[-17-] After this action of the soldiers Mithridates won back almost all his domain and wrought dire devastation in Cappadocia, since neither Lucullus defended it, under the excuse that Acilius was near, nor Acilius himself. For the latter, who in the first place was hurrying on to rob Lucullus of the fruits of victory, now, when he learned what had taken place, did not come to the camp, but delayed in Bithynia. As for Marcius, the pretext which he gave for not assisting Lucullus was that his soldiers refused to follow him. When he reached Cilicia he received one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and Clodius who had revolted under Lucullus, and, fearing a repetition of the doings at Nisibis, he put him in command of the fleet; for Marcius, too, had one of his sisters as wife. Now Clodius, after being captured by the pirates and released by them in consequence of their fear of Pompey, came to Antioch in Syria, declaring that he would be their ally against the Arabians, with whom the people were then at variance. There, likewise, he caused some to revolt, and his activity nearly cost him his life.
[-18-] … he spares.[7] In his eagerness for supremacy he assailed even the Cretans who had come to terms with him, and not heeding their objection that there was a state of truce he hastened to do them harm before Pompey came up. Octavius, who was there, had no troops and so kept quiet: in fact, he had not been sent to do any fighting, but to take charge of the cities. Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the villages, but on failing to persuade him made no active opposition. Metellus, after many other outrages, captured by treachery the city Eleuthera and extorted money from it. The traitors had repeatedly at night saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower, most difficult of capture, so that it became brittle. Next he took by storm Lappa, in spite of Octavius's occupancy, and did the latter no harm, but put to death the Cilicians, his followers. [-19-]Octavius, incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there the victims of oppression, and then, when the detachment of Metellus had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hieropydna, by whose side he fought. Aristion, on the retreat from Cydonia about that time, had conquered one Lucius Bassus who sailed out to oppose him, and had gained possession of Hieropydna. They held out for a while, but at the approach of Metellus left the fortification and put to sea. There they encountered a storm, and were driven ashore, losing many men. Henceforth Metellus was master of the entire island.
In this way the Cretans, who had been free through all preceding ages and had never owned a foreign lord, were enslaved; and from their subjugation Metellus obtained his title. He was, however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes (whom he had also captured) march in his triumph. For Pompey had got them away beforehand by persuading one of the tribunes that it was to him they had submitted and not to Metellus.
[-20-] I will now relate the progress of Pompey's career. The pirates, occupied in plundering, kept troubling continually those who sailed as well as the dwellers on land. There was never a time when piracy was not practiced, nor may it cease so long as the nature of mankind remains the same. But formerly plundering was limited to certain localities and small bands operating only during the regular season on sea and on land; whereas at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different places, and many cities had been uprooted, while sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives even, and fear confronted men in everything, large numbers turned to plundering. Now the bandit organizations on the mainland, being rather in sight of towns, which could thus perceive a source of injury close by, proved not so very difficult to overwhelm and were somehow broken up with a fair degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest proportions. While the Romans were busy with antagonists they flourished. They sailed about to many quarters, adding to their band all of like condition, and some of these, after the fashion of allies, assisted many others.[-21-] How much they accomplished with the help of the outsiders has been told. When those nations were overthrown, instead of ceasing they did much serious damage alone by themselves to the Romans and Roman allies. They were no longer in small force, but were accustomed to sail in great expeditions; and they had generals, so that they had acquired a great reputation. They robbed and harried first and foremost sailors: for such not even the winter season was any longer safe; the pirates through daring and through practice and through success were now showing absolute fearlessness in their seamanship. Second, they pillaged even craft lying in harbors. If any one ventured to put out against them, usually he was defeated and perished; but even if he conquered he would be unable to capture any of the enemy by reason of the speed of their ships. Accordingly, they would return after a little, as if victors, to ravage and set in flames not only farms and country districts, but also whole cities. But other places they conciliated, so as to gain apparently friendly naval stations and winter quarters.
[-22-] As they progressed by these means it became customary for them to go into the interior, and they did much mischief even among those who had no sea-traffic. This is the way they treated not only those outside of their body of allies, but the land of Italy itself. Believing that they would obtain greater gains from that quarter and that they would terrify all others still more, if they refused to hold their hands even from that country, they sailed into the very harbor of Ostia, and also of other cities in the vicinity, burned the ships and ravaged everything. Finally, as no setback occurred, they took up their abode on the land, disposing of whatever men they did not kill, and of the spoils they took quite fearlessly, as if in their own territory. And though some plundered in one region and others elsewhere,—it not being possible for the same persons to do harm the whole length of the sea,—they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another that they sent money and assistance even to those entirely unknown, as if to nearest kin. One of the largest elements in their strength was that those who helped any of them all would honor, and those who came into collision with any of them all would despoil.
