Preparations for a renewal of the war.

Pretexts for war.

The Falkland Islands affair.

The peace of 1763 was looked upon by France and Spain as a truce, for if England had been dangerous before, she was doubly so now. France wished revenge and the restoration of her overseas domains, while Spain’s principal motive was a desire to save her colonies from conquest by England. Both countries therefore bent their energies to preparations for another war; in Spain the next decade and a half was a period of remarkable economic reforms tending to the regeneration of the peninsula as the basis for an army and navy. Meanwhile, steps were taken to avoid the possibility of an English descent upon the Spanish West Indies, which were regarded as the principal danger-point, both because of the strength of England’s position in the Caribbean area, and because that region was the key to the Spanish mainland colonies of the two Americas. Pretexts for trouble were not lacking. The English dyewood cutters of Honduras did not observe the restrictions placed upon them by the treaty of Paris, and the British government neglected to satisfy Spain’s complaints in that regard; the French settlers of Louisiana refused to acknowledge their transfer to the Spanish crown, wherefore it was necessary to employ force against them, and it was believed that English agents had instigated them to resist; on the other hand England repeatedly demanded the payment of a ransom which the English conquerors of Manila had exacted from that city, but Spain refused to pay the claim. The principal diplomatic interest down to 1771, however, was the so-called question of the Falkland Islands (called Malouines by the French, and Maluinas by Spaniards). This group, lying some 250 miles east of the Strait of Magellan, seems to have been discovered by Spanish navigators of the sixteenth century, for a description of the islands was in the possession of the Spanish authorities at an early time. The first English voyage to this group was that of Captain Cowley, as late as 1686, but no claim could be made on this basis, for in 1748 England formally recognized the rights of Spain. Not much attention was paid to the Falklands until after the Seven Years’ War, although various navigators visited them, but in 1763 a Spanish pilot, Mathei, made the first of a series of voyages to these islands. In 1764 a French expedition under Bougainville landed at one of them, and formed a settlement, and in the next year the English captain, Biron, touched at a place called Port Egmont by him, took formal possession for England, applying the name Falkland to the group, and proceeded on his way to the Pacific Ocean and around the world. Not long afterward an English settlement was made at Port Egmont, and the governor no sooner heard of the presence of the French than he ordered their withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Spanish government had lodged a complaint at the French court against the occupation of the islands by France, and an agreement was reached, whereby the French should abandon the group and a Spanish settlement there should be formed. This was done, and the English and Spanish governors began mutually to demand each other’s withdrawal, the Englishman setting a time limit of six months. The Spanish government directed the captain-general of Buenos Aires to expel the English settlers, and accordingly, though not until June, 1770, these orders were carried out. When the news reached England the British Parliament voted funds in preparation for war, and made excessive demands for reparation for what was considered an insult to England as well as for the restitution of the colony. Spain, in reliance upon the Family Compact, was not inclined to avoid the issue, and matters even went so far as the retirement of the Spanish and English ambassadors, when an unforeseen event occurred, changing the whole aspect of affairs. This was the fall of Choiseul, the French minister who had negotiated the Family Compact and who was believed by Spain to be ready to bring France into the war. It was on this occasion that Louis XV is reported to have said “My minister wanted war, but I do not,” thus calmly disregarding the treaty with Spain. Consequently, Spain had to yield, and in 1771 the Spanish ambassador to London signed a declaration disapproving the removal of the English colonists and promising to restore Port Egmont, although without prejudice to Spain’s claim to the islands.[59]

Revival of the Family Compact as a force in European politics.

Spain might justly have abandoned the Family Compact after the Falkland incident, and for a time that treaty did suffer a partial eclipse. Charles III felt that in future he could count only on his own forces, but he continued to increase and equip them, for the danger from England was as great as ever. Self-interest inevitably brought Spain and France together, and with the appearance of the warlike Aranda in France, late in the year 1773, as Spanish ambassador to that court, plans with a view to meeting the common enemy were again discussed. The death of Louis XV, in May, 1774, brought matters still more to a head, for it resulted in a change of ministry in France, whereby Vergennes, believed to be an enthusiastic partisan of the Family Compact, became minister of foreign affairs. Vergennes was in fact an ardent supporter of the Franco-Spanish alliance, although his enthusiasm was tempered in moments of crisis by a clear view of what most favored France, and he did not fail to see that he might employ it as the basis for trade concessions from Spain, the better to build up the resources of France. Nevertheless, the opinion was general that Vergennes intended to adhere to the Family Compact, and consequently England planned to occupy Spain with other affairs, so as to separate her from France, or at least divert her from pursuing a common policy with the last-named country against England. Two matters were at hand, of which they might avail themselves: Spain’s disputes with the sultan of Morocco; and her quarrels with Portugal over boundaries in South America.

