109. Do you attribute any more meaning to those words than a pledge to human beings around you?—I attach no more meaning to those words than I do to a pledge to human beings authorised by law to take such a pledge from me under similar solemn circumstances.
110. But the solemn circumstances, I suppose, are the mere mundane circumstances?—The statutory circumstances. I meant “solemn” simply in the sense of being the statutory circumstances; I meant to distinguish between that and mere conversation.
111. I think we understand from your answers that you do not attribute any more weight to the use of the words “I swear,” and to the words “So help me God,” than you would to an ordinary promise if it were given under the same circumstances as those under which you gave that promise in the House of Commons?—I conceive myself entitled by law to distinguish, and I beg therefore to object to so much of the question as deals with the words “So help me God,” my objection being founded on the case of Miller v. Salomons, in the 17th Jurist, and the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company v. Heaton in the 4th Jurist, new series.
112. I presume by that answer you mean that “So help me, God” is no part of the oath or promise, but merely the form in which it is taken?—That is so; it is merely a form of asseveration.
113. Will you confine yourself, then, to the words “I swear”?—I will.
114. Do you attribute any greater weight or any meaning to the words “I swear,” and to the fact of kissing the book, beyond the words of ordinary promise?—Not beyond the words of ordinary promise made under statutory obligation.
115. Then what greater weight do you attach to a promise made under statutory obligation than to an ordinary promise?—I would prefer not making any promise that I did not intend to keep; but the law has attached a weight to statutory promises, and a penalty and disgrace on the breaking of them.
116. That is a consequence resulting from human action; you do not attribute any other weight to such a promise beyond what results from such penalties?—I object to that question.
117. I will now go to another point. How lately is it that you have claimed a right to affirm in a court of law?—In a superior court or in an inferior court?
118. In any court where you have taken an oath?—Recently in an inferior court, within a few days.