[7] [This was the celebrated Note of which Thiers gave me a printed copy when I dined with him on the 8th October at Auteuil. I came back to Paris, sat up all night with a friend to translate it, and despatched it to England next morning. My translation appeared in the ‘Times’ on the same day the Note was given to Lord Palmerston—which was another grievance. It was a very lengthy document, recapitulating the whole conduct of France in this affair, but ending in a very tame conclusion. Unfortunately Lord Palmerston did not display the same moderation, and his Notes continued to be as acrimonious as ever.—H.R.]
I went almost immediately to Guizot, and told him that the reception of his note had given a new turn to the discussion, but that it had given the greatest satisfaction, and they were certainly not prepared for such a moderate communication. He laughed, shrugged his shoulders, and said, ‘He should think they were not,’ any more than he was, that nothing could equal his surprise at receiving it, that it was very ill written, ill arranged, and he owned to me, in confidence, that he thought it went even farther than it ought; farther than he (much as he desired peace) could ever have consented to go. He did not disguise from me, and almost said in terms, that he thought it very discreditable, and strikingly inconsistent with their previous language and ostentatious preparations. I said that I could not comprehend how such a note could emanate from the same quarter as all the denunciations and threats we had lately heard, and that though Thiers had, as everybody knew, a great deal of savoir faire, he would have some difficulty in defending both the note and the preparations. He seemed by no means sorry at the idea of Thiers having got into a scrape and dilemma, but not at all satisfied at the figure which France is made to act in the affair, and not much liking to play any part in the transaction. It is for this reason that he gave Palmerston the note without any remarks on its contents. When I asked him how it was all to be accounted for, he told me that the truth was, it was owing to the dissensions in the French Cabinet, and the determination of the King; and that it was the only mode by which an entire rupture in the Cabinet could be avoided. He said, however, that he would have preferred the rupture rather than a violent difference of opinion ending in such a measure. (At least as I understood him, but I am not quite clear as to his meaning on this point.) I told him that Palmerston would see him, and would (or ought at least to) speak to him in a very conciliatory tone; but that if he did not do so, if he was wanting in any proper expression of the sense of our Government of the conduct of that of France, and if he evinced any disposition to haggle and drive a bargain, he was not to believe that he expressed the sentiments of the Cabinet, but merely gave utterance to his own. We agreed that at all events the road to peace was still open, and could hardly be missed. He said, it depended on us, and only entreated that the communication we made to the French Government might be full, cordial, and satisfactory, giving them all the assurances they could require, setting their minds at rest as to Egypt, and generally in a tone as conciliatory and moderate as theirs to us. He earnestly deprecated the idea of any bargaining, and said that if Palmerston hinted at such a thing with him he must make his proposals directly to Paris, for he would listen to none such here. On the whole, he is well satisfied at the prospect of the preservation of peace, but very much dissatisfied, and even disgusted, at the manner in which this consummation is likely to be brought about; conscious and ashamed of the false position in which the Government of France is placed, probably by their own conduct from the beginning, but certainly by their violent and declamatory language, so full of invective and menace, their expensive and ostentatious preparations, and now their tame (and if it were possible they could be afraid), pusillanimous conclusion. He did not say a great deal, but what he did say was with energy and strong feeling, and these I am certain are his sentiments.
POLICY OF LOUIS PHILIPPE. The real truth I take to be that the King is the cause of the whole thing. With that wonderful sagacity which renders him the ablest man in France, and enables him sooner or later to carry all his points, and that tact and discernment with which he knows when to yield and when to stand, he allowed Thiers to have his fall swing; and to commit himself with the nation, the King himself all the time consenting to put the country in a formidable attitude, but making no secret of his desire for peace; and then at the decisive moment, when he found there was a division in the Cabinet, throwing all his influence into the pacific scale, and eventually reducing Thiers to the alternative of making a very moderate overture or breaking up the Government. The King in all probability knew that in the latter event Thiers would no longer be so formidable, and that there would be the same division in the party as in the Cabinet, and that he should be able to turn the scale in the Chamber in favour of peace. It is probable that His Majesty looks beyond the present crisis, and sees in the transaction the means of emancipating himself from the domination of Thiers, and either getting rid of him, or, what would probably be more convenient and safe, reducing him to a dependence on himself.
