10. ¶ Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great circumspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of their enormous multitude would encounter danger again even if once defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse assent, and he further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
11. ¶ The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)
13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p. 543.)
14 ¶ Hannibal either as a favor to Fabius, on the ground that he was an advantage to them or perhaps to create a prejudice against him, did not ravage any of his possessions. Accordingly, when an exchange of captives was made between the Romans and Carthaginians with the proviso that any number in excess on either side should be ransomed, and as the Romans were unwilling to ransom their men with money from the public treasury, Fabius sold the farms and paid their ransom. Therefore they did not depose him but they gave equal power to his master of the horse, so that both held their commands on a like footing. Fabius harbored no wrath against either the citizens or Rufus: he excused them for an act prompted by human nature and was for contenting himself if in any way they might survive. He desired the preservation and victory of the commonwealth rather than an individual reputation, and continued to believe that excellence depends not on decrees but on each man's spirit, and that a man is better or worse not as a result of any ordinance but as a result of his own wisdom or ignorance.
Rufus, however, who had not shown the right spirit in the first place was now more than ever puffed up and could not contain himself because he had obtained through his insubordination the further prize of equal authority with the dictator. And so he kept asking for the right to hold sole sway a day at a time, or for several days alternately. But Fabius, in the fear that he might work some harm if he should get possession of the undivided power, would not consent to either plan of his, but divided the army in such a way that they each, like the consuls, had a separate force. And immediately Rufus encamped apart, in order that he might give a practical illustration of the fact that he held sway in his own right and not subject to the dictator. (Valesius, p. 597. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
15. ¶ It is customary for men who are ruled to concur in opinion easily. Especially often do they join forces when the object is to slander men of good reputation, for the reason that it is their nature to help in augmenting any power just come to light but to bring low what has already obtained preëminence. And though one can not immediately measure one's self with men who surpass one through ampler resources, growth in an unexpected quarter brings hope of a like good fortune to others that dwell in obscurity. [Footnote: This may come from a speech of M. Terentius Varro in favor of equalizing the powers of dictator and of master-of-horse.](Mai, p. 194.) 16. ¶ Rufus, who obtained equal authority with the dictator, after a defeat by the Carthaginians altered his attitude (for disasters chasten somehow those who are not completely fools) and voluntarily gave up his leadership. And for this all praised him loudly. He was not held worthy of censure because he had failed to recognize at first what was fitting, but was commended for not hesitating to change his mind. They deemed it an act of good fortune for a man to choose right at the start a proper course of conduct, but they thoroughly approved the course of one, who, having learned from practical experience the better way, was not ashamed to face squarely about. From this episode, too, it was clearly shown how much one man differs from another and true excellence from the reputation therefor. What had been taken from Fabius by jealousy and prejudice of the citizens, he received back with good-will and even at the request of his colleague. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.) 17. ¶ The same man when about to retire from office sent for the consuls, surrendered his army to them, and advised them in addition very fully regarding all the details of what must be done. The safety of the city stood higher in his estimation than a reputation for being the only successful commander, and expecting that if they followed their own bent they would probably meet with failure, but if they heeded his counsel they would meet with a favorable outcome, he preferred to look to the second contingency for praise. And the consuls were not unduly bold but acted on the suggestion of Fabius, deeming it better not to accomplish any important result than to be ruined; hence they remained where they were throughout the entire period of their command. (Mai, p. 195. Zonaras, 8, 26.)
18. For the Iapygians and Apulians dwell around the Ionic Gulf. Of the
Apulians the tribes according to Dio are the Peuketii Pediculi, Daunii,
Tarentini. There is also Cannæ, the "plain of Diomed," near Daunian
Apulia. Messapia was called also Iapygia, later Salentia, and then
Calabria. Argyrippa, a Diomedian city, was renamed Arpi by the
Apulians. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603 and 852. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (a.u. 538)] 19. Later he was arrayed against the
Romans at Cannæ, when the Roman generals were Paulus and Terentius. Now
Cannæ is a level district of Argyrippa, where Diomed founded the city
Argyrippa, that is to say "Argos the Horse-City" in the tongue of the
Greeks. And this plain comes to belong later to the Daunii (of the
Iapygians), then to the Salantii, and now to those that all call by the
name Calauri. It is also the boundary between the Calauri and
Longibardi, where the great war burst upon them. (Tzetzes, Hist., 1,
757-767. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
20. ¶ With regard to divination and astronomy Dio says: "I, however, can not form any opinion either about these events or about others that are foretold by divination. For what does foreshowing avail, if a thing shall certainly come to pass, and if there could be no averting of it either by human devices or by divine providence? Accordingly, let each man look at these matters in what way he pleases." (Mai, p. 195. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)