This line of reasoning is plausible, but none the less open to one serious objection; it is sustained neither by statistics nor by practical experience. Moreover it is not new, for, slightly varied in phraseology, it has been persistently urged against the introduction of every new railroad appliance, and, indeed, was first and most persistently of all urged against the introduction of railroads themselves. Pretty and ingenious in theory, practically it is not feasible!—for more than half a century this formula has been heard. That the automatic electric signal system is complicated, and in many of its parts of most delicate construction, is undeniable. So also is the locomotive. In point of fact the whole railroad organization from beginning to end—from machine-shop to train-movement—is at once so vast and complicated, so delicate in that action which goes on with such velocity and power, that it is small cause for wonder that in the beginning all plain, sensible, practical men scouted it as the fanciful creation of visionaries. They were wholly justified in so doing; and to-day any sane man would of course pronounce the combined safety and rapidity of ordinary railroad movement an utter impossibility, did he not see it going on before his eyes. So it is with each new appliance. It is ever suggested that at last the final result has already been reached. It is but a few years, as will presently be seen, since the Westinghouse brake encountered the old "pretty and ingenious" formula. Going yet a step further, and taking the case of electricity itself, the bold conception of operating an entire line of single track road wholly as respects one half of its train movement by telegraph, and without the use of any time table at all, would once have been condemned as mad. Yet to-day half of the vast freight movement of this continent is carried on in absolute reliance on the telegraph. Nevertheless it is still not uncommon to hear among the class of men who rise to the height of their capacity in themselves being automaton superintendents that they do not believe in deviating from their time tables and printed rules; that, acting under them, the men know or ought to know exactly what to do, and any interference by a train despatcher only relieves them of responsibility, and is more likely to lead to accidents than if they were left alone to grope their own way out.
Another and very similar argument frequently urged against the electric, in common with all other block systems by the large class who prefer to exercise their ingenuity in finding objections rather than in overcoming difficulties, is that they breed dependence and carelessness in employés;—that engine-drivers accustomed to rely on the signals, rely on them implicitly, and get into habits of recklessness which lead inevitably to accidents, for which they then contend the signals, and not they themselves, are responsible. This argument is, indeed, hardly less familiar than the "pretty and ingenious" formula just referred to. It has, however, been met and disposed of by Captain Tyler in his annual reports to the Board of Trade in a way which can hardly be improved upon:—
It is a favorite argument with those who oppose the introduction of some of these improvements, or who make excuses for the want of them, that their servants are apt to become more careless from the use of them, in consequence of the extra security which they are believed to afford; and it is desirable to consider seriously how much of truth there is in this assertion. * * * Allowing to the utmost for these tendencies to confide too much in additional means of safety, the risk is proved by experience to be very much greater without them than with them; and, in fact, the negligence and mistakes of servants are found to occur most frequently, and generally with the most serious results, not when the men are over-confident in their appliances or apparatus, but when, in the absence of them, they are habituated to risk in the conduct of the traffic. In the daily practice of railway working station-masters, porters, signalmen, engine-drivers or guards are frequently placed in difficulties which they have to surmount as best they can. The more they are accustomed to incur risk in order to perform their duties, the less they think of it, and the more difficult it is to enforce discipline and obedience to regulations. The personal risk which is encountered by certain classes of railway servants is coming to be more precisely ascertained. It is very considerable; and it is difficult to prevent men who are in constant danger themselves from doing things which may be a source of danger to others, or to compel them to obey regulations for which they do not see altogether the necessity, and which impede them in their work. This difficulty increases with the want of necessary means and appliances; and is diminished when, with proper means and appliances, stricter discipline becomes possible, safer modes of working become habitual, and a higher margin of safety is constantly preserved.[14]
In Great Britain the ingenious theory that superior appliances or greater personal comfort in some indefinable way lead to carelessness in employés was carried to such an extent that only within the last few years has any protection against wind, rain and sunshine been furnished on locomotives for the engine-drivers and stokers. The old stage-coach driver faced the elements, and why should not his successor on the locomotive do the same?—If made too comfortable, he would become careless and go to sleep!—This was the line of argument advanced, and the tortures to which the wretched men were subjected in consequence of it led to their fortifying nature by drink. They had to be regularly inspected and examined before mounting the foot-board, to see that they were sober. It took years in Great Britain for intelligent railroad managers to learn that the more protected and comfortable a man is the better he will attend to his duty. And even when the old argument, refuted by long experience, was at last abandoned as respected the locomotive cab, it, with perfect freshness and confidence in its own novelty and force, promptly showed its brutal visage in opposition to the next new safeguard.
