21. ¶ The commanders were Paulus and Terentius, men not of similar temperament, but differing alike in family and in character. The former was a patrician, possessed of the graces of education, and esteemed safety before haste, being restrained partly, it might be said, as a result of the censure he had received for his former conduct in office. Hence he was not inclined to audacity, but was considering how he might keep from getting into trouble again rather than how he might achieve success by some desperate venture. Terentius, however, had been brought up among the rabble, was practiced in vulgar bravado, and so displayed lack of prudence in nearly all respects; for instance, he promised himself general direction of the war, kept constantly annoying the patricians, and thought that he alone should have the leadership in view of the quiet behavior of his colleague. Now they both reached the camp at a most opportune time: Hannibal had no longer any provender; Spain was in turmoil; the affection of the allies was being alienated from him: and if they had waited for even the briefest possible period, they would have conquered without trouble. As matters went, however, the heedlessness of Terentius and the submissiveness of Paulus, who always desired the proper course but assented to his colleague in most points—so sure is gentleness to be overcome by audacity,—compassed their defeat. (Mai, p. 196. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
22. ¶ In the mêlée of the war not even the boldest possessed a hope so buoyant as to rise above the fear that arose from its uncertainty. The surer they felt of conquering the more did they tremble for fear they might in some way come to grief. Those who are ignorant of a matter by reason of their very lack of perception are not awaiting anything terrible, but the boldness derived from calculation [lacuna] (Six pages are lacking.) (Mai, p. 196.)
23. At the time when burst this frightful war, a terrific earthquake occurred, so that mountains were cleft asunder and showers of great stones poured down from heaven. But they, fighting vigorously, perceived none of these things. At last so great a multitude of Roman warriors fell that Hannibal, the general, in sending to Sicily the finger-rings of the generals and the other men of repute filled many bushel and peck measures—so great a multitude that the noble, foremost Roman women ran lamenting to the temples in Rome and with the hairs of their heads cleansed the statues there;—and later had intercourse with both slaves and barbarians (because the Roman land had been utterly impoverished of men), to the end that their race might not be every whit extirpated. Rome at that time, after the utter loss of all her citizens, stood inglorious through many day-coursing cycles. Her old men sitting at her outer gates bewailed the disaster most grievous to be borne and asked ever and anon the passers-by whether any one perchance were left alive. (Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 767-785. (Cp. Fragm. LVI, 19, which precedes this.) Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)
24. ¶ Scipio, on learning that some of the Romans were prepared to abandon Rome, and indeed all Italy, because they felt it was destined to fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, yet found a way to restrain them. Sword in hand he sprang suddenly into the room where they were conferring, and after himself swearing to take all proper measures both of word and act he made them also devote themselves by oath to utter destruction, should they fail to keep their pledges to him. Later these men reached a harmonious decision and wrote to the consul that they were safe enough. He, however, did not at once write or despatch a messenger to Rome; on reaching Canusium he set in order affairs at that place, sent to the regions in proximity garrisons sufficient for immediate needs, and repulsed a cavalry attack upon the city. Altogether, he displayed neither dejection nor terror, but with an unbending spirit, as if no serious evil had befallen them, he both planned and executed all measures of immediate benefit. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
25. Hannibal took possession of the Nucerini under an agreement that each man should leave the city carrying one change of clothing. As soon, however, as he was master of the situation he shut the senators into bath-houses and suffocated them, and in the case of the others, although he had granted them permission to go away where they pleased, he cut down many of them even on the road. Still, this course was of no profit to him, for the rest became afraid that they might suffer a similar fate, and so would not come to terms with him and resisted as long as they could hold out. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
26. ¶ Marcellus showed great bravery, moderation, and justice. His demands on his subjects were not all rigorous or harsh, nor was he careful to see that they also should do what was needful. Those of them who committed any errors he pardoned humanely and, furthermore, was not angry if they failed to be like him. (Valesius, p. 601.)
27. ¶ When many citizens of Nola were dreading the men captured at Cannæ and later released by Hannibal, because they thought that such persons favored the invader's cause, and when they were even desirous of putting them to death, he opposed it. Furthermore, he concealed from this time on the suspicion that he felt toward them, and treated them in such a way that they chose his side by preference, and became extremely useful both to their native land and to the Romans. (Valesius, p. 601. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
28. ¶ The same Marcellus when he perceived that one of the Lucanian cavalrymen was in love with a woman permitted him to keep her in the camp, because he was a most excellent fighter: this in spite of the fact that he had forbidden any women to enter the ramparts. (Valesius, p. 601.)
29. ¶ He pursued the same course with the people of Acerræ as he had with those of Nucreia, except that he cast the senators into wells and not into bath-houses. (Valesius, p. 601. Zonaras, 9, 2.)
30. ¶ Fabius got back some of the men captured in former battles by exchanging man for man, while others he made a compact to ransom with money. When, however, the senate failed to confirm the expenditure, because it did not approve of their ransoming, he offered for sale, as I have said, [Footnote: Cp. section 14 (first paragraph) of this fragment.] his own farms and from the proceeds of them furnished the ransom for the men. (Valesius, p. 601.)