It is not very easy to ascertain what the feeling is in Russia about the war, but there is reason to believe that the nobles are getting very sick of it, and are very discontented with the Emperor, not so much for having engaged in it as for the manner in which it has been carried on. At St. Petersburg there prevails an intense hostility to us, and great wrath against Austria, and instead of yielding, or any thought of it, the notion is that they mean to redouble their efforts next year, and bring into the field far greater forces than they have yet done. I perceive that the question of the disposal of the Crimea (when we get it) is still undecided. Some fancy that we ought to hold it, as a great advantage to have the power of offering it back to Russia when the question of peace arises. I am more inclined to the other view, of destroying the place, and if possible the harbour, and, after carrying off or destroying all the ships, to abandon the peninsula and leave the Russians to reoccupy it if they please. This would be very consistent with the object with which the war was professedly undertaken, and the Crimea, without Sebastopol and without a fleet, would be no longer formidable to Turkey for many a year to come; but no doubt there would be difficulty in this as in any arrangement, and much difference of opinion, not unlikely to produce dissension, amongst our allies and ourselves. There is good reason to believe that our late naval attack on the forts was a blunder, and that it did no good whatever. If Lyons had been in command, he probably would have declined to make it, and he could have ventured to exercise his own discretion, which Dundas could not. Then it was very badly arranged, and this was the fault of the French Admiral, who at the last moment insisted on altering the plan of attack, and (contrary to the advice of all his officers) Dundas gave way to him. In this, however, it is not fair to blame the English Admiral, who may have acted wisely; for his position was delicate and difficult, and he had to consider the alliance of the countries and the harmonious action of the two fleets, as well as the particular operation.
BALAKLAVA.
November 14th.—Yesterday morning we received telegraphic news of another battle, from which we may expect a long list of killed and wounded. The affair of the 25th, in which our light cavalry was cut to pieces, seems to have been the result of mismanagement in some quarter, and the blame must attach either to Lucan, Cardigan, Captain Nolan who was killed, or to Raglan himself. Perhaps nobody is really to blame, but, if any one be, my own impression is that it is Raglan. He wrote the order, and it was his business to make it so clear that it could not be mistaken, and to give it conditionally, or with such discretionary powers as should prevent its being vigorously enforced under circumstances which he could not foresee, or of which he might have no cognisance.
It is evidently the plan of the Russians to wear out the allied armies by incessant attacks and a prolonged defence, sacrificing enormous numbers of men which they can afford, but considering that they gain on the whole by the disproportionate, but still considerable, losses they inflict upon us. It is quite on the cards, if they can keep up the spirit of their men, who show great bravery though they cannot stand against our's, that they may cunctando restituere rem, and compel us at last to raise the siege, and at St. Petersburg they are very confident of this result. Here, though people are no longer so confident and elated as they were, no human being doubts of our ultimately taking the town.
Yesterday we had rather an amusing scene in the Court of Exchequer at the nomination of sheriffs, which does not often supply anything lively. The Head of Caius College, Cambridge, and this year Vice-Chancellor, was on the list, and Judge Alderson vehemently protested against his remaining there. A long discussion ensued, in which almost everybody took part, whether his name should be kept on or not, and if he should be struck off the roll. At last Alderson moved he should be struck off, to which somebody moved as an amendment (a course I suggested) that he should be omitted, but not struck off. It was to be put to the vote, when I asked if Alderson himself could vote, whether it was not a meeting of the Privy Council, at which the judges attended to give in names for sheriffs, and that Privy Councillors only could vote as to the choice of them. Alderson vehemently denied this view, and asserted that it was no meeting of the Privy Council, the proof of which was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer took precedence of the Lord President, and that the puisne judges had a right to vote. They then desired to see the Act of Richard II., which the Chancellor examined and read out, and afterwards he gave it as his opinion that the judges could vote, and this opinion was acquiesced in by the rest. Ultimately they all agreed, Alderson included, to accept the course I had proposed, and the Doctor's name was omitted from the list, but not struck off the roll.
