Putting the area of Latin America at nine million square miles and the population at ninety millions (of both these items various estimates are given), it may be said that six million square miles and fifty million people were at least non-neutral.
However, such figures must be taken for what they were worth. Only Brazil and Cuba took any active part. Argentina and Chile, the two most important and powerful States after Brazil, carefully preserved their neutral attitude. (It will be recollected that the group of the three greatest Powers of Latin America, which have been termed the "A B C" Powers, are Argentina, Brazil and Chile.) Mexico, the second largest State of Latin America in point of population, was also neutral, and at one time appeared to be strongly pro-German—an attitude which was partly instrumental in influencing the United States to take up arms.
It must always be recollected, again, that the official attitude of these States—as in the case of the United States also, before it took part—did not necessarily represent that of the majority of the intelligent classes.
The actual entry of Brazil did not come until October, 1917; that of Cuba came simultaneously with that of the United States. Peru broke off relations with Germany in October; Ecuador in December; Bolivia in February (with the United States); Uruguay in October; Panama at the same period; Guatemala in April; Honduras and Nicaragua in May; Costa Rica in September; Haiti and San Domingo in July.
We may cast a glance at the various influences at work in the respective attitudes of these States towards the war.
Some of the States regarded with alarm the possibilities of a German victory as such would concern themselves. They had not forgotten that their independence was largely a result of the European outburst that followed the French Revolution, nor yet the designs of Napoleon on the Spanish American colonies and Brazil, which England had helped to thwart, and those of Spain and the Holy Alliance after Independence, which, again, England and the United States had frustrated. They knew Germany but for the Monroe Doctrine—an Anglo-American creation—would long ago have striven to help herself to South American territory. On the other hand, German propaganda had been especially active and sinister among them during the war—business men and professors—and the Germans had strong influence there. Also Spanish and other clerical influences were at work among them, often representing France as the great atheist nation, due to her anti-Church legislation and apostasy, and—for example in Chile—it was even said that Germany was the chosen instrument of heaven to punish France on this account. Further, there was always the smouldering distrust of the "Colossus of the North," the Norteamericanos of the United States, which it was often thought desired to exercise an undue hegemony over Latin America. Colombia retained an animus against the United States as a result of the Panama affair.
The most active spirit in Brazil on the side of the right was the eminent Brazilian statesman, Ruy Barbosa, and it was soon seen where the sympathies of Brazil lay. Submarine outrages on her merchant marine and other motives brought forth pronouncements against the German assassins, and the seizure of the large German vessels in Brazilian ports followed, and both public and official opinion led to the rupture. The Brazilian Navy co-operated with that of the Allies, and Brazil even sent forces to the Western front, and the republic assisted with supplies. As for Argentina, the war brought her enormous prosperity as a neutral, but here the neutrality was far more official than popular, and was largely motivated by the President. An episode in Argentina was in the famous Spurlos Versenkt Notes of the unspeakable Luxburg, the German Chargé d'Affaires in the republic, of May and July, 1917. "As regards Argentine steamers," he wrote to his Government—through the medium of the Swedish Minister at Buenos Ayres, be it noted!—"I recommend either compelling them to turn back, letting them through, or sinking them without trace." This devilishly cynical pronouncement goes down to history with that of the infamous German "scrap of paper" argument. Argentine neutral citizens were to be murdered in cold blood for German ends! The Minister received his passports, the German club in Buenos Ayres was burnt by the mob, and there was a popular demand for a break with Germany; and the Senate passed resolutions. But it ended in nothing. It has been said that President Irrigoyen's extraordinary attitude in opposing the popular mind was due to pro-German feeling—which, however, was denied; to his aversion from merely following in the wake of the United States; and from a desire to preserve Argentina from war in order that his deep-seated plans of social and economic reform might not be disturbed. Be it as it may, Argentina lost her chance.
With regard to Chile, neutrality also was profitable, in the enormous demand for her nitrates. German influence was very strong in the country, both in matters military and educational; and the clerical attribute—the Church is powerful in Chile—was also a factor, as before remarked. But a large element viewed Germany with detestation, and the republic "reserved its right to act in the event of hostility against her vessels." However, Chile also lost her opportunity.
It is to be noted that it was the submarine policy of Germany in the direct attack upon vessels which was the determining factor in all these principal republics, from the United States downward.
The attitude of Uruguay was always pro-Ally. The Government of that country issued a noteworthy decree in defining its position: that "no American country, which, in defence of its own rights, should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents will be treated as a belligerent." It may be said in general terms that the attitude of all these States proclaimed the principle of "American solidarity," or Pan-Americanism.