In the morning, after I had been with Guizot (and after Palmerston’s interview with Lord John), he went to Palmerston and communicated fully the offer of France, saying he would not enter into the details of the question, but he could not help reminding him of the failure of so many of his confident expectations. Palmerston said that there would be no sort of difficulty in enforcing the Treaty, and that then France might join if she pleased. Guizot replied that this was out of the question, that France was now ready to join in a transaction fair and honourable to both parties, but she would not stand by, see the question settled without her, and then come in to bolster up an arrangement made by others, and with which she had had no concern. In the evening he went to Holland House, where he told Melbourne what he had communicated to Palmerston; found him in a satisfactory disposition, but Melbourne said that there was a danger greatly to be feared, and that was, that our ambassador at Constantinople, who was very violent against Mehemet Ali, and not afraid of war, might and probably would urge the immediate rejection of the Pacha’s proposal and every sort of violent measure.[18] Guizot, naturally enough, expressed (to me) his astonishment that the LORD PALMERSTON’S RESOLUTION. Prime Minister should hold such language, and that, if he had an ambassador who was likely to act in such a manner so much at variance with his political views, he did not recall him or supersede him by a special mission. This, however, was very characteristic of Melbourne; and I told Clarendon, urging him to insist that some positive understanding should be come to, upon the conduct to be adopted by Ponsonby. There can be no doubt that Palmerston and Ponsonby between them will do all they can to embroil matters, and to make a transaction impossible, and Palmerston writes just what he pleases without any of his colleagues having the least idea what he says. The result of the whole then is, that the Cabinet meet at three to-day, and that Lord John will have to stand forth in opposition to Palmerston’s policy, and to propose the adoption of measures leading to an amicable arrangement. A few hours will show how the rest are disposed to take it.
[18] As he did.
CHAPTER IX.
The Cabinet meets — The Government on the verge of Dissolution — The Second Cabinet — Palmerston lowers his Tone in the Cabinet — But continues to bully in the Press — Taking of Beyrout — Deposition of Mehemet Ali — Lord John acquiesces — Total Defeat of Peace Party — Lord John Russell’s False Position — His Views — Lord Granville’s Dissatisfaction — Further Attempts at Conciliation — Prevarication of Lord Ponsonby — Newspaper Hostilities — Discussion of the French Note of the 8th October — Guizot’s Opinion of the Note of the 8th October — Louis Philippe’s Influence on the Crisis — Summary of Events — Death of Lord Holland — Lord Clarendon’s Regret for Lord Holland — M. Guizot’s Intentions as to France — Effects of the Queen’s Partiality for Melbourne — Resignation to Thiers — Bickerings in the Ministry — Lord John Russell’s Dissatisfaction with Lord Palmerston — Lord John resigns — Lord John demands the Recall of Lord Ponsonby — Lord Palmerston defends Lord Ponsonby — M. Guizot’s Policy — Conciliatory Propositions fail — Attitude of Austria — Asperity of Lord Palmerston — Operations in Syria — Success of Lord Palmerston and his Policy — Baron Mounier’s Mission to London — Birth of the Princess Royal — Results of the Success of Lord Palmerston’s Measures — The Tories divided in Opinion as to the Treaty — Retrospect of the Year — Lord Holland.
