TRANSFER OF INDIA TO THE CROWN.
December 7th.—I called on Lord Grey in the morning and dined with Lyndhurst in the evening, and had much talk with both of them about the pending questions, Reform, India, Bank Act. Lord Grey is bringing out a book upon Reform. Lyndhurst is decidedly against any strong and subversive measure about India, and is for improving and not upsetting the present system. Public opinion, led by the Press, has hitherto leant to the dissolution of the Company and the Directorial Government; but as time advances and the extreme difficulty of concocting another system becomes apparent, people begin to dread the idea of destroying an ancient system, without any certainty of a better one replacing it, and I think there is a general feeling of alarm at the notion of the Indian Empire being placed under the direction of such a man as Vernon Smith; more, indeed, than is quite just and called for, as his talents, though of a second-rate calibre, are not so low as is supposed, and he is not the cipher in his office he is thought to be, but is well enough acquainted with all its details, and always able to explain everything to the Cabinet clearly and correctly. But these merits, which are those of a diligent clerk, are far from being sufficient to qualify him for having the direction of an office which circumstances have rendered by far the most important and difficult in the whole Government. Till recently the Board of Control has been looked upon as a very subordinate department, and one of mere routine, which anybody might fill. I remember when John Russell offered it to Graham some years ago, he treated the proposal as an insult.
December 8th.—I went to the House of Lords last night and heard for the first time Ellenborough speak—an admirable style of speaking. It was a good night for Canning. The 'Times' has turned right round and defends him, finding the Government are in earnest in doing so. The account of Lucknow just come by telegram is very alarming, and keeps one in a state of nervous excitement, difficult to describe.
London, December 17th.—Though the last advices from India were satisfactory as far as they went, it is generally understood that the next mail must bring the account of a bloody battle at or near Lucknow, in which, though no one doubts that the British will be victorious, it is certain that there will be great loss of life. Sanguine people and the Press, with hardly any exception, imagine that this anticipated victory will terminate the contest and leave only some straggling conflicts to go on for a short time longer, ending by a speedy suppression of the rebellion. In this expectation I do not share, but, on the contrary, believe it will be a protracted affair, not indeed doubtful in its ultimate result, but which will cost as much time and money and many men, for all who know anything of the matter tell us that the wear and tear in India is enormous, and that a continual stream of reinforcements must be poured into the country to keep the army in a state of efficiency. Captain Lowe, lately aide-de-camp to poor George Anson, and who was in the storm of Delhi, an intelligent officer, confirms all these notions, and he says that nothing can be more inexpedient than the scheme, propounded here with great confidence, of forming the native force, on which we are hereafter to rely, of Sikhs instead of Hindoos. He says that inasmuch as they are very brave and excellent soldiers, it would only be to place ourselves in a state of far greater danger and uncertainty, for though the Sikhs have proved very faithful to us, and rendered excellent service, it is impossible to predict how long this humour may last, and whether circumstances may not arise to induce them to throw off our yoke and assert their own independence. It is marvellous and providential that on this occasion the Sikhs were disposed to side with us instead of against us, for if they had taken the latter course, it would have been all up and nothing could have saved us. � propos of this consideration he told me a curious anecdote. A Sikh was talking to a British officer in a very friendly way, and he said, 'Don't you think it very strange that we, who were so recently fighting against you, should be now fighting with you? and should you be very much surprised if a year or two hence you should see us fighting against you again?'
CONVERSATION WITH MR. DISRAELI.
Disraeli called on me a day or two ago, when we had a political chat. He talked with much contempt of the present Government, except of George Lewis, of whom he spoke in the highest terms. He said Palmerston's popularity was of a negative character, and, rather more from the unpopularity of every other public man than from any peculiar attachment to him; he talked bitterly of Derby's having declined to take the Government in 1855, which he seemed to consider as an irreparable blow to his party. He is evidently not without hopes that the Government may find themselves in some inextricable difficulty about their Reform Bill, and thinks they will be incapable of concocting an India Bill which will go down with the country. He does not appear to have made up his mind what course to take on the Indian question, and it is evident that at present the Tory party have decided on nothing. The Cabinet has committed the scheme of Reform to a select number of its members, as was done in 1830, but what they are doing about India I do not know. There is certainly a difference of opinion amongst them, as there no doubt is about Reform, but as little doubt that they are all agreed upon not letting their conflicting opinions break up the Government.
