During the period of the revolt of the Comunidades in Castile even more bitter civil wars were going on in Valencia (1520-1522) and Majorca (1521-1523). The contest in Valencia was a social conflict from the start, of plebeians against the lords, whereas the Castilian conflict was fundamentally political. In Majorca the strife began over pressure for financial reforms, but developed into an attempt to eliminate the nobility altogether. Both uprisings were independent of the Castilian revolt, although serving to aid the latter through the necessary diversion of troops. As in Castile, so in Valencia and Majorca, Charles took sides against the popular element, and put down the insurrections, displaying great severity toward the leaders.
Charles’ difficulties in Germany and war with France.
While the civil wars were at their height Charles was having more than his share of trouble in other quarters. The princes of Germany compelled him to sign a document affirming their privileges, in which appeared many paragraphs similar to those of the Castilian petitions to the king, together with one requiring Charles to maintain the empire independently of the Spanish crown. The acceptance of these principles by the emperor is an evidence of the weakness of his authority in the subject states of Germany, for not only was he a believer in the divine origin of the imperial dignity, a doctrine which would have impelled him to establish his personal and absolute rule in all of his realms if possible, but he seems also to have intended to make Spain the political centre of his dominions, because she was, after all, his strongest element of support. At the same time, a fresh difficulty appeared in Germany with the Lutheran outbreak of 1521. Charles himself favored reform in the church, but was opposed to any change in dogma. Before he could confront either the political or the religious problem in Germany, he found himself attacked on another quarter. Francis I of France had seized upon Charles’ difficulties as affording him a rich opportunity to strike to advantage; so in 1521 he twice sent French armies into Spain through the western Pyrenees on the pretext of restoring the crown of Navarre to the Labrit family. With all these questions pressing for solution Charles was in an exceedingly unsatisfactory position. Thus early in the period lack of funds to prosecute European policies was chronic. Spain herself, even if there had been no civil wars, was not united internally like the compact French nation, and the other Hapsburg dominions could give but little help. Finally, Charles could not depend on the alliance of any other power, for his own realms were neighbors of all the others, and his designs were therefore generally suspected. Nevertheless, Charles brought to his many tasks an indomitable will, marked energy, a steadfast purpose, and an all-round ability which were to do much toward overcoming the obstacles that hindered him.
Wars with France, the pope, the Italian states, and German princes.
The outcome.
It is profitless, here, to relate the course of the wars with France and other European states. In the years 1521 to 1529, 1536 to 1538, and 1542 to 1544, France and Spain were at war, and at other times, down to the death of Francis I in 1547, the two countries enjoyed what was virtually no more than a truce. Meanwhile, Charles was usually in conflict with the popes, whose temporal dominions in central Italy were threatened by the growing power of Spain and the empire in the Italian peninsula. Other states in Italy fought now on Charles’ side, now against him, while the princes of Germany were an equally variable quantity. England favored each side in turn, but offered little effective aid to either. As affecting the history of religion these wars gave Protestantism a chance to develop. Neither Charles nor Francis disdained the aid of Protestant princes, and the former had little opportunity to proceed against them on religious grounds. Francis even allied himself with the Moslem power of Turkey. On the whole, Charles was the victor in the wars, and could point to the occupation of Milan as a tangible evidence of his success,—about the only territorial change of consequence as a result of the many campaigns. Perhaps the most noteworthy fact as affecting the history of Spain and Spanish America was the financial drain occasioned by the fighting. Time and again lack of funds was mainly responsible for defeats or failures to follow up a victory. Spain and the Americas had to meet the bills, but, liberal as were their contributions, more were always needed.
Wars with the Turks and the Moslems of northern Africa.
The wars with Turkey had a special significance because of the ever impending peril from Moslem northern Africa. The pirates of the Berber, or Barbary, Coast, as the lands in northwestern Africa are often called, seemed to be more than ever audacious in the early years of the reign of Charles. Not only did they attack Spanish ships and even Spanish ports, but they also made numerous incursions inland in the peninsula. Aside from the loss in captives and in economic wealth that these visitations represented, they served to remind the authorities of the Moslem sympathies of Spanish Moriscos and of the ease with which a Moslem invasion might be effected. Furthermore the conquests of Isabella and Ximénez had created Castilian interests in northern Africa, of both a political and an economic character, which were in need of defence against the efforts of the tributary princes to free themselves by Turkish aid. The situation was aggravated by the achievements of a renegade Greek adventurer and pirate, known best by the sobriquet “Barbarossa.” This daring corsair became so powerful that he was able to dethrone the king of Algiers and set up his own brother in his stead. On the death of the latter at the hands of the Spaniards in 1518, Barbarossa placed the kingdom of Algiers under the protection of the sultan of Turkey, became himself an admiral in the Turkish navy, and soon afterward conquered the kingdom of Tunis, whence during many years he menaced the Spanish dominions in Italy. Charles in person led an expedition in 1535 which was successful in dethroning Barbarossa and in restoring the former king to the throne, but an expedition of 1541, sent against Algiers, was a dismal failure. On yet another frontier, that of Hungary, Spanish troops were called upon to meet the Turks, and there they contributed to the checking of that people at a time when their military power threatened Europe. The problem of northern Africa, however, had been little affected by the efforts of Charles.
Charles’ failure to stamp out Protestantism.
Meanwhile, the religious question in Germany had all along been considered by Charles as one of his most important problems. The first war with France prevented any action on his part until 1529, since he needed the support of the Protestant princes. The movement therefore had time to gather headway, and it was evident that Charles would meet with determined opposition whenever he should decide to face the issue. Various factors entered in to complicate the matter, such, for example, as the fear on the part of many princes of the growing Hapsburg power and the belief that Charles meant to make the imperial succession hereditary in his family. A temporary adjustment of the religious situation was made by the imperial Diet held at Spires in 1526, when it was agreed that every prince should decide for himself in matters of religion. With the close of the war with France in 1529, Charles caused the Diet to meet again at Spires, on which occasion the previous decision was revoked. The princes devoted to the reform ideas protested, giving rise to the name “Protestant,” but without avail. The Diet was called for the next year at Augsburg, when Charles sat in judgment between the two parties. The Protestants presented their side in a document which became known as the confession of Augsburg. The Catholic theologians replied, and Charles accepted their view, ordering the Protestant leaders to submit, and threatening to employ force unless they should do so. The international situation again operated to protect the reform movement, for the Turks became threatening, and, indeed, what with the wars with France and his numerous other difficulties Charles was unable to proceed resolutely to a solution of the religious problem until the year 1545. At last he was ready to declare war. In 1547 he won what seemed to be a decisive victory in the Battle of Mühlberg, resulting in the subjection of the Protestant princes to the Roman Church. They protested anew, and, aided by the opposition to Charles on other grounds,—for example, because of his introduction of Italian and Spanish soldiery into what was regarded as a domestic quarrel,—were able to present a warlike front again. This time they were joined by Charles’ former powerful ally, Maurice of Saxony, through whose assistance they successfully defended themselves. Peace was made at Passau in 1552, ratified by the Diet of Augsburg in 1555, whereby the Protestant princes obtained equal rights with the Catholic lords as to their freedom in religious beliefs.