For the reasons which Captain Tyler has so forcibly put in the extracts which have just been quoted, the argument against the block system from the increased carelessness of employés, supposed to be induced by it, is entitled to no weight. Neither is the argument from the delicacy and complication of the automatic, electric signal system entitled to any more, when urged against that. Not only has it been too often refuted under similar conditions by practical results, but in this case it is based on certain assumptions of fact which are wholly opposed to experience. The record does not show that there is any peculiar liability to railroad accidents during periods of storm; perhaps because those in charge of train movements or persons crossing tracks are under such circumstances more especially on the look out for danger. On the contrary the full average of accidents of the worst description appear to have occurred under the most ordinary conditions of weather, and usually in the most unanticipated way. This is peculiarly true of accidents at highway grade crossings. These commonly occur when the conditions are such as to cause the highway travelers to suppose that, if any danger existed, they could not but be aware of it. In the next place, the question in regard to automatic electric signals is exactly what it was in regard to the Westinghouse brake, with its air-pump, its valves and connecting tubes;—it is the purely practical question,—Does the thing work?—The burden of proof is properly on the inventor. The presumption is all against him. In the case of the electric signals they have for years been in limited but constant use, and while thus in use they have been undergoing steady improvement. Though now brought to a considerable degree of comparative perfection they are, of course, still in their earlier stage of development. In use, however, they have not been found open to the practical objections urged against them. At first much too complicated and expensive, requiring more machinery than could by any reasonable exertions be kept in order and more care than they were worth, they have now been simplified until a single battery properly located can do all the necessary work for a road of indefinite length. As a system they are effective and do not lead to accidents; nor are they any more subject than telegraph wires to derangement from atmospheric causes. When any disturbance does take place, until it can be overcome it amounts simply to a general signal for operating the road with extreme caution. But with railroads, as everywhere else in life, it is the normal condition of affairs for which provision must be made, while the dangers incident to exceptional circumstances must be met by exceptional precautions. As long as things are in their normal state, that is, probably, during nineteen days out of twenty, the electric signals have now through several years of constant trial proved themselves a reliable safeguard. It can hardly admit of doubt that in the near future they will be both further perfected and generally adopted.
CHAPTER XVIII.
INTERLOCKING.
In their management of switches, especially at points of railroad convergence where a heavy traffic is concentrated and the passage of trains or movement of cars and locomotives is unceasing, the English are immeasurably in advance of the Americans; and, indeed, of all other people. In fact, in this respect the American managers have shown themselves slow to learn, and have evinced an indisposition to adopt labor-saving appliances which, considering their usual quickness of discernment in that regard, is at first sight inexplicable. Having always been accustomed to the old and simple methods, just so long as they can through those methods handle their traffic with a bearable degree of inconvenience and expense, they will continue to do so. That their present method is most extravagant, just as extravagant as it would be to rent two houses or to run two steam engines where one, if properly used, could be made to suffice, admits of demonstration;—but the waste is not on the surface, and the necessity for economy is not imperative. The difference of conditions and the difference in results may be made very obvious by a comparison. Take, for instance, London and Boston—the Cannon street station in the one and the Beach street station in the other. The concentration of traffic at London is so great that it becomes necessary to utilize every foot of ground devoted to railroad purposes to the utmost possible extent. Not only must it be packed with tracks, but those tracks must never be idle. The incessant train movement at Cannon street has already been referred to as probably the most extraordinary and confusing spectacle in the whole wide circle of railroad wonders. The result is that in some way, at this one station and under this single roof, more trains must daily be made to enter and leave than enter and leave, not only the Beach street station, but all the eight railroad stations in Boston combined.[15]