489. General Butler in New Orleans.—General Benjamin F. Butler took command of New Orleans as military governor, and Farragut’s fleet passed on and soon opened the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg. The war governor with great difficulty wrought order out of chaos by a policy that was much criticised for its severity. One of the citizens defiantly pulled down the American flag, whereupon the general, after the offender had been duly convicted of the act, ordered him to be hanged. In other ways, he made it evident that the authority of the United States was not to be trifled with; but some of his orders naturally gave much offense to the people of the South. His services to the city from the point of view of sanitation are, however, generally acknowledged to have been very noteworthy.
THE WAR IN THE EAST.
General George B. McClellan.
490. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac.—In the East, the campaigns of 1862 were far less successful for the Union than were those in the West. McClellan,[[217]] whose successes in West Virginia had brought him rapidly forward, succeeded Scott, in November, 1861, as general in chief of all the armies. While, during the winter, he was successfully organizing the forces of the East, his direction of the Western armies was confusing and unsatisfactory. For this reason, and also because of his attitude toward the President, which seemed to be characterized by insubordination, his authority was limited to the Army of the Potomac. The number of parallel rivers and the swampy nature of much of the ground between Washington and Richmond, as already described (§ [460]), gave excellent opportunities for defensive warfare, but made an offensive campaign, especially in the vicinity of Richmond, exceedingly difficult. The Federal government was in favor of a direct advance, such as was afterwards made by Grant; but McClellan strongly recommended a transfer of his army to the Peninsula between the York and the James rivers, and an advance upon Richmond from the southeast. Lincoln very reluctantly yielded to this plan, which had the disadvantage of separating McClellan from the forces that were to protect Washington.
491. Unfortunate Division of Forces.—Unfortunately, also, this arrangement resulted in the Union’s having in the field in the East four separate armies, under independent commanders: that under McClellan in the Peninsula; that under McDowell for the immediate protection of Washington; that under Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, to prevent the Confederates from crossing the Potomac; and that under Frémont in the passes leading to West Virginia. By reason of the ease with which the Confederates could move on interior lines from one point to another, it was possible to strike either of the Union armies with a large Confederate force before a Federal combination could be formed. Hence, though the Confederates were really much inferior in numbers, they were generally able, in the battles that ensued, to attack with a superior force. The Confederates had the further advantage of being in their own country, where every movement of the Federals was easily ascertained. In the early spring, the Union force numbered about two hundred thousand, while the Confederates had scarcely one hundred thousand; but the latter, by the conscription act of April 15, increased their forces considerably.
General Joseph E. Johnston.
492. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign.—McClellan, with an army one hundred thousand strong, reached the lower Peninsula, between the York and the James, early in March. Here he found himself confronted by General Joseph E. Johnston[[218]] at Yorktown, and later at Williamsburg. Johnston’s force was less than a third of McClellan’s, yet McClellan decided not to attack, but to employ an engineer’s slow methods of siege. If a resolute attack had been made, Johnston would probably have been defeated, and McClellan would have been free to advance up the James. Johnston watched his adversary closely, well knowing that when McClellan’s siege works were ready they could not be resisted. Meanwhile the Confederate force was constantly increasing, and a precious month was gained for drilling their new recruits. On May 3, three days before McClellan was to attack, the Confederates evacuated Yorktown. McClellan ordered Hooker to pursue. Overtaking Johnston at Williamsburg, Hooker was repulsed, after which Johnston retreated rapidly towards Richmond. McClellan followed with such slowness that fourteen days were consumed in marching less than fifty miles. During the whole of these two months, he enormously overestimated the force by which he was confronted and continually asked for reënforcements. On the 17th of May, Lincoln ordered McDowell to join McClellan, but the order was not carried out, for reasons that will now be given.
