[-28-] "Do you think that whereas this Pompey when a youth could conduct campaigns, be general, increase our possessions, preserve those of our allies, and acquire those of our adversaries, now, in the prime of life, when every man fairly surpasses himself, with a mass of additional experience gained from wars he could not prove most useful to you? Will you reject, now that he has reached man's estate, him whom while iuvenis you chose to lead? Will you not confide this campaign to the man, now become a member of the senate, to whom while still a knight you committed those wars? Will you not, now that you have most amply tested his mettle, commit the present emergency, no less pressing than former ones, to him for whom alone you asked in the face of those urgent dangers ere you had applied any accurate test at all? Will you not send out against the pirates one, now an ex-consul, whom before he could yet properly hold office you elected against Sertorius? Rather, do not for a moment adopt any other course; and Pompey, do you heed your country, and me. By her you were borne, by her you were reared. You must be a slave to whatever is for her advantage, not shrinking from any hardship or danger to secure it. And should it become necessary for you to lose your life, you must in that case not await your fated day but embrace whatever death meets you. [-29-] But truly I am ridiculous to give you this advice,—you who in so many great conflicts have exhibited both your bravery and your love for your country. Heed me, therefore, and these citizens here; do not fear because some are envious. Rather press on all the more for this very reason to a goal which is the friendship of the majority and the common advantage of us all, and scorn your traducers. Or, if you are willing to grieve them a little, take command for this very reason, that you may distress them by serving and winning glory contrary to their expectations, and that you may in person set an ending worthy of yourself beside your former accomplishments, by ridding us of many great evils."
[-30-] When Gabinius had thus expressed himself, Trebellius strove to make a dissenting speech; but as he did not receive leave to speak he proceeded to oppose the casting of a vote. Gabinius was incensed, and delayed the balloting regarding Pompey, but introduced a new motion concerning the same man. The first seventeen tribes to register an opinion decided that Trebellius was at fault and might be no longer tribune. And not until the eighteenth was on the point of voting the same way, was he barely induced to maintain silence. Roscius, seeing this, did not dare utter a word, but by a gesture of his raised hand urged them to choose two men, so that he might by so doing cut off a little of Pompey's supremacy. At this gesticulation of his the crowd gave a great threatening shout, whereat a crow flying above their heads was so startled that it fell as if smitten by lightning. After that Roscius kept not only his tongue but his hand still. Catulus was for remaining silent, but Gabinius urged him to make some speech, inasmuch as he ranked among the foremost in the senate and it seemed likely that through his agency the rest might reach a harmonious decision; it was Gabinius's hope, likewise, that he would join in approving the general desire from the fact that he saw the tribunes in bad straits. Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected and honored him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage, and delivered an address about as follows:
[-31-] "That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it is requisite for me to set forth in simple fashion and quite frankly what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for my part assert in the first place most emphatically that it is not proper to confide to any one man so many positions of command, one after another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest space of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible: and similarly the cause of Sulla's frenzy was that he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man's nature for a person, not necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs.[-32-] I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws. For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor proportionately; this is mere equity.
"Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not done.
[-33-] "This is the first and most important point I have to mention. Second arises the consideration, that when consuls and praetors and those serving in their place can take offices and leaderships in a way prescribed by the laws it is neither decent nor advantageous for you to overlook them and introduce some new office. To what end do you elect the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such businesses? Not, presumably, that they may stalk about in purple-bordered togas, nor that endued with the name alone of the office they may be deprived of its duties. How can you fail to alienate these and all the rest who have a purpose to enter politics at all, if you break down the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by law, but assign a strange and previously non-existent position of command to a private individual? [-34-] If there should be any necessity of choosing, in addition to the annual officials, still another, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent,—I mean the dictator. However, because he held such power, our fathers did not appoint him on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you need any such person, you may, without transgressing the laws or making light of the common welfare, designate either Pompey or any one else dictator,—on condition that he shall sway for not more than the time ordained, nor outside of Italy. You doubtless are not ignorant that this latter limitation, too, our fathers guarded scrupulously, and no instance would be found of a dictator chosen for any other country, except one sent to Sicily, and that without accomplishing anything. But if Italy needs no such person and you would no longer endure, apart from the functions of dictator, even the name (this is clear from your anger against Sulla), how would it be right for a new position of command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all interests both in Italy and without? What disasters come to cities from such a course, and how many men on account of lawless lust for rule have often disturbed our populace and done themselves countless evils, you all alike understand.
[-35-] "About this, then, I shall say no more. Who can fail to know that on general principles it is neither decent nor advantageous to commit matters to any one man, or for any one man to be put in charge of all the blessings we own, even if he be the best man conceivable? Great honors and excessive powers excite and ruin even such persons. I ask you, however, to consider my next assertion,—that it is not possible for one man to preside over the entire sea and to manage the entire war properly. You must, if you shall in the least do what is needful, make war on them everywhere at once, so that they may neither unite, nor by finding a refuge among those not attacked, become hard to capture. Any one man who might be in command could by no manner of means accomplish this. For how on about the same days could he fight in Italy and in Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the islands? Consequently you need many soldiers and generals both, to take matters in hand, if they are going to be of any use to you. [-36-] In case any one declares that even if you confide the entire war to some one person he will most certainly have plenty of admirals and lieutenants, my reply would be: 'Would it not be much juster and more advantageous for these men destined to serve under him to be chosen by you beforehand for the very purpose and to receive an independent command from you? What prevents such a course?' By this plan they will pay more heed to the war, since each of them is entrusted with his own particular share and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they effect. By the other plan what man do you think, subordinate to some one else, will with equal readiness perform any duty, when the credit for his victory will belong not to himself but to another?
