions of public authority and the conditions of ministerial responsibility. This was inevitably another step toward the affirmation of a permanent republic by the clearer specification of governmental attributes. The majority of the committee were hostile to M. Thiers and were determined to overthrow him. The Left was also growing dissatisfied with his opposition to a dissolution. He found it increasingly difficult to ride two horses. The committee of thirty wished to prevent Thiers from exercising pressure on the Assembly by intervention in debates and threats to resign. In February and March, 1873, it proposed that the President should notify the Assembly by message of his intention to speak, and the ensuing discussion was not to take place in his presence. M. Thiers protested in vain against this red tape (chinoiseries). The effect was to drive him more and more from the Assembly, where his personal influence might be felt.