The Italian venture of the Aragonese kings had yielded probably more of advantage than of harm down to the time of Ferdinand, and it may be that even he did not overstep the bounds of prudence in his ambitious designs. When his policies were continued, however, in the person of Charles I, better known by his imperial title as the Emperor Charles V, the results were to prove more disastrous to Spain than beneficial. The circumstances were in fact different for the two monarchs, although their aims were much the same. Some writers have supposed that Ferdinand himself recognized the danger of a union of the Austrian, Burgundian, and Spanish dominions under one king, and they assert that he planned to make Charles’ younger brother, Ferdinand, ruler of Spain and the Two Sicilies in case the former should be elected emperor. In his will, however, he respected the principle of primogeniture, and left all to Charles, eldest son of Philip the Handsome and Juana la Loca. Through his mother and Ferdinand, Charles inherited Castile, Aragon, and Navarre, the Castilian dominions in Africa and America (where the era of great conquests was just about to begin), the Roussillon and Cerdagne across the Pyrenees, and Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples in Italy; through his father he had already become possessed of the territories of the House of Burgundy, comprised of Flanders and Artois in northern France, Franche-Comté and Charolais in the east, Luxembourg, and the Low Countries. This was not all, for Charles was heir of the Emperor Maximilian, and in addition to inheriting the latter’s Austrian dominions might hope to succeed to the imperial title as ruler of the Holy Roman Empire. To be sure, the system of electing the emperors by the electoral princes still obtained, but the Germanic states of the empire were almost certain to prefer a powerful Hapsburg, with such dominions as Charles had, to any other candidate, if only to serve as a counterpoise to the ambitions of France. Nevertheless, the electors did not miss the opportunity to make a profit out of the situation, and encouraged the candidacy of Henry VIII of England and especially of Francis I of France as well as that of Charles, receiving bribes and favors from all. In the end, following the death of Maximilian in 1519, they decided in favor of Charles. He was now ruler, at least in name, of one of the most vast empires in the history of the world.
Inherent weakness of his empire.
The mere possession of such extensive domains inevitably led to an imperialistic policy to insure their retention. Each of the three principal elements therein, Spain, Burgundy, and the Austrian dominions, was ambitious in itself and especially hostile to France, and all of these aspirations and enmities were now combined in a single monarch. Charles himself was desirous not only of conquest but also of becoming the most powerful prince in the world, thus assuring the Hapsburg supremacy in Europe, and making himself the arbiter in European political affairs and the protector of Christianity; he may even have dreamed of a world monarchy, for if he did not aspire to such a state for himself he believed its attainment possible of realization. In the achievement of a less vast ideal, however, Charles was certain to experience many difficulties, and at some point or other was bound to encounter the hostility not only of France but also of the other states of Europe. If this were not enough there came along the unforeseen dilemma of the Reformation. Finally, his own dominions were none too strongly held together, one with another or within themselves. They were widely separated, some indeed entirely surrounded by French territory, leading to a multiplicity of problems of a military and a political nature. The imperial rank carried little real authority in Germany, and the Burgundian realms were not a great source of power. It appears, therefore, that the empire was more a matter of show than of strength, and that Spain, who already had a surfeit of responsibility, what with her conquests in Italy, Africa, and the Americas, must bear the burden for all. The reign of Charles would seem to be the parting of the ways for Spain. If she could have restricted herself to her purely Spanish inheritance, even with the incubus of her Italian possessions, she might have prolonged her existence as a great power indefinitely. A century ahead of England in colonial enterprise, she had such an opportunity as that which made the island of Britain one of the dominant factors in the world. Even as matters were, Spain was able to stand forth as a first rank nation for well over a century. Whatever might have happened if a different policy had been followed, it hardly admits of doubt that Spain’s intervention in European affairs involved too great a strain on her resources, and proved a detriment politically and economically to the peninsula.
Dissatisfaction over foreign favorites and increased taxation.
