I saw Guizot, who showed me a letter he had written to Thiers, telling him as far as he knew how matters stood, of the difficulties there were, and entreating him to moderate the French press. He also showed me a note from John Russell, in which, after thanking him for not speaking to him at Holland House, as it was better he should only talk to Palmerston or Melbourne, he added that he begged he would not consider that the articles which had lately appeared in the ‘Morning Chronicle’ and ‘Observer’ were approved of by the Government, and repudiated any connexion or concurrence with them. He had pronounced in the Cabinet a violent philippic against the newspapers, which was entirely directed at Palmerston, who, he knows very well, writes constantly in them, and Guizot knows this also. Guizot, therefore, if he had any doubt before of Lord John’s sentiments, can have none now. An article appeared in the ‘Times’ on Tuesday strongly in favour of peace and harmony with France and the acceptance of the Pasha’s offers. Guizot, of course, was delighted with it; but I found it had taken in other quarters, for Dedel asked me if I had read it, and said it was the true view of the question, and Ben Stanley said the same thing to me at dinner, and that he had found at Manchester and elsewhere a strong public opinion, of which he was sure Palmerston was not aware, and would not believe in if told. Dedel showed me a letter from Fagel, giving an account of a conversation he had with Louis Philippe, in which the King disclaimed any ambitious design or desire for war, but said he was determined to put France in a respectable state of preparation; very firm language. Dedel had been at Peel’s, but got nothing out of him except that he did not know whether he should have made such a treaty, but as it was made we ought to abide by it. The Tories will turn this business to good account, end as it may; they have beau jeu. But what Neumann said to Dedel is anything but confirmatory of Palmerston’s stories of Austrian stoutness, for he told him it would be a very fortunate thing if the Sultan would accept Mehemet Ali’s new proposals.[1]
[1] [M. Neumann was the Austrian Minister in London; M. Fagel the Dutch Minister in Paris.]
Evening.—The Cabinet went off far better than could have been expected; indeed, as well as possible under all the circumstances. Lord John had previously intimated to Melbourne that he should expect him to take the lead upon this occasion, and it seems pretty clear that Melbourne had contrived to effect some arrangement with Palmerston. Accordingly Melbourne (very nervous) began, said that the question was in the same state as when they last met, pronounced a few commonplaces, such as that the success or failure of the coercive means might by this time have been proved, only they could not yet know the event, but ended with referring to a paper delivered some time ago by Metternich, in which he had made certain contingent suggestions, PRINCE METTERNICH’S SUGGESTION. of which the last and most important was, that in the event of ‘inefficacité des moyens’ becoming apparent some communication should be made to France for the purpose of drawing her again into the alliance (or something to that effect; I cannot recollect the exact words, but it was a peg on which a communication might be hung), and asking Palmerston if he had not got this paper.[2] Palmerston pulled it, all cut and dry, out of his pocket and read it. A good deal of talk then ensued, and some doubts and suspicions were expressed about France, which drew out Lord Holland, who said, ‘For God’s sake, if you are so full of distrust of France, if you suspect all her acts and all her words, put the worst construction on all she does, and are resolved to be on bad terms with her, call Parliament together, ask for men and money, and fight it out with her manfully. Do this or meet her in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, and cast aside all those suspicions which make such bad blood between the two countries.’ This appeal (of which I only give the spirit) was very well received, and, after some more talk, Palmerston said that though he was still convinced success would crown the efforts now making in the East, and that it was unnecessary to take any other step, yet, if it was the wish and opinion of the Cabinet that some communication should be made to France, he was ready to make it. This was, of course, very well taken, and was a prodigious concession and change from his former tone. A great deal more discussion then ensued, and the result was that Palmerston is to see the Ministers of the Conference, either separately or together, to-morrow, and to propose to them that he should make a communication to France on the basis of Metternich’s suggestion. There can be no doubt of Neumann’s acquiescence, and the Prussian will go with the Austrian; the only doubt is Brunnow. They all agreed that nothing could be done but with the common consent of all, and as Russia has behaved exceedingly well since the signature of the Treaty, it would be wholly unjustifiable not to treat her with perfect good faith and every sort of consideration. If Brunnow objects, and will not consent to the communication being made, another Cabinet is to be summoned to-morrow afternoon; if he acquiesces, Palmerston is to speak to Guizot immediately. If Brunnow is not consenting, Palmerston will equally speak to Guizot, but, instead of making a proposition, will say that Brunnow will apply for instructions, and that we have requested him to do so, to enable us, with the consent of all the three parties to the treaty, to make the communication to France. Such is the substance and result of this important Cabinet, which I have very roughly and imperfectly put down, and I am conscious that I have forgotten some of the details which reached me; however, I have preserved the essential parts. Lord John (to whom it is all due) said very little, Lansdowne not much; Hobhouse was talkative, but nobody listened to him; Melbourne, when it was over, swaggering like any Bobadil, and talking about ‘fellows being frightened at their own shadows,’ and a deal of bravery when he began to breathe freely from the danger.
[2] Metternich’s paper was a suggestion which he put into the mouth of the French Minister, and which he gave Leopold, who sent it here. He said, ‘If I were the French Minister, I would say so and so,’ to the effect that if the means of coercion did not prove efficacious, the Allies had better consider the matter afresh in conjunction with France, who would assist in settling it.
October 2nd, 1840
Last night it was decided that Palmerston should call the Conference together, and propose to them to make a conciliatory advance to France. All Europe is looking with anxiety for the result of the Cabinet held yesterday; and this morning the ‘Morning Chronicle’ puts forth an article having every appearance of being written by Palmerston himself (as I have no doubt it was), most violent, declamatory, and insulting to France.
October 4th, 1840
I was obliged to break off, and now resume the narrative. It was resolved at the Cabinet that Palmerston should summon the Ministers of the Conference and ask their consent to his making some communication to Guizot. The Austrian and the Prussian said they would consent to whatever Brunnow agreed to. Brunnow said he could say nothing till he had consulted his Court; and he added that England could do what she pleased, but that he LORD PALMERSTON DEFEATS CONCILIATION. would not conceal from Palmerston that the Emperor would be exceedingly hurt if any step of the kind was taken without his knowledge or consent.[4] On this the Cabinet again met on Friday afternoon to hear the report; but it must have been clear enough what the result of Palmerston’s interview with the Ministers would be, after the appearance of the article in the ‘Chronicle.’ I made the Duke of Bedford go to Lord John and tell him this ought not to be endured; and that if I were he I would not sit for one hour in the Cabinet with a man who could agree to take a certain line (with his colleagues) over night, and publish a furious attack upon the same the next morning. Lord John said he had already written to Melbourne about it, that Palmerston had positively denied having anything to do with the ‘Morning Chronicle,’ and he did not see what more he could do; but he owned that all his confidence in him was gone.
[4] [It is obvious that when Lord Palmerston agreed to make a conciliatory overture to France, in order to allay the storm in the Cabinet, and prevent the threatened dissolution of the Ministry, he was perfectly aware that Brunnow and the Emperor of Russia would not concur in the proposal, or would, at least, delay it so long that it would be useless. Moreover, Lord Palmerston confidently relied, and in this it turned out he was right, on the success of his naval measures against the Pasha, and of the Pasha’s inability to resist them. It was this prompt success—prompt beyond all conception and belief—that averted the catastrophe of a dissolution of the Ministry or a breach with France.]
I received a note in the morning from Guizot desiring to see me, and I went. I told him that the article was abominable, but that so far from its being a true exposition of the intentions of the Cabinet, they had resolved upon the attempt at conciliation which Palmerston had himself agreed to make. I begged him to make allowance for the difficulties of the case, and be contented with a small advance; and I told him that the Cabinet were unanimously agreed upon the necessity of adhering to their engagements with their Allies, and at the same time endeavouring to bring about a rapprochement to France. He promised to make the best of it with his Government, and, making them comprehend that there was a strong peace party in the Cabinet, work in conjunction with that party here to keep matters quiet.