CHAPTER XXXII
CHARLES III AND ENGLAND, 1759-1788

Greatness of the reign of Charles III and principal factors therein.

UNDER Charles III, Spain reached the highest point she has attained since the sixteenth century. In many respects the internal situation was better at this time than in the great days of the siglo de oro, but Spain’s relative authority in Europe was less, because of the striking advances which had been made by the other powers. One of them, England, was particularly dangerous, and it will be found that Spain’s foreign policy in this reign was directed primarily toward meeting the possibility of war with that country. Other difficulties, such as those with Portugal and Morocco, particularly with the former, were cogent factors because of the relations which England bore, or was believed to bear, to them. Contrary to the impression usually to be derived from the histories of the American Revolution, Spain was intensely hostile to England throughout this reign. To oppose that country the Family Compact with France was formed, and continued to be the basis of Spain’s foreign policy, although it early became manifest that France would honor the treaty only when it suited her purposes. In the end the policies of Charles III were crowned with success,—not so great as Spain could have wished, but sufficiently so to make this reign the most pleasingly satisfactory to Spaniards of any since the days of Isabella, next to whom Charles III has some claim to rank as the greatest Spanish monarch of modern times. This becomes the more worthy of belief when one investigates the sweeping character of and the success attained in the social, political, and economic reforms of the period. These were at the basis of Spain’s victories in European councils, for they provided the sinews of war. Nevertheless there was one drawback. The reforms in the Americas, following the precedent of nearly three centuries, were undertaken more with a view to the production of revenues for Spain than for the contented development of the colonies themselves. Spain also ran counter to a new force in world history, which she herself was obliged by circumstances to assist in establishing itself. The spirit of world democracy was born with the American Revolution, and appeared in France soon afterward. This meant that the autocratic basis of Spanish greatness was presently to be destroyed. The success of the American Revolution was to be related in no small degree to the loss of Spain’s colonial empire. The failure of the French Revolution was to produce a powerful despot who was to bring Spain, under Charles IV, to the lowest point she had reached since the days of Charles II. Nevertheless, the reign of Charles III is to be considered as something more than a brilliant moment in history without ultimate effect. The internal reforms were of permanent benefit to Spain and even to the Americas, capable of utilization under the more democratic systems of the future. Finally, the part played by Spain in the successful issue of the American Revolution deserves to bulk large, even though she could not look with sympathy upon a movement which, she clearly saw, might bring about her own ruin.

Causes of Charles III’s policy of opposition to England.

Many writers have ascribed Charles III’s policy of opposition to England to his hatred of that country, growing out of certain humiliations forced upon him by an English fleet while he was king in Naples. There is no reason to believe, however, that this feeling, if indeed it did exist in unusual degree, dominated his political action, and in fact Charles was always a partisan of peace; far from plunging into war he had rather to be convinced of its necessity. There were reasons in plenty to induce him to such a course, irrespective of any personal spite he might have felt. Prior to the reign of Charles, Spain had already engaged in four wars with England (1702-1713, 1718-1720, 1727-1729, 1739-1748) in the course of half a century, and at no time in the Bourbon era had the two countries been on nearly cordial terms. The gist of the trouble lay in the British ambition to possess the greatest colonial empire and the richest commerce in the world. For the realization of these aims it seemed necessary to destroy the colonial importance of France and Spain, and any advances in wealth or military power on the part of either of those countries was regarded as detrimental to the imperialistic designs of England. With respect to Spain, British contraband trade in the Americas under the cover of the asiento treaty had tended to break down the Spanish commercial monopoly, and the annulment of the asiento had not put an end to the smuggling. While no territories in the Americas had been wrested from Spain under the Bourbons, the previous century had recorded many conquests by England in the Caribbean area, principal of which was that of Jamaica, and along the Atlantic coast strip of North America, the southern part of which had been not only claimed but also occupied by Spain in earlier days. Meanwhile, the losses of France and the aggressive character of English foreign policy under Pitt made it appear that Spain might expect to be deprived of her colonies whenever the opportunity to secure them should seem ripe to England.

Continuance of England’s affronts to Spain.

The Family Compact and Spain’s entry into the Seven Years’ War.

From the outset of the reign of Charles III there occurred many incidents to heighten Spain’s suspicion or anger with respect to England. The exigencies of the war with France led the English to adopt many arbitrary measures against the as yet neutral power of Spain. English vessels stopped Spanish ships on the high seas, claiming a right of search, and seized many of them, often without justification in international law; the English government occupied a bit of Spanish territory, and did not abandon it with a good grace; and there were instances when Spanish merchants in England were treated badly. Meanwhile, British acts of aggression and smuggling in the Americas continued to take place; the English placed difficulties in the way of Spanish fishing off the coast of Newfoundland, though beyond the territorial waters of the British domain; they founded establishments in Honduras without authorization from Spain, and began to cut the valuable dyewoods there; and Gibraltar and Minorca still remained in English hands, a standing affront to Spanish pride and a danger to the peninsula. Nevertheless, the underlying factor which influenced Spain was the imperialism of England, backed up as it was by her vast resources and her almost invincible navy. Charles did not wish to bring Spain into the war, but it was clear that an overwhelming defeat for France would be almost equally disadvantageous to Spain, who might expect to receive the next shock from the English arms. France had gotten much the worst of it in the Seven Years’ War when Charles III ascended the Spanish throne, wherefore Charles endeavored to mediate between that power and England. The British government’s arrogant rejection of his proffer tended only to make him the more disposed to consider an alliance with France. When, therefore, the French authorities approached him with the proposal for an alliance he resolved to join with them if England should refuse to meet Spain’s demands relative to the release of captured Spanish ships, the free use of the Newfoundland fisheries, and the abandonment of the English settlements in Honduras. England not only refused to give satisfaction, but also asked for an explanation of the naval preparations Spain was making. Thereupon, Charles prepared for war. Two treaties, called jointly the Family Compact, were made with the Bourbon king of France. The first of these, signed in August, 1761, was a defensive alliance against such powers as should attack either of the two crowns. The second, dated in February, 1762, was an offensive and defensive alliance directed specifically against England. War, meanwhile, had already been declared in January.

Spanish losses in the Seven Years’ War.

In the ensuing campaign France and Spain were badly beaten. Manila and Havana were taken by the English, although Spain won a notable success in the capture of Sacramento, a Portuguese colony on the Río de la Plata,—for Portugal had entered the war on the side of England. Twenty-seven richly laden English boats were taken at Sacramento,—significant of the profits which the English merchants were making in contraband trade, using Sacramento as a base. In 1763 a peace which was in many respects humiliating to Spain was signed at Paris. England restored Manila and Havana, but required the cession of Florida and all other Spanish territories east of the Mississippi; Sacramento was returned to Portugal; Spain gave up all rights of her subjects to fish in Newfoundland waters; questions arising out of the English captures of Spanish ships prior to Spain’s entry into the war were to be decided by the British courts of admiralty; and the English right to cut dyewoods in Honduras was acknowledged, although England agreed to the demolition of all the fortifications which British subjects might have constructed there. France, who had lost practically all her other colonies to England, now gave the scantily settled, ill-defined region of French influence west of the Mississippi, all that remained of French Louisiana, to Spain. According to the terms of the grant it was to compensate Spain for her loss of Florida, but in fact it was in order to ensure the continued alliance of Spain with France.