November 15th.—The Duke of Bedford tells me that Lord John is in a better frame of mind than was apprehended not long ago, by no means satisfied with his own situation, and complaining of much that appertains to the Government, but conscious that his position cannot be altered at present, and not at all disposed by any captious conduct to break up or endanger the Government itself. With regard to Reform he is extremely reasonable, feeling the difficulty of his own antecedents in regard to the question; he is ready to conform himself to the necessities of the case, and does not think of urging anything unreasonable and impracticable. He is naturally enough very anxious that the Government should manage their affairs in Parliament better this year than last, and not expose themselves to so many defeats and the mortification of having their measures rejected or spoilt, and his notion seems to be that they should introduce and announce fewer measures, only such as are urgent and generally desired, and such as they may reasonably expect to carry, and, having taken that course, to stand or fall by them; this is the wisest and most becoming course, and I hope it will be adhered to and succeed. Its success depends very much on Lord John's own conduct, and the way in which he treats the Whig and Liberal party. I hear nothing of the intentions and expectations of the Opposition, but Lyndhurst tells me he considers them extinct as a party and in no condition to get into power. He spoke very disparagingly of Disraeli, and said his want of character was fatal to him, and weighed down all his cleverness.
BATTLE OF INKERMAN.
November 16th.—A telegraphic despatch arrived from Raglan with account of the battle of the 5th,[1] from which we learn only that we were entirely successful in repulsing the Russian attack, but that our loss was very great. Another long interval of suspense to be succeeded by woe and mourning; but besides the private misery we have to witness, the aggregate of the news fills me with the most dismal forebodings. Raglan says the Russian force was even greater than at Alma, and vastly superior to his own. Menschikoff says that he is assembling all his forces, and preparing to take the offensive, that their numbers are very superior, and he confidently announces that he shall wear us out, and that our army cannot escape him. I do not see how the siege is to be continued by an army itself besieged by a superior force and placed between two fires. The reinforcements cannot possibly arrive in time, and even if they were all there now, they would not be sufficient to redress the balance. I dread some great disaster which would be besides a great disgrace. Whether every exertion possible has been made here to reinforce Raglan, or whether anything more could have been done, I cannot pretend to say; but if matters turn out ill there will be a fine clamour, and principally from those rash and impatient idiots who were so full of misplaced confidence, and who insisted on precipitating our armies on the Crimea, and on any and every part of the Russian territory, without knowing anything of the adequacy of our means for such a contest. To overrate the strength and power of the allies, and to underrate that of Russia on her own territory, has been the fault and folly of the English public, and if they find themselves deceived in their calculations and disappointed in their expectations, their rage and fury will know no bounds, and be lavished on everybody but themselves. In the height of arrogance few exceptions were found to those who imagined it would be quite easy to crumple up Russia, and reduce her to accept such terms as we might choose to impose upon her. All the examples which history furnishes were disregarded, and a general belief prevailed that Russia would be unable to oppose any effectual or prolonged resistance to our forces combined. When the successes of the Turks at the beginning of the war became known, this confidence not unnaturally became confirmed, and boundless was the contempt with which the Russians were treated; and the bare idea of granting peace to the Emperor except on the most ruinous and humiliating terms was scouted. We now see what sort of a fight the Russians can make; and though the superhuman valour and conduct of our troops still inspire confidence and forbid despair, it is evident that we have rashly embarked in a contest which from the nature of it must be an unequal one, and that we are placed in a position of enormous difficulty and danger.
[1] [The battle of Inkerman was fought on November 5.]
November 23rd.—Last week at Savernake and at The Grange; came back on Tuesday; and yesterday morning arrived the despatches with an account of the furious battle of Inkerman, in which, according to Raglan's account, 8,000 English and 6,000 French resisted the attack of 60,000 Russians, and eventually defeated and drove them back with enormous loss, our own loss being very great. The accounts of Raglan and Canrobert do not quite agree as to the numbers engaged, but, admitting that there may be some exaggeration in the estimate of the numbers of the Russians and of their loss, it still remains one of the most wonderful feats of arms that was ever displayed; and, gallantly as our troops have always behaved, it may be doubted if they ever evinced such constancy and heroism as on this occasion—certainly never greater. My brother lost his youngest and favourite son in this battle—a boy of 18, who had only landed in the Crimea a few weeks before, and who was in a great battle for the first and last time. This is only one of innumerable instances of the same kind, and half England is in mourning. It is dreadful to see the misery and grief in which so many are already plunged, and the universal terror and agitation which beset all who have relations engaged in the war. But the nation is not only as warlike as ever, but if possible more full of ardour and enthusiasm, and thinking of nothing but the most lavish expenditure of men and money to carry on the war; the blood that has been shed appears only to animate the people, and to urge them to fresh exertions. This is so far natural that I, hating the war, feel as strongly as anybody that, now we are in it, and our soldiers placed in great jeopardy and peril, it is indispensable to make every possible exertion to relieve them; and I am therefore anxious for ample reinforcements being sent out to them, that they may not be crushed by overwhelming force.