September 29th, 1840: Wednesday
The Cabinet met on Monday evening and sat till seven o’clock. The account of the proceedings which has reached me is to the last degree amusing, but at the same time pitoyable. It must have been à payer les places to see. They met, and as if all were conscious of something unpleasant in prospect, and all shy, there was for some time a dead silence. At length Melbourne, trying to shuffle off the discussion, but aware that he must say something, began: ‘We must consider about the time to which Parliament should be prorogued.’ Upon this Lord John took it up and said, ‘I presume we must consider whether Parliament should be called together or not, because, as matters are now going on, it seems to me that we may at A CABINET ON THE EASTERN QUESTION. any moment find ourselves at war, and it is high time to consider the very serious state of affairs. I should like,’ he added, turning to Melbourne, ‘to know what is your opinion upon the subject.’ Nothing, however, could be got from Melbourne, and there was another long pause, which was not broken till somebody asked Palmerston, ‘What are your last accounts?’ On this Palmerston pulled out of his pocket a whole parcel of letters and reports from Ponsonby, Hodges, and others, and began reading them through, in the middle of which operation someone happened to look up, and perceived Melbourne fast asleep in his armchair. At length Palmerston got through his papers, when there was another pause; and at last Lord John, finding that Melbourne would not take the lead or say a word, went at once into the whole subject. He stated both sides of the case with great precision, and in an admirable, though very artful speech, a statement which, if elaborated into a Parliamentary speech and completed as it would be in the House of Commons, was calculated to produce the greatest effect. He delivered this, speaking for about a quarter of an hour, and then threw himself back in his chair, waiting for what anybody else would say. After some little talk, Palmerston delivered his sentiments the other way, made a violent philippic against France, talked of her weakness and want of preparation, of the union of all the Powers of Europe against her, said that Prussia had 200,000 men on the Rhine, and (as Lord Holland said) exhibited all the violence of ’93. Lord John was then asked, since such were his opinions, what course he would advise? He said he had formed his opinion as to what it would be advisable to do, and he produced a slip of paper on which he had written two or three things. The first was, that we should immediately make a communication to the French Government, expressing our thanks for the efforts France had made to induce the Pasha to make concessions for the purpose of bringing about a settlement; and next, to call together the Ministers of the other Powers, and express to them our opinion that it would be desirable to re-open negotiations for a settlement of the dispute in consequence of the effects produced by the mediation of France. There then ensued a good deal of talk (in which, however, the Prime Minister took no part), Lord Minto espousing Palmerston’s side, and saying (which was true enough), that though Lord Holland and Clarendon, who had all along opposed the Treaty, might very consistently take this course, he did not see how any of those could do so who had originally supported and approved of it; to which Lord John quietly and briefly said, ‘The events at Alexandria have made all the difference.’ This was in fact no answer; and Minto was quite right, especially as Lord John had taken his line before the events at Alexandria were known. Of the Ministers present besides Minto, Macaulay seemed rather disposed to go with Palmerston, and talked blusteringly about France, as he probably thought a Secretary of War should. Labouchere was first one way and then the other, and neither the Chancellor nor the Chancellor of the Exchequer said one word. The result was an agreement, that it would be disrespectful to Lord Lansdowne, considering his position, to come to any resolution in his absence; and as he could not arrive before this day, that the discussion should be adjourned till Thursday (to-morrow) by which time he and Morpeth would be here. They were all to dine with Palmerston, and a queer dinner it must have been.
October 1st, 1840
No progress made, everything in statu quo. The dinner at Palmerston’s on Monday after the Cabinet, went off well enough. In the evening Clarendon had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, who repeated to him everything she had said to me, and seemed confident enough that Palmerston would carry his point at last. He told her, however, that if he persisted, the Government must be broken up, as at least half a dozen would resign, and that she must be aware Government could not go on if either Palmerston or John Russell resigned (putting in Palmerston out of civility). He thought he had made some impression on her. The next day they all dined at Holland House. There he had again some talk with Palmerston himself, amicable enough, but leading to nothing; to what Clarendon LORD JOHN’S PACIFIC SENTIMENTS. said about breaking up the Government, Palmerston did not reply a word. Afterwards Palmerston had a long talk with Lord Holland, but not satisfactory. Morpeth has arrived, and naturally enough was extremely embarrassed. He had supported Palmerston originally, and was not aware of any impending change of policy, or any change in anybody’s opinion, and he felt that it was an extraordinary whisk round. Melbourne, of course, hopped off to Windsor the moment the Cabinet was over, and instead of remaining here, trying to conciliate people and arrange matters, he left everything to shift for itself. Having shown the Queen a letter of John Russell’s, which she was not intended to see, he sent to Lord John a letter of hers, which probably she did not mean him to see either. She said, among other things, that she thought it was rather hard that Lord Palmerston and Lord John could not settle these matters amicably, without introducing their own personal objects, and raising such difficulties. She added one thing in her letter which may lead to some important consequences. She said that it was her wish that some attempt should be made to open communications with the French Government. If Palmerston chooses to give way, he may make her wishes the pretext for doing so, and yield to them what he refuses to everybody else.