The Great Famine and Epidemic Sicknesses of 1846-49.
The great epidemic of relapsing fever, typhus, dysentery, anasarca and purpura, which arose in Ireland in the end of 1846 or spring of 1847 and lasted until the beginning of 1849, had for its direct antecedents the more or less complete loss of the potato-crop through blight in two successive autumns, 1845 and 1846, while the state of distress and sickness was prolonged by the potato disease in 1847 and 1848[498]. The potato-blight, which caused so much alarm in Ireland for the first time in September, 1845, had been seen in Germany several years before, in Belgium in 1842, in Canada in 1844, and in England about the 19th of August, 1845. Shortly after the last date, it attacked the Irish potato-fields, first in Wexford, and before the end of the year it was estimated that one-third to one-half of the yield, which was a fifth larger than usual from the greater breadth planted and the abundant crop, was lost by absolute rottenness or unfitness for food, the process of decay being of a kind to make great progress after the tubers were pitted. The loss to Ireland was estimated at about one pound sterling per head of the population. Sir Robert Peel was keenly alive to the magnitude of the calamity which threatened the Irish peasantry. His first step was to summon to his aid a botanist, Dr Lindley, and a chemist, Dr Playfair; the latter went down to Drayton Manor, and joined the prime minister in examining samples of the diseased potatoes. The question was whether some chemical process could not be found to arrest the decay of the tubers. Sir Robert Peel, in a much talked-of address at the opening of the Tamworth Reading-Room in the winter of 1840, had hailed the rising sun of science and useful knowledge. It was only in reference to morals and religion that Peel’s deliverance called forth criticism, more particularly the memorable series of letters to the Times by John Henry Newman. But one of Newman’s gibes was in a manner prophetic of Peel’s attitude in approaching the material distress of Ireland: “Let us, in consistency, take chemists for our cooks, and mineralogists for our masons.” The two professors proceeded to Ireland, but could only confirm the fact, already known, that one-third, or one-half, of the potato-crop would be lost.
Botany and chemistry being powerless to stay the effects of the potato-blight, the appeal was next to economics. Ireland produced not only potatoes but also corn. But for the most part the cottiers and cottagers tasted little of the oats or wheat which they grew; as soon as the harvest was gathered, the corn was sold to pay the November rents, and was exported. Ireland was still in the paradoxical condition which Bishop Berkeley puzzled over a hundred years before: “whether our exports do not consist of such necessaries as other countries cannot well be without?” The industry and trade of Irish ports was largely that of corn-milling and shipping of oatmeal, flour and other produce; thus Skibbereen in the extreme south-west, where the horrors of famine were felt first, had several flour-mills and a considerable export trade in corn, meal, flour and provisions. The Irish corn harvest of 1845 had been abundant: O’Connell cited the Mark Lane Express for the fact that 16,000 quarters of oats from Ireland had arrived in the Thames in a single week of October; on the 23rd of the same month the parish priest of Kells saw fifty dray-loads of oatmeal on the road to Drogheda for shipment. Ireland paid its rent to absentee landlords in corn and butter, just as a century before it had paid it largely in barrelled beef, keeping little for its own use besides potatoes and milk. In the face of the potato famine, the measure approved by the Irish leaders of all parties, O’Connell and Smith O’Brien as well as ducal proprietors, was to keep some of the oatmeal at home. A committee which sat at the Dublin Mansion House were of opinion, on 19 November, 1845, that the quantity of oats already exported of that harvest would have sufficed to feed the entire population of Ireland. O’Connell’s plan was to raise a million and a half on the annual revenue of the Irish woods and forests (£74,000), and to impose a tax on landlords, both absentee and resident, and with the moneys so obtained to buy up what remained of the Irish corn harvest for use at home. In the ensuing session of Parliament, both he and Smith O’Brien protested that Ireland had no need of English doles, having resources of her own if the landlords were compelled to do their duty.
About the same time Lord John Russell, leader of the Opposition, was led by the danger of famine in Ireland to pronounce for the repeal of the Corn Laws of 1815; and at the meetings of the Cabinet in December, Peel urged the same policy upon his colleagues for the same reason. The political history does not concern us beyond the fact that the threatened Irish distress caused by the first partial potato-blight of 1845 was the occasion of the Corn and Customs Act of June, 1846, by which the Corn Laws were repealed, and that an Irish Coercion Bill, brought in on account of outrages following an unusual number of evictions, was made the occasion of turning out Peel’s ministry at the moment of its Free Trade victory, by a combination of Tory protectionists, Whigs and Irish patriots.
The direct effects of the potato-blight of 1845 were not so serious as had been expected. The Government quietly bought Indian meal (maize flour) in America without disturbing the market, and had it distributed from twenty principal food-depots in Ireland, to the amount of 11,503 tons, along with 528 tons of oatmeal. This governmental action ceased on the 15th of August, 1846, by which time £733,372 had been spent, £368,000 being loans and the rest grants. The people were set to road-making, so as to pay by labour for their food, the number employed reaching a maximum of 97,000 in August. The Government, having been led by physicians in Dublin to expect an epidemic of fever, passed a Fever Act in March, 1846, by which a Board of Health was constituted. But no notable increase of sickness took place, and the Board was dissolved. There was a small outbreak of dysentery and diarrhoea at Kilkenny (and possibly elsewhere) in the spring of 1846, which the physician to the workhouse set down to the use of the Indian meal “and other substitutes for potatoes[499].”
It was the total loss of the potato crop in the summer and autumn following, 1846, together with a failure of the harvest in England and in other countries of Northern Europe, that brought the real Irish distress. A large breadth of potatoes had been planted as usual, but doubtless with a good deal of the seed tainted. An ordinary crop would have been worth, according to one estimate, sixteen millions sterling, according to another, twice as much. The crop was a total loss. The fields looked well in the summer, but those who dug the early potatoes found them unusually small. About the beginning of August the blight began suddenly and spread swiftly. A letter of the celebrated Father Mathew, the temperance reformer, brings this out:
“On the 29th of last month (July) I passed from Cork to Dublin, and this doomed plant bloomed in all the luxuriance of an abundant harvest. Returning on the 3rd instant (August) I beheld with sorrow one wide waste of putrefying vegetation. In many places the wretched people were seated on the fences of the decaying gardens wringing their hands and wailing bitterly the destruction that had left them foodless[500].”
The relief-works and distribution of Indian meal, which had been estimated by the Government to last only to August, 1846, at a cost of £476,000 (one-half of it being a free grant), were resumed under the pressure of public opinion, in the winter of 1846 and spring of 1847, a cost of £4,850,000, one-half of the sum being again a free grant. Before the distress was over, other free grants and advances were made; so that, on 15 February, 1850, Lord John Russell summed up the famine-indebtedness of Ireland to the Consolidated Fund at £3,350,000, (which was to be repaid out of the rates in forty years from that date). Allowing an equal sum freely gifted from the national exchequer, the whole public cost of the famine would have been about seven millions sterling.
The short crops in Britain in 1846 were an excuse for not interfering with the export of oats from Ireland. The imports of Indian meal were left to the ordinary course of the market, and the distribution to retail traders. The corn merchants of Cork, Limerick and other ports made fortunes out of the American cargoes, and the dealers throughout the country made large profits.
To encourage the influx of foreign food-supplies, and to lower freights, the Navigation Laws were suspended for a few months, so that corn could be carried in other than British bottoms. When Parliament met in January, 1847, the distress in Ireland occupied the greater part of the Queen’s Speech.