Charles had been brought up in Flanders, and, it is said, was unable to speak Spanish when he first entered the peninsula as king of Spain. His official reign began in 1516, but it was not until his arrival in the following year that the full effect of his measures began to be felt. Even before that time there was some inkling of what was to come in the appointments of foreigners, mostly Flemings, to political or ecclesiastical office in Castile. At length Charles reached Spain, surrounded by Flemish courtiers, who proceeded to supplant Spaniards not only in the favor but also in the patronage of the king. The new officials, more eager for personal profit than patriotic, began to sell privileges and the posts of lower grade to the highest bidders. Such practices could not fail to wound the feelings of Spaniards, besides which they contravened the laws, and many protests by individuals and towns were made, to which was joined the complaint of the Cortes of Valladolid in 1518. To make matters worse Chièvres, the favorite minister of the king, caused taxes to be raised. The amount of the alcabala was increased, and the tax was made applicable to the hitherto privileged nobility, much against their will. In like manner the opposition of the clergy was roused through a bull procured from the pope requiring ecclesiastical estates to pay a tenth of their income to the king during a period of three years. Furthermore it was commonly believed, no doubt with justice, that the Flemish office-holders were sending gold and other precious metals out of the country, despite the laws forbidding such export. Nevertheless the Cortes of 1518 granted a generous subsidy to the king, but this was followed by new increases in royal taxation. Opposition to these practices now began to crystallize, with the nobles of Toledo taking the lead in remonstrance against them.
Charles’ manipulation of the Cortes in Galicia.
The situation in Castile was complicated by the question of the imperial election. Between the death of Maximilian in January, 1519, and the election of Charles in June of the same year it was necessary to pay huge bribes to the electoral princes. Once chosen, Charles accepted the imperial honor, and prepared to go to Germany to be crowned, an event which called for yet more expenditures of a substantial nature. So, notwithstanding the grant of 1518, it was decided to call the Cortes early in 1520 with a view to a fresh subsidy. Since all Castile was in a state of tumult it was deemed best that the meeting should take place at some point whence an escape from the country would be easy in case of need. Thus Santiago de Compostela in Galicia was selected, and it was there that the Cortes eventually met, moving to the neighboring port of Coruña after the first few days’ sessions. The call for the Cortes provoked a storm of protest not only by Toledo but also by many other cities with which the first-named was in correspondence. Messengers were sent to the king to beg of him not to leave Spain, or, if he must do so, to place Spaniards in control of the affairs of state, and complaints were made against the practices already recounted and numerous others, such, for example, as the royal use of the title “Majesty,” an unwonted term in Spain. From the first, Charles turned a deaf ear, refusing to receive the messengers of the towns, or reproving them when he did give them audience, and he even went so far as to order the arrest of the Toledan leaders. The Cortes at length met, and gave evidence of the widespread discontent in its demands upon the king. In accordance with their instructions most of the deputies were disinclined to take up the matter of a supply for the king until he should accede to their petitions. Under the royal eye, however, they gradually modified their demands, and when Charles took it upon himself to absolve them from the pledges they had given to their constituents they voted the subsidy without obtaining any tangible redress of grievances. The king did promise not to appoint any foreigners to Spanish benefices or political holdings during his absence, but broke his word forthwith when he named Cardinal Adrian, a foreigner, as his representative and governor during his absence. This done, Charles set out in the same year, 1520, for Germany.
War of the Comunidades in Castile.
Meanwhile, a riot in Toledo, promoted by the nobles whom Charles had ordered arrested, converted itself into a veritable revolt when the royal corregidor was expelled from the city. This action was stated to have been taken in the name of the Comunidad, or community, of Toledo, and served to give a name to the uprising which now took place in all parts of Castile. Deputies to the Cortes who had been faithless to their trust, some of whom had accepted bribes from the king, were roughly handled upon their return home, and city after city joined Toledo in proclaiming the Comunidad. In July, 1520, delegates of the rebellious communities met, and formed the Junta of Ávila, which from that town and later from Tordesillas and Valladolid served as the executive body of the revolution. For a time the Junta was practically the ruling body in the state; so complete was the overturn of royal authority that Cardinal Adrian and his advisers made no attempt to put down the rebellion. Time worked to the advantage of the king, however. The revolt of Toledo had begun as a protest of the nobles and clergy against the imposition of taxes against them. The program of the Junta of Ávila went much further than that, going into the question of the grievances of the various social classes. At length many of the comuneros began to indulge in acts of violence and revenge against those by whom they regarded themselves as having been oppressed, and the movement changed from one of all the classes, including the nobles, against the royal infractions of law and privileges, to one of the popular element against the lords. Thus the middle classes, who objected to the disorder of the times as harmful to business, and the nobles, in self-defence, began to take sides with the king. City after city went over to Charles, and late in 1520 the government was strong enough to declare war on the communities still faithful to the Junta. Dissension, treason, and incompetent leadership furthered the decline of the popular cause, and in 1521 the revolt was crushed at the battle of Villalar. Charles promised a general pardon, but when he came to Spain in 1522 he caused a great many to be put to death. Not until 1526 did he show a disposition to clemency. Moreover he retained his Flemish advisers.
Social wars in Valencia and Majorca.