Livermere, October 17th, 1840
All this week at Newmarket, where I received regular information of all that went on. Before I left town I saw Lord Holland and Lord John Russell. The latter expressed himself better satisfied than he had yet been, but was still doubtful how far Palmerston could be trusted. Palmerston made no communication to Guizot, and seemed resolved to interpose every delay, though everybody kept on urging that something should be done without loss of time. But he assured Melbourne that in a few days we should hear of the total evacuation of Syria, and that then we should be in a better condition to treat. His colleagues, however, began to get alarmed at these delays, and none more than Melbourne, who would not say or do anything to accelerate Palmerston’s movements, though he acknowledged to others that, so far from partaking of his confidence in the success of the operations in Syria, he expected no good news from that quarter. Palmerston went to Windsor, and there the Queen herself began to urge him more strongly than she had ever done, for she hears constantly from Leopold, who is mad with fright, and who imparts all his fears to her. All this did at last produce something, for there was a Cabinet the day before yesterday, at which a despatch to Ponsonby was read, in which he was desired to move the Sultan to reinstate the Pasha in the hereditary government of Egypt, and this had been shown to Guizot, who had expressed himself satisfied with it. This, it may be hoped, will be sufficient, for the Note requires no more than this, and it may be taken as an earnest of our desire to meet the wishes of France. If it only produces a pacific paragraph in the King’s speech the crisis will be over.
I do not quite understand how we can consistently send such an instruction to our Ambassador separately. The Sultan pronounced the deposition of Mehemet Ali by the advice of the Four Powers (that is, by that of the four Ambassadors), and I know not how we are entitled to do this act rather than any other without the concurrence of the rest. It was admitted that we could make no overture to France, no pacific communication even, without the consent of all. The Pasha has been solemnly deposed, all the Powers advised this measure, and now we are alone and separately recommending that he should be again restored to the government of Egypt. Russia may not coincide in this recommendation; his deposition from Egypt is now a part of the Treaty. Whatever was the secret intention of the parties, we are now bound,[8] if the Porte insists on it, to exert all our power to expel the Pasha from Egypt as well as from Syria. Such are the inconsistencies into which the precipitate violence of Ponsonby has plunged us.
[8] It is held (though this seems a nice point) that we are not bound.
Downham, October 23rd, 1840
From Livermere to Riddlesworth last Monday, and home to-day. This morning I learnt (by reading it in the ‘Globe’) the sudden death of Lord DEATH OF LORD HOLLAND. Holland, after a few hours’ illness, whom I left not a fortnight ago in his usual health, and likely to live many years.[9] There did not, probably, exist an individual whose loss will be more sincerely lamented and severely felt than his. Never was popularity so great and so general, and his death will produce a social revolution, utterly extinguishing not only the most brilliant, but the only great house of reception and constant society in England. His marvellous social qualities, imperturbable temper, unflagging vivacity and spirit, his inexhaustible fund of anecdote, extensive information, sprightly wit, with universal toleration and urbanity, inspired all who approached him with the keenest taste for his company, and those who lived with him in intimacy with the warmest regard for his person. This event may be said with perfect truth to ‘eclipse the gaiety of nations,’ for besides being an irreparable loss to the world at large, it turns adrift, as it were, the innumerable habitués who, according to their different degrees of intimacy, or the accidents of their social habits, made Holland House their regular and constant resort. It is impossible to overrate the privation, the blank, which it will make to the old friends and associates, political and personal, to whom Holland House has always been open like a home, and there cannot be a sadder sight than to see the curtain suddenly fall upon a scene so brilliant and apparently prosperous, and the light which for nearly half a century has adorned and cheered the world, thus suddenly and for ever extinguished. Although I did not rank among the old and intimate friends of Holland House, I came among the first of the second class of those who were always welcome, passed much of my time there, and have been continually treated with the greatest cordiality and kindness, and I partake largely and sincerely of the regret that must be so deep and universal.
[9] Lord Holland said, just before he died, to the page, ‘Edgar, these Syrian affairs will be too much for me. Mehemet Ali will kill me.’