Relations with the Moslem states of the Barbary Coast.

The never-ending wars with the Moslems of northern Africa were inherited from the preceding era, and continued to occupy Spanish troops and fleets down to the reign of Charles III. In 1767 satisfactory relations between Spain and Morocco seemed to have been reached when the latter agreed to abandon piracy and recognized Spain’s title to her establishments on the North African coast. Late in 1774, however, the sultan announced that he would no longer tolerate Christian posts in his empire, and commenced a siege of Melilla. The attack was beaten off, and it was decided to strike what was hoped might be a decisive blow against the dey of Algiers, the ally of the Moroccan sultan. An expedition of some 18,000 men was prepared, and placed under the command of General O’Reilly, reformer of the Spanish army and a man of tremendous reputation, but in the ensuing operations before Algiers O’Reilly was crushingly defeated with a loss of several thousand men. Rightly or wrongly, England was believed to have instigated the Moslem rulers to attack Spain. Years later, Charles came to an understanding with the Moslem states of the Barbary Coast. Between 1782 and 1786 treaties were made, whereby the rulers of those lands agreed once again to give up piracy and also the institution of slavery, besides granting certain religious and commercial privileges to Spaniards in their lands. This was not the last of piracy and warfare in North Africa, however; the former endured for another generation, and the end of the latter, even in the restricted Spanish area, is not yet.

Disputes with Portugal over boundaries in South America.

There was a much stronger case against England with regard to Portugal, whose exaggerated claims were supported by the British government. The boundaries between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America had been an unending source of dispute, ever since the treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, and the question was complicated by that of British and Portuguese smuggling into Spain’s colonies. The principal scene of conflict was the Portuguese post of Sacramento, founded in 1679 on the eastern bank of the Río de la Plata. The Spanish-owned region of Paraguay was also a field for Portuguese aggressions. Domestic animals to the number of hundreds of thousands were driven off from the Spanish settlements, while thousands of Indian families were captured and sold into slavery. Ferdinand VI endeavored to solve these problems through a treaty which he made with Portugal, in 1750, according to which Spain acquired Sacramento in exchange for territories in the Paraguayan region. The treaty met with the spirited opposition of leading Spanish ministers, and with that of the Jesuit missionaries, the Indians, and the Spanish settlers in the regions affected, and after many vicissitudes, including a war in Paraguay, it was annulled in 1761, but the troubles on the border continued. One of the underlying difficulties was the ambition of Portugal. Under the direction of the Marquis of Pombal, Portuguese minister of state, she was desirous of making conquests in South America, for which purpose Pombal was willing to go to any length in bad faith to achieve his end, relying upon the support of England in case Spain should declare war. Pombal secretly directed the Portuguese officials in the Sacramento region to seize desirable Spanish territories, and when reports of these captures came to Europe pretended that they were false, or that they were nothing more than inconsequential affrays between the Spanish and Portuguese soldiery. He promised to order his troops to desist from such actions, and asked Charles III to do the same. The Spanish king complied with his wishes, while Pombal on the contrary continued to give orders for hostilities and to send reinforcements, hoping that the Portuguese might secure posts from which it would be impossible to dislodge them by the time his duplicity should be found out. Not only did he deceive Charles III for a while, but he also misled the English ministers, pretending that Portugal was a victim of Spanish ambition when the facts were quite the contrary. England supported Pombal with vigorous diplomatic action. By the close of the year 1775, however, England was so busily engaged in the disputes with her own colonies that she was far from desiring a war in Europe. The British Cabinet announced that it would take no part in the quarrel between Spain and Portugal, provided Charles III should make no attempts on the territorial integrity of Portugal and Brazil. Pombal now made peaceful overtures to Charles III, hoping to delay the sending of Spanish troops to South America, but the proofs of Pombal’s perfidy were by this time so clear that the king of Spain would not trust him. In fact, a Portuguese fleet in South America attacked the Spanish fleet, in February, 1776, and shortly afterward the Portuguese captured the Spanish post of Santa Tecla. In November a Spanish expedition left Cádiz, and on arrival in South America put a check to the Portuguese aggressions, and captured Sacramento. Fortune played into Spain’s hands in another respect when María Victoria, sister of Charles III, became regent of Portugal on the death of the king in 1777. This occasioned the dismissal of Pombal, and in October of that year a treaty was arranged between Spain and Portugal entirely favorable to the former. The much-disputed Sacramento colony was awarded to Spain, while Paraguay was retained. This treaty, supplemented by another in 1778, put an end, after nearly three centuries, to the disputes between Spain and Portugal with regard to their American boundaries.