"Accordingly, that one man could not at one time carry on so great a war has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself, in that he asks for many helpers to be given to whomever is elected. Our final consideration is whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, and whether they should be despatched by the entire populace, or by the commandant alone for his assistance. Every one of you would agree that my proposition is more law-abiding in all respects, and not merely in reference to the case of the freebooters. Aside from that, notice how it looks for all our offices to be overthrown on the pretext of 'pirates' and for no one of them either in Italy or in subject territory during this time …" [8]
[-37-] … and of Italy in place of consul for three years, they assigned to him fifteen lieutenants and voted all the ships, money and armaments that he might wish to take. These measures as well as the others which the senate decided to be necessary to their effectiveness in any given case that body ratified even against its will. Its action was prompted more particularly by the fact that when Piso refused to allow the subordinate officers to hold enlistments in Gallia Narbonensis, of which he was governor, the populace was furiously enraged and would straightway have cast him out of office, had not Pompey begged him off. So after making preparations as the business and his judgment demanded he patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea that the pirates were troubling, partly himself and partly through the agency of his under officers, and subdued the greater part of it that very year. For whereas the force that he directed was vast both in point of fleet and in point of heavy-armed infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, his kindness to those who made terms with him was equally vast, so that he won over great numbers by such procedure. Persons defeated by his troops who made trial of his clemency went over to his side very readily. For besides other ways in which he took care of them he would give them any lands he saw vacant and cities that needed inhabitants, in order that they might never again through poverty fall into need of criminal exertions. Among the other cities settled in this way was the one called in commemoration Pompeiopolis. It is in the coast region of Cilicia and had been sacked by Tigranes. Soli was its original name.
[-38-] Besides these events in the year of Acilius and Piso, an ordinance directed at men convicted of bribery regarding offices was framed by the consuls themselves, to the effect that no one of those involved should either hold office or be a senator, and should furthermore be subject to a fine. For now that the power of the tribunes had returned to its ancient state, and many of the persons whose names had been stricken off by the censors were aspiring to get back the rank of senator by one means or another, a great many political unions and combinations were formed aiming at all the offices. The consuls took this course not because they were angry at the affair—they themselves were shown to have been actively engaged, and Piso, who was indicted by several persons on this charge, escaped being brought to trial only by purchasing exemption—but because pressure had been exerted by the senate. The reason for this was that one Gaius Cornelius, while tribune, undertook to lay very severe penalties upon such unions, and the populace sided with him. The senate, being aware that an excessive punishment threatened has some deterrent force, but that men are then not easily found to accuse or condemn the guilty, since the latter will be in desperate danger, whereas moderation stimulates many to accusations and does not divert condemnations, was desirous of remodeling his proposition somehow, and bade the consuls frame it as a law.[-39-] Now when the comitiae had been announced in advance and accordingly no law could be enacted till they were held, the canvassers kept doing much evil in this intervening time, to such an extent that assassinations occurred. As a consequence the senators voted that the law should be introduced before the elections and a body-guard be given to the consuls. Cornelius, angry at this, submitted a proposal that the senators be not allowed to grant office to any one seeking it in a way not prescribed by law, nor to vote away any other prerogative of the people. This had been the law from very early times: it was not, however, being observed in practice. Thereupon arose a great uproar, since many of the senate and Piso in particular resisted; the crowd broke his staves to pieces and threatened to tear him limb from limb. Seeing the rush they made, Cornelius for the time being before calling for any vote dismissed the assembly: later he added to the law that the senate should invariably hold a preliminary consultation about these cases and that it be compulsory to have the preliminary degree ratified by the people.[-40-] So he secured the passage of both that law and another now to be explained.
All the praetors themselves compiled and published the principles according to which they intended to try cases; for all the decrees regarding contracts had not yet been laid down. Now since they were not in the habit of doing this once for all and did not observe the rules as written, but often made changes in them and incidentally a number of clauses naturally appeared in some one's favor or to some one's hurt, he moved that they should at the very start announce the principles they would use, and not swerve from them at all. In fine, the Romans took such good care about that time to have no bribery, that in addition to punishing those convicted they furthermore honored the accusers. For instance, when Marcus Cotta dismissed the quaestor Publius Oppius because of bribery and suspicion of conspiracy, though he himself had made great profit out of Bithynia, they exalted Gaius Carbo who thereupon accused Cotta, with consular honors, notwithstanding he had served as tribune merely. Subsequently the latter himself was governor of Bithynia and erred no less widely than Cotta; he was, in his turn, accused by his son and convicted. Some persons, of course, can more easily censure others than admonish themselves, and when it comes to their own case commit very readily deeds for which they think their neighbors deserving of punishment. Hence they can not, from the mere fact that they prosecute others, inspire confidence in their own detestation of the acts in question.