[-23-] To such an extent did the supremacy of the pirates grow that their hostility became a matter of moment, constant, admitting no precaution, implacable. The Romans, of course, from time to time heard and saw a little of what was going on, inasmuch as imports in general ceased coming in and the corn supply was shut off entirely; but they gave no serious attention to it when they ought. On the contrary, they would send out fleets and generals, according as they were stirred by individual reports, but effected nothing; instead, they caused their allies all the greater distress by these very means, until they were finally reduced to extremities. Then at last they came together and deliberated many days as to what steps must be taken. Wearied by the continued dangers and noting how great and far reaching was the war raised against them, and believing, too, that it was impossible to assail the pirates all at once or individually, because the latter gave mutual assistance and it was impracticable to drive them back everywhere at once, the people fell into a dilemma and into great despair of making any successful stroke. In the end one Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, set forth his plan: he was either prompted by Pompey or wished to do him some favor; certainly he was not impelled by any love of the common welfare, for he was the vilest of men: his plan was that they should choose from among the ex-consuls one general with full powers over all, who should command for three years and have the use of a huge force, with many lieutenants. He did not actually utter the name of Pompey, but it was easy to see that if once the multitude should hear of any such proposition, they would choose him. [-24-] So it turned out. His motion was carried and immediately all save the senate began to favor Pompey. That body was in favor of enduring anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than to put so great command into Pompey's hands. In fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very halls of the senate, but he eluded them somehow. When the people learned the intention of the senators they raised an uproar, going to the point of making a rush at them as they sat assembled: and if the elders had not gotten out of the way, the populace would without doubt have killed them. They all scattered and secreted themselves except Gaius Piso the consul (it was in his year and Acilius's that these events took place), who was arrested and condemned to perish for the others; but Gabinius begged him off. After this the leading men themselves gladly held their peace on condition of being allowed to live, but used influence on the nine tribunes, to have them oppose Gabinius. All of the latter, however, except a Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius, out of fear of the multitude would not say a word in opposition; and those two men, who had the courage, were unable to redeem any of their promises by either word or deed. For when the appointed day came on which the motion was to be ratified, things went as follows.
Pompey, who was thoroughly anxious to command, and already by reason of his own ambition and the zeal of the populace no longer so much regarded this commission as an honor as the failure to win it a disgrace, seeing the opposition of those in power had a wish to appear as if compulsion were being used. In general he was as little as possible in the habit of revealing his real desires, but still more on this occasion did he feign reluctance, because of the ensuing jealousy, should he of his own accord lay claim to the leadership, and because of the glory if he should be appointed unwillingly as the one most worthy to command.
[-25-] He now came forward and said: "Quirites, I rejoice at the honor laid upon me by you. All men naturally take pride in benefits conferred upon them by the citizens, and I, who have often enjoyed honors at your hands, scarcely know how to be worthily pleased at the present contingency. However, I do not think that you should be so insatiable with regard to my services, nor that I should incessantly be in some position of command. For I have labored since childhood, and as you know, you should be promoting others as well. Do you not recall how many toils I underwent in the war against Cinna, though I was the veriest youth, or how many labors in Sicily and in Africa before I had quite reached the age of iuvenis, or how many dangers I encountered in Spain, while I was not as yet a senator? I shall not say that you have shown yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labors. How could I? Quite the reverse, in addition to the many other important favors of which you have deemed me worthy, the very fact that I was trusted to undertake the post of general against Sertorius, when no one else was either willing or able, and that I held a triumph, contrary to custom, after resigning it, brought me the greatest honor. I only say that I have undergone many anxieties and many dangers, that I am worn out in body and wearied in soul. Do not keep reckoning that I am still young, nor calculate that I have lived just so many years. For if you count up the campaigns that I have made and the dangers I have faced, you will find them far more in number than my years, and by this means you will more readily believe that I can no longer withstand the anxieties and the hardships."
[-26-] "Some one might possibly reply: 'But you see that all such opportunities for toil are causes of jealousy and hatred.' This feature you hold in no account—you ought not properly even to pretend to regard it—but to me it would prove most grievous. And I must admit that I am not so much disturbed or troubled by any danger to be encountered in the midst of wars as by such exhibitions. For what person in his right mind could take pleasure in living among men who are jealous of him, and who would feel the heart to carry out any public enterprise, if destined in case of failure to submit to punishment and if successful to be the object of rancorous envy? In view of these and other considerations allow me to remain at peace and attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. There are many who are both willing and able to serve as admirals, both younger and older men, so that your choice from so numerous a company becomes easy. Of course I am not the only one who loves you, nor am I alone skilled in warfare, but—not seeming to favor any by mentioning names—equally so is A or B."
[-27-] At this point in his harangue Gabinius, interrupting, cried: "Pompey's behavior in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character. He does not seek the leadership, nor does he accept it without thought when granted him. An upright man has no business, generally speaking, to desire the annoyances incident to office, and it is Pompey's way to undertake all tasks imposed upon him only with due consideration, in order that he may accomplish them with corresponding safety. Precipitation in promises and in action, more hasty than the occasion demands, causes the downfall of many; but exactitude at the start as well as in execution possesses a constant value and is to the advantage of all. You must choose not what would satisfy Pompey, but what is of benefit to the state. Not office seekers, but those who have capacity should be appointed to the business in hand; the former exist in very large numbers, but any other such man as my candidate you will not find. You recall, further, how many reverses of a serious nature we endured in the war against Sertorius through lack of a general, and that we found no one else among young or old adapted to it except the man before you; and that we sent him to the field in place of both consuls, although at that time he had not yet reached a mature age and was not a member of the senate. I should be glad if we did have many able men, and if I ought to pray for such, I would so pray: since, however, this ability does not depend on prayer or come of its own accord to any one, but a man has to be born with a natural bent for it, to learn what is pertinent and practice what is fitting and beyond everything to enjoy good fortune, which would very rarely fall to the lot of the same man, you must all unanimously, whenever such an one is found, both support him and make the fullest use of him even if he does not wish it. Such violence proves most noble both to him who exerts it and to him who suffers it,—to the former because he would be preserved by it, and to the latter because it would preserve the citizens, in whose behalf the excellent and patriotic man would most readily give up both body and soul.