December 21st.—I called on George Lewis the day before yesterday and had a long talk with him. He told me that Palmerston had given notice to the Chairs that the Government had come to the resolution of bringing in a Bill to put an end to their dominion, and that the plan was to have an Indian Secretary of State with a Council, and the Council to have the distribution of the patronage. I was surprised to hear him say that he saw no difficulty in the settlement of the Indian question, either in passing it through Parliament or in producing a good measure which would work better than the present system, and he said he wished the other great question they had upon their hands, that of Reform, was as easy, but that the more they went into it, the more difficult it appeared. I need not enter into the details which we discussed, as the Bill is not yet settled, and in a few weeks more it will come forth. He said that the great misfortune was their having thrown out Locke King's motion this year, for if they had done what they had originally intended with regard to it, they should in all probability have laid the question at rest for ten years longer at least, and he then told me a curious anecdote on this matter, giving an example of strange levity and incapacity on the part of the Government. When Locke King brought forward his motion, it was considered in the Cabinet, and they came to a unanimous resolution to let his bill be read a second time, but to oppose the amount of his franchise in Committee and raise it from 10l. to 20l., which they had no doubt they should carry. On the very night on which the question was to be moved Lewis went down to the House of Commons with this understanding, never dreaming that any alteration was contemplated, when George Grey said to him, 'You know Palmerston is going to oppose Locke King's motion' (for leave to bring in his Bill). Lewis expressed his surprise, and asked what had happened to set aside the unanimous agreement come to in the Cabinet. Grey said there had been a dinner at Charles Wood's, at which certain Ministers were present (whom he named, but I forget if Palmerston was one), when the question had been discussed, and the result had been to make a change in their opinions, and Palmerston had agreed that Locke King should be opposed in limine. This Lewis told me he regarded as a fatal error, to which they owed the dilemma in which they found themselves placed. But what struck me most was the mode of doing business of such importance, and that there should not be found a single individual to protest against it, and to resign his office rather than to submit to be so dragged through the mire; but the present doctrine seems to be that Palmerston's Government must be held together at any price, and this is the more curious when it is obvious to me that his colleagues, while conscious of the difficulty of doing without him, have an exceedingly mean opinion of his intrinsic value. I told Lewis all that Disraeli had said to me about him as well as about Palmerston, when he expressed his surprise at the manner in which Disraeli had spoken of him, for which he was not at all prepared, but said he estimated Palmerston at his real worth. He told me of Harrowby's resignation on account of his health, and that his place had been offered to Clanricarde, and wanted to know if I thought Clanricarde would be objected to.[1] We talked of the stories which John Russell had heard of, about our being on bad terms with France, and the Emperor Napoleon out of humour with us, and of Palmerston's meditating hostile designs against Russia, all of which he said were pure fabrications, as we were on the best terms with France, and Palmerston entertained no hostile designs against Russia or any other Power. We both agreed that our hands were too full to think of any fresh quarrels or aggressions, and I found him of the same opinion as myself about our arbitrary and dictatorial system, and of the mischief it had done, and as much with reference to the slave trade as any other question.
THE CASE OF THE 'NEWPORT.'
I told him of the slave case just decided in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and of the sum of money it would cost our Government, to say nothing of the mortification. He said no doubt Palmerston would proclaim it to be a wrong decision, and would defend the Foreign Office and all the agents who had been concerned in the outrage.[2]
[1] [The Earl of Harrowby held the office of Lord Privy Seal. He was succeeded by the Marquis of Clanricarde, which proved a very unpopular appointment.]