[CHAPTER XIII.]
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY.
Aware, that we are constantly liable to perversion as to the intent of our remarks in these pages, it is proper for us to say, that we have not taken up this topic in order to bring our interpretation of it to bear against the right of slaves to their freedom. That is a question which we do not assume to discuss, though we have signified our opinion, and are ready freely and frankly so to do on all proper occasions. But our object at this time is to correct the vague, poetic, and romantic notions which are commonly attached to these terms. In this country, their origin may fairly be ascribed to a notable declaration, so often quoted from our national bill of rights: “that all men are created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Now, what is the meaning of this? The history of those times, and of the occasions which produced it, will answer this question.
First, as to the term Liberty. The British Government refused the Colonies a representation in the law-making power of the empire, and this was the ground of the quarrel, the cause of the Revolution. We have, then, in this great historical fact, a fair and clear interpretation of the meaning of the term “liberty” in the declaration of Rights, viz. the right to a representation of the people in the law-making authority. So much and no more, we conceive, is the meaning of this term in this place; and that is enough for the free and full action of “the principles of our republican form of Government.” In connexion with the provisions of our National and State Constitutions, the people are thus constituted the law-making power. That is, they are entitled to govern themselves. But the very idea of Government is subjection to law, not a liberty for every man to do as he pleases. This last meaning is the vague, poetic, and romantic notion commonly attached to this term—to do as one pleases; whereas, the Constitutional and proper meaning is the right to a voice in the making of law. In the strict sense of the term, therefore, it is not liberty, but a right. The moment a man enters into society, he resigns his liberty, and consents to be subjected to the regulations of the community, of which he is a member. There is no liberty, except in the simple state of nature, where man is isolated from man, and becomes a solitary savage.
Having alluded to the state of nature, it may be proper in this place to observe, that the same poetic fancies are constantly played off on “natural rights,” as on liberty and equality; whereas, the slightest reflection ought to teach us, that all society is artificial and conventional, and that no man who enters into society can any farther lay claim to “natural rights” than the law allows. Every regulation of society is so far an infringement on natural rights, if, indeed, we have any correct notion of the meaning of these terms. It is difficult, indeed, to define natural rights. We have never yet seen it done, and confess our own inability for the task. What is the use, then, in talking about that for which we cannot find even a definition? We have a right, however, since it is used for practical purposes, to make it mean something. Say, then, that it means such rights as a savage would be entitled to, when alone in the desert, to do what he is inclined, as in such circumstances he would not interfere with any social right. But in society men give up their natural rights, if the above is a fair statement of what they are; and the law becomes the rule of right. The whole system of society is artificial, and at war with natural rights; and he who claims the privilege of natural right, in opposition to the established code of society, asserts the right of rebellion. We have no objection, however, that any body should give us a definition of natural rights, that would lead to a different conclusion, if it can be done; but till that time, we are compelled to say, that this talk about natural rights, for any practical purpose in society, is something we do not understand, unless, for example, it be the right to live and to breathe; and even that may be forfeited to the law. Suppose the murderer sentenced to be hung, should claim the privilege of natural rights—would he be heard? Natural rights, as we understand them, are not available in society, when they interfere with law. That is to say, the law is always above them, and must be, so long as it is judged best to maintain the social state. There is not a single natural right that can be named, which may not, in given cases, be abridged, or controlled, or superseded, or entirely suppressed, by the artificial organisation of society. To talk of natural right, therefore, as being paramount to law, simply because it is natural right, is arrant nonsense—mere declamation, at best.
But, to return to “liberty.” We have seen, that the Constitutional meaning of this term in our Charter or Bill of rights is limited to the single and simple claim to a voice by representation in the power of making law, and that laws are made for our subjection. All the rest beyond this is duty, obedience, not liberty. Law limits and circumscribes us at all points, in the house and out of it, every where, in relation to every body, and to every body’s rights. All the rights of our fellow beings, as secured by law, are an abridgment of our liberty. The higher the degrees of civilization, which add to the multiplication of laws, so much greater is the abridgment of liberty. That is, the more perfect society is made, so much less of liberty do we have; and, as good citizens, we are not only contented with it, but we prefer it. For the advantages of society, we enter into terms of mutual concession; and every degree of concession cuts us off from liberty.
Now for the romance of “Equality”—“that all men are created equal.” And what is the meaning of this in the Charter of our rights? Simply, that royal blood, and noble blood, is no better than any other blood; and therefore, that we will have no king, and no aristocracy. The hereditary and divine right of kings, and the hereditary right of nobles, are here barred, and the people are enthroned in their place, with all the chances open before them of rising in society, according to their merits, even to the highest honors of the Republic. This, we think, is the exact meaning of equality in this place, and that it goes no farther than to cut off the hereditary claims of kings and nobles, and of privileged orders in the community—that is, of orders privileged by the enactments of Constitutional law. But this principle, obviously, was never intended to apply practically to general society, nor to any ranks of society below these degrees. In this sense of the term the whole community is reduced fairly to what is generally understood by the republican level: that all may have a chance to rise according to their merits. But who will say, that it was intended to make a President of the United States of a man, who has no sort of qualification or claim to that office? Or to raise any man to an honor or office, to which he is not judged to be entitled by a majority of those voices appointed by law to determine such a question? Who will say, that it was intended to annihilate those grades of society, which the use of common rights necessarily creates, because one man is more industrious, or more virtuous, or more fortunate than another? Who will say, that it was intended to establish the Agrarian principle, that because the industry of one man has built him a good house, the lazy, idle, and worthless man has a right to claim a part of it, and a part of the wealth of its owner? Or, that all inequalities of wealth and condition in life, produced by different degrees of virtue, application to business, and good luck, are to be levelled by making all things common, and an equal distribution to every man, whatever may be his character? We are disposed to believe, that our American society is hardly yet prepared for the application of such a rule as this; or that there is a single man in the community who will relinquish his fairly acquired rights and property to those, who may happen not to have acquired the same advantages.
As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as equality among men, nor can there be. There is no equality in their physical powers, none in the circumstances of their birth and education, none in the privileges and wealth which they inherit or acquire, none in their social advantages—no equality in any thing. The two men cannot be found who are in all or any respects exactly equal. If all the talents and powers of the whole community were solely devoted to produce equality, they would be unequal to the task. Neither God nor man ever instituted equality. We do not say, that God could not have done it; but, to our taste, he would have spoiled creation, if he had. We desire, therefore, and think we have good reasons, to be contented with such a Universe as he has made. We desire also to be contented, that any man, by his virtues or good fortune, should be more elevated and better off than ourself. If we are not, we sin: “Thou shalt not covet.” This Divine law, was enacted for such a case, as well as others; and the very frame of society was intended to maintain these inequalities; that is, to secure to every man his own rights.
What, then, becomes of this song of liberty and equality—this poetry and romance of popular declamation—this soul-stirring and heaven-appealing claim?—Has nothing really been acquired? Yes, much: We have acquired the right of making our own laws, and cut off kings and nobles from all claim to hereditary ascendancy. This is a great, a mighty achievement, if we prove wise enough to know how to use it. We hold it to be an advance in human society—a most important acquisition to the liberties and rights of mankind. But it will be seen, that the general and vague notion commonly attached to these terms is utterly without foundation—mere poetry and romance.
We may ask, then, with what propriety the Abolitionists apply this passage in our National bill of rights to slavery? Obviously, there is no warrant for it, if we stick to the meaning and intent thereof. If they see fit to give it another meaning—to force a construction from it that was never intended, of course, in such an arbitrary interpretation, we can have no farther controversy with them, than to state, that it is arbitrary.
We deem it proper to say, that the Bill of Rights set forth in the Declaration of our Independence, was never intended for such an application; but that this particular passage was limited to the two single points which we have noticed. It neither affirms nor denies, it neither vitiates nor strengthens, the claim of the slave to his freedom, because it never contemplated the case. We are now settling a question of fact. To be wrong is one thing; to be inconsistent another. That there is wrong in slavery we do not deny; but we do say, that there is no inconsistency in the existence of slavery in the United States with our National Bill of Rights, when fairly interpreted. It will doubtless be allowed, that the Federal Constitution is a good interpreter of that Bill; and that decrees the perpetuity of slavery, at the will of the slave States. The consistency of our Government, and of our country, therefore, is maintained and defended, in this particular, against all imputation to the contrary, whatever may be the right of the case. If any body chooses to say, that the principle involved in this passage of our Bill of Rights reaches the case of the slave, we have no objection. For, we frankly confess, we have always thought so too. But we deny, that it was ever intended to have such an application, and that there is any inconsistency, however there may be wrong, in the existence of slavery in our country, so long as we abide by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as the rule, when interpreted according to their meaning.