99. You will not suppose that I am arguing with you, but as I understand that case the witness who tendered himself having said he was an Atheist, the court held that the magistrate was bound to draw the inference from that assertion that the oath was not binding, and therefore to let him make the affirmation?—That is so. Whether the presiding officer did draw the inference or not, the court held that he was bound to.
100. Then I do not think that there is much difference between us; but I assume that when you come to the table of the House of Commons, and asked leave to make affirmation instead of taking the Oath, you were a person, as I understand it, who, if you had gone into a court of justice and made the same request, would have been held by the presiding judge to be one upon whom the oath would have no binding effect?—I did think so when I applied to affirm. I do not think so since the Report of your Committee, for your Committee has reported that the two oaths are entirely different.
101. It is a question for you: do you draw any distinction between the binding effect upon your conscience of the Assertory Oath, as it is called, and the Promissory Oath?—Most certainly I do. The Testimony Oath is not binding upon my conscience, because there is another form which the law has provided which I may take, which is more consonant with my feelings. The Promissory Oath is and will be binding upon my conscience if I take it, because the law, as interpreted by your Committee, says that it is the form which I am to take, and the Statute requires me to take it.
102. Pray do not answer this question unless you like: am I to understand you that the binding effect upon your conscience of the Oath depends upon whether there is an alternative method of taking that which is to you equivalent to the oath?—No, most certainly not. Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree. I would go through no form, I would take no oath, unless I meant it to be so binding.
103. Pray object if you do not wish to answer this question: By virtue of what do you regard that assertion which you make within the Oath as binding?—I have not caught your question, if you will pardon me for saying so.
104. By virtue of what portion of what is contained in the Oath do you feel that your conscience is bound; is it by the mere fact that you repeat the words therein contained, or is it by that which is contained in the form of the Oath?—Those words, “I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law,” are to me, binding in the most full and complete and thorough degree on my conscience.
105. If you read a promise out of any book or paper, and said, “I promise so to do,” is there more binding effect in those words that you have read than in the mere ordinary assertion of a promise?—Yes, because this reading is by law, and by the decision of your Committee intended to be the form in which I pledge my allegiance as a Member.
106. Then if it were a form sanctioned by law, as in the case of an affirmation, is there any more effect upon your mind if you take it in the form of what we call an oath than if you took it simply by words of affirmation or promise?—If the form sanctioned by law ran “I affirm,” or “I declare and affirm,” or “I solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law,” that would be equally binding upon my conscience.
107. Do you attach any express or particular meaning to the words “I swear”?—The meaning that I attach to them is that they are a pledge upon my conscience to the truth of the declaration which I am making.
108. But a pledge given, may I ask, to whom?—A pledge given to the properly constituted authorities, whomsoever they may be, who are entitled to receive it from me.