The Americans of the United States, as has often been pointed out, are a people without a distinctive or appropriate race name. The Canadian, the Mexican, the Brazilian, the Peruvian and all other units of America have their own designation. So far no term for the American has developed, and convenience warrants the usage of that they have adopted, which is as if a single nation of Europe were to take to itself the name European. To the American aborigine, whether in the Northern or Southern continent, ethnologists have applied the term Amerind, a contraction of "American Indian," and the word seems to have been adopted, at least as a technical term. (No one, however, has applied the name "Amersaxon" to the people of the United States, although it would be equally correct.)
The relation between the two races, or rather the common possession of the New World by them, has given rise to that peculiar and well-known policy or system known as the Monroe Doctrine. Washington recommended the policy that the United States should refrain from entangling itself in the politics of Europe. The converse, that Europe should be prevented from meddling in American affairs, grew as the importance of the United States increased, and was enunciated—after a hint from Canning—by President Monroe, in a message to Congress in 1823, at the time of the "Holy Alliance" of European Powers, which it was feared would attempt to restore the dominion of Spain to the Spanish American colonies, which had asserted their independence. "We should consider any attempt on their part (the European Powers) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling their destiny by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." So ran the decree.
The Latin American States, whilst probably not ungrateful for the Doctrine in general, resent any assertion of hegemony upon the part of the United States. They do not regard themselves as in any way inferior thereto, except as concerns the material development of the more mechanical arts of civilization. Their own social culture, the traditions of the caballero, or gentleman, they consider as superior, and if truth must be told, it is so in some respects. The people of the United States—and Canada—have preferred the less-polished and more practical outlook and social port; the Spanish American the more reserved and ceremonious. Indeed, the southern folk often regard the northerner as uncultured. There is no doubt that the two races have a good deal to learn from each other, the southerner in the practical things of life, the northerner in social amenities, and each could well absorb some of the virtues of the other.
Until very recent times there was a disposition on the part of the Spanish American people to imagine the northerner as disposed to overrun them, and there was an element in the United States which undoubtedly had such purpose before it. But probably this is past, and the idea that the Monroe Doctrine of "America for the Americans" meant in reality "America for the North Americans," may die out. The judicious and generous attitude of the United States in Cuba after the war between the United States and Spain has been put against the methods employed, for example, in the case of Panama and the Canal. Mexico, however, remains a difficult question, upon whose future relations with her neighbour it would be impossible to dogmatize. The United States at the present time are in the heyday of their commercial life, and would appear to be resolved to conquer the Latin American countries commercially. This may or may not lead to strife in the future. We shall not forget that the Great War was, in large degree, the outcome of the modern phase of commercial jealousy, and what developments the future holds we cannot foresee.
We ought not to close our survey of the Latin American nations without at least briefly recording their attitude in the Great War, in the question of right against might, of civilization against German savagery. Far out of the beaten track of European (and North American) affairs as are these growing nations, their history in this connexion might readily be forgotten, and its importance overlooked.
It was not unnatural perhaps that the Latin American Republics should have been tardy in entering into the war, in view of the attitude of the senior Republic of the Western Hemisphere—the United States—which hung so long in the balance. It did not at all follow that they would imitate that country. In some respects they might do so; in others they did not necessarily regard their cousin of the north with entire confidence. However, they were greatly influenced thereby.
The earlier attitude of the United States towards the war must ever remain a source of wonder to the historian, accompanied by regret. It was largely, if not principally, the result of the attitude of their President, Dr. Woodrow Wilson. It will be recollected that the United States did not enter the war against the German barbarians until April, 1917—that is, over two and a half years after the outbreak of the war. That was the period necessary for the Republic to overcome its own suspicion of Europe, and especially England; to overcome its own self-interest, to awaken to the truth; and this notwithstanding all the horrors that had been visited upon Belgium. Long after these dreadful occurrences had sunk into the mind of the Allies, who, originally unprepared for war, were fighting for their life in support of humanity against the huge organized army which Germany had for decades been building up to carry out her ambitions, the American President could send out his extraordinary Note to all the belligerents (December, 1916) stating that in his view "the objects on both sides appeared to be the same." In plain words, the respective merits of the combatants were as good or bad as each other! In this view, however, to the credit of the United States, it should be said that a large body of Americans had a much clearer moral perception of the issues at stake than their leader, and among them was the vigorous ex-President, Mr. Roosevelt. But it required a direct blow in the face for the United States before the President could shake off his pacifist attitude, and actual injury to American property and life; and this incentive was furnished by the German submarine activity and the sinking of American ships. The United States' interposition in the war had not been asked for by England and the Allies at first, but it had become evident long before that the Republic should have ranged itself on the side of law, order, and humanity; and America lost an opportunity, which may never recur, of asserting her moral influence in the world—a loss which, it may be said, is hers as much as that of Europe. The American interposition was of great value when it did come, but the bulk of the work had been done. America was almost too late to save her prestige and to take efficient part in this great adventure. When the Americans did enter they displayed great energy and valour, and it must also be recollected that the part the United States had played in the supply of munitions of war, foodstuffs, credit and so forth had been of the utmost value, and there was more in this than a mere business transaction.
The Latin American States did not necessarily hasten to follow President Wilson's implied suggestion of February, 1917, on severing diplomatic relations with Germany, that the remaining neutral States should follow suit, which no doubt was largely aimed at the southern republics. There were various reasons against it. Many of these thought their own interests would best be served by remaining neutral; some were afraid of Germany—it was not unnatural. Some were angered with France, for reasons later discussed; some were—at least clerically—pro-German. On the whole, however, it must be recorded that Latin American sympathy as a whole was, and had been from the beginning, on the side of the Allies. It would indeed have augured ill for their moral perception if the reverse had been the case, and would have seriously injured them in the eyes of historians.
Of these twenty independent Latin American States, eight actually entered the war, on the side of the Allies and the United States. They were (in alphabetical order) Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Five broke off relations with Germany but did not declare war. They were Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, San Domingo (the Dominican Republic) and Uruguay. Peru and Uruguay were practically belligerents, by their various acts against Germany, but Germany did not appear so to regard them. However, both these republics were invited to the Peace Conference, and signed the Peace Treaty. Seven republics remained neutral. They were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Salvador and Venezuela.