I told him that Palmerston had gained his point, and that the whole thing turned upon the success of the insurrection. He admitted that it did, and stated the grounds there were for hoping that it would succeed. He owned to me LORD JOHN’S LAST EFFORT. that his reason for consenting to the Treaty was the refusal of France to join in coercive measures; which I told him was in my opinion the strong point of Palmerston’s case. The fact is, the offer of France is come too late; the machine has been set in motion, and now there is no stopping it. But I shall ever think that if the advances of France had been met in another way, much might have been done. Lord John said the Queen had talked to him, and had expressed her anxiety for some settlement, but at the same time was quite determined to make no unworthy concession.

My brother writes me word that Lord Granville is so disgusted at his position, and at being kept entirely in the dark as to the real position of affairs, that he is seriously thinking of resigning. Bulwer[6] has, however, done his utmost to prevent him, and advised him to write instead and earnestly recommend that, if they meditate any change, whatever they mean to do should be done immediately.

[6] [Mr. Henry Bulwer (afterwards Lord Dalling) was at that time First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, and an ardent supporter of Lord Palmerston’s policy—much more so than the Ambassador, Lord Granville.]

I went to Lord John this morning, and read to him my brother Henry’s letter. He is alarmed, and says that no doubt much might have been done in the way of conciliation that has not been done; admits that Palmerston (through whom everything must necessarily pass) will do nothing; and that the fact is he does not believe in war, and does not care if it happens. He showed me a paper he wrote with the project of making certain tranquillising communications to the French Government; one of which was, that if the Allies resolved to attack Egypt, they would first give notice to France and try and arrange matters with her. The Emperor of Russia, it appears, is all for attacking Egypt; but no intention exists of taking Egypt from the Pasha in any case. I told him again that I thought an opportunity had been lost of responding to the last offer of France in a conciliatory way, and Lord John said he thought so too; he had written a paper on the subject, showed it to Melbourne—who highly approved of it, left it with him, never heard more about it, and nothing was done. Palmerston’s extinguisher was, of course, put upon it. Lord John said he was tired of attempting to do anything; and he now appears to have resolved to wait patiently, and meet his destiny with the stoical resignation of a Turk.

October 9th, 1840

Everything looking black these last two days, funds falling, and general alarm. Lord Granville has written to Palmerston both publicly and privately; in the former enforcing the necessity of some speedy arrangement, if any there is to be; in the latter remonstrating upon his own situation vis-à-vis of the Government. Lord John has again screwed his courage up to summon the Cabinet, with the determination of making another attempt at accommodation with France. He proposed this to Melbourne, who said ‘it was too late.’ This is what he always does: entreats people to wait when they first want to move, and then when they have waited, and will wait no longer, he says, ‘it is too late.’ Lord John’s design is to have a despatch written to Granville, with which he is to go to Thiers, inviting a frank explanation de part et d’autre, asking what France desires and expects, saying what England intends and does not intend, entering into the position in which all parties are placed, and expressing a readiness to conciliate France in any way that we honourably and consistently can, communicating to our Allies exactly what we say.

But what he would principally desire, and I perceive will not be able to effect, is the supersession in some shape of Lord Ponsonby, against whom grave charges do certainly lie. The other day (the day before the Council at Claremont), Palmerston produced at the Cabinet Ponsonby’s despatch announcing the deposition of Mehemet Ali, which he read aloud. Melbourne asked if there was not something said indicative of some differences of opinion among the Ambassadors (probably something grave struck him), to which Palmerston responded that there was nothing. The next day Beauvale’s despatch arrived with the report of the Austrian Internuncio to Metternich, who said that Ponsonby had assembled the Ministers at his house on Rifat NOTE FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. Bey’s arrival, and proposed the immediate déchéance of the Pasha, to which he had made no objection, but that his Russian colleague had objected. His objections were, however, overruled by Ponsonby, who had taken upon himself to say that he would make England responsible for the whole and sole execution of the sentence of deposition. Nothing of this was hinted in Ponsonby’s own despatch, and the false account therefore which it conveyed of what had passed raised a general and strong feeling of indignation.

In the afternoon I saw Guizot, whom I found very reasonable, full of regret for the violence at Paris, and admitting that it was not only mad but ridiculous; said he had urged as forcibly as he could that they should do nothing for several days, and pay no attention to any events that might occur on the Syrian coast; that he had written to the Duc de Broglie and entreated him to exert all his influence to keep matters quiet; and then he said that he still did not despair of peace if we would only do something to pacify and conciliate France; that some concession in return for hers she must have, and without which her Government had not the power to maintain peace; that his conviction was, that if we would give Mehemet Ali Candia, or a little more of Syria—two out of the four Pashaliks—that this would be accepted, and that surely the alliance and concurrence of France were worth as much as this. I went from him to John Russell, and told him what he had said.

October 10th, 1840

The Cabinet met this afternoon. Lord John Russell was to have taken the lead and developed his conciliatory notions, but a new turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot placed in Palmerston’s hands just before the Cabinet, which he only received from Paris this morning.[7] He called on Palmerston and gave it him; but without any observations. Palmerston brought it to the Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise of everybody, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a disposition to be very easily satisfied. This note is ill written, ill put together, and very tame. What a difficult task a French Minister must have, to defend at once such a note and such an expense as had been incurred! Probably Guizot did not much admire the production. The consequence was that the discussion turned on this document, and Palmerston immediately showed a disposition to haggle and bargain, and make it a pretext for extorting from France the best terms she could be got to yield, and all this in the spirit of a pedlar rather than of a statesman. This was, however, overruled. A better and more liberal disposition pervaded the majority, and it was settled that Palmerston should see Guizot and speak to him in a conciliatory tone, and that a note, in a corresponding spirit, should be drawn up and sent to the French Government. This note is, however, to be first submitted for the approbation, and, if necessary, alteration of the Cabinet, so that care will be taken to make it what it ought to be. It would now appear that the French Government would be well enough satisfied if the original terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, and if it is made clear that he will in no case be molested in the hereditary possession of Egypt; but Palmerston began talking of leaving him Egypt for his life, which was, however, instantly put down by the majority. A more decided disposition appeared in the majority of the Cabinet to adopt the conciliatory policy; whereas they exhibited at the previous meetings rather a doubtful manner, without, however, on any occasion saying much either way. Palmerston displayed the same overweening confidence, and the same desire to conceal whatever militated against his opinion. Besides talking of the success they had already obtained (which after all amounts to very little), he said he had seen somebody, who had seen somebody else, who knew RECEPTION OF THE FRENCH NOTE. that Louis Philippe was absolutely determined against war under any circumstances. It turned out that there was a despatch from Sir Charles Smith (between whom and Napier there is some jealousy or misunderstanding), in which he says that the position they occupy is of no use whatever, but is purely defensive, and if Ibrahim does not attack the Turks, and expose himself to a defeat, they can do nothing against him. This, however, Palmerston held cheap, because it did not square with his wishes. On the whole the result was satisfactory; and if anybody but Palmerston was at the Foreign Office, everything must be settled at once; but he is so little to be trusted that there is always danger while he is there.