No sooner were the preliminaries signed than Thiers returned post-haste to Bordeaux, and obtained an almost immediate assent (March 1), so that the Germans were obliged to forego a large part of their plans for a triumphal entry into Paris and a review by the Emperor. Only one body of thirty thousand men marched in through one section and, two days later, evacuated the city.
The same meeting which ratified the preliminaries of peace officially proclaimed the expulsion of the imperial dynasty and declared Napoleon III responsible for the invasion, the ruin and dismemberment of France. The same day also beheld the pathetic withdrawal of the representatives of Alsace and of Lorraine, turned over to the conqueror.
The misfortunes of France were far from ended. Paris was soon to break out into rebellion under the eyes of the Germans still in possession of many of the suburbs. The enemy looked on and saw Frenchman killing Frenchman in civil war.
It had become obvious that the division of administration between Bordeaux and Paris was making government difficult. The Assembly, still suspicious of Paris, decided to transfer its place of meeting to Versailles. But Paris itself was in a state of nervous hysteria as a result of the long and exhausting siege (fièvre obsidionale). The Paris proletariat were as jealous and suspicious of the Assembly as the Assembly of them. The suggestion of a transfer to Versailles instead of to Paris seemed a direct challenge. Versailles recalled too easily Louis XIV and the Bourbons. The monarchical sympathies of the Assembly were, moreover, well known, and the Parisians dreaded the restoration of royalty. The people were hungry and penniless, and industry and commerce had almost completely ceased. The city was full, besides, of soldiers disarmed through the armistice and ready for riot. On the other hand, the National Guards, a large body of semi-disciplined militia made up, at least in part, of the dregs of the populace, had been allowed to retain their weapons, and many of them gave their time to drunkenness, loafing, and listening to agitators. Some rather injudicious condemnations of leaders in the October riots merely aggravated the dissatisfaction. All this led to the Commune.
The leaders of the Commune were, some of them, sincere though visionary reformers, whose hearts rankled at the sufferings of the poor and the inequalities of wealth and privilege. The majority were mischief-makers and café orators, loquacious but incompetent or inexperienced, without definite plans and unfit to be leaders, some vicious and some dishonest. The rank and file soon became a lawless mob, ready to burn and murder, imitating, in their ignorant cult of "liberty," the worst phases of the French Revolution and its Reign of Terror. Still, the Communards have their admirers to-day, and, as the world advances in radicalism, it is not unlikely that the Jacobin Charles Delescluze, the bloodthirsty Raoul Rigault, and the brilliant and scholarly Gustave Flourens will be considered heroic precursors.
The idea of the Commune was decentralization. It was an experiment aiming at a free and autonomous Paris serving as model for the other self-governing communes of France, united merely for their common needs. It amounted almost to the quasi-independence of each separate town. But mixed up with the theorists of the Commune were countless anarchist revolutionaries, followers of the teachings of Blanqui, as well as admirers of the great Revolution which overthrew the old régime, and socialists of various types.
The germs of the movement which was to culminate in the Commune were visible at an early hour. The dissatisfaction of the Radicals with the moderation of the Government of National Defence, the riots of October 31 and January 22 were all symptoms of the discontent of the proletariat. Indeed, the proclamation of the Republic, on September 4, was itself an object lesson in illegality to the malcontents. Organized dissatisfaction began to centre about the obstreperous and disorderly, but armed and now "federated" National Guards. Manifestoes signed by self-appointed committees of plebeian patriots appeared on the walls of Paris. These committees finally merged into the "Comité central," or were replaced by it. This committee advocated the trial and imprisonment of the members of the Government of National Defence, and protested against the disarmament of the National Guards and the entrance of the Germans into Paris.
The Government was almost helpless. The few regulars left under arms in Paris were of doubtful reliance, and General d'Aurelle de Paladines, now in command of the National Guards, was not obeyed. A certain number of artillery guns in Paris had been paid for by popular subscription, and the rumor spread at one time that these were to be turned over to the Germans. The populace seized them and dragged them to different parts of the city.
The Government decided at last to act boldly and, on March 18, dispatched General Lecomte with some troops to seize the guns at Montmartre. But the mob surrounded the soldiers, and these mutinied and refused to obey orders to fire, and arrested their own commander. Later in the day General Lecomte was shot with General Clément Thomas, a former commander of the National Guard, who rather thoughtlessly and out of curiosity had mingled with the crowd and was recognized.
Thus armed forces in Paris were in direct rebellion. Other outlying quarters had also sprung into insurrection. M. Thiers, who had recently arrived from Bordeaux, and the chief government officials quartered in Paris, withdrew to Versailles. Paris had to be besieged again and